

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

TWELVE YEARS IN A MONASTERY

LIFE IN A MODERN MONASTERY

CHURCH DISCIPLINE

PETER ABÉLARD

ST AUGUSTINE AND HIS AGE

TALLEYRAND

GEORGE JACOB HOLYOAKE

THE IRON CARDINAL

THE DECAY OF THE CHURCH OF ROME

BY

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
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THE DECAY OF THE CHURCH OF ROME

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

IS the Church of Rome gaining or losing ground in the worn field of religious controversy?

No other issue, perhaps, in the spiritual struggle of our time attracts a wider interest, yet is concealed from the inquirer by a more perplexing tangle of contradictory statements, than this. To many the Church of Rome seems to silence all question by its display of vitality. Growing outward from the most fascinating city in the world, sending its roots deep into the life of the past 2000 years, spreading its branches to the outer limit of the five continents, it gives one an instinctive feeling of strength and endurance. It has survived the fiercest storms that have swept over Europe for many ages. Ancient Rome, at least in the days of Diocletian, employed its vast energy to tear it from its soil, yet in a century's time it looked down on the ruins of the Western Empire. It stood proudly out from the barbaric waves that rolled down from the north, and gathered from them greater force than ever. It flourished through the lethal degradation of the next five centuries, and drew fresh energy from the menacing revival of intellectual life. It reeled for a moment at the mighty upheaval of the Reformation, and then produced a power that almost

restored its proportions. It came almost unscathed, apparently, out of the first revolutionary fires of a century ago. Is it possible that it will succumb to the new and subtler forces that seek to loosen its great frame in our time?

It is hardly surprising that, with so wonderful a history, the Church of Rome should still impose, even on many who wholly reject its creed, a firm belief in its solidity and durability. The prophecy with which Macaulay flattered it in a rhetorical mood has been repeated, in less graceful and more sincere terms, by social observers of the most diverse schools. The more jealous adherents of other Christian bodies have not indeed been disposed to share that belief, save in the sense that Rome will lose its proper characters, and merge, an indistinguishable element, in the federal Church of the coming time. But social students who regard the religious movements of our age from neutral eminences have been remarkably unanimous in the expectation that Rome will outlive all the other Christian bodies. The Positivist pays Rome the tribute of borrowing what he thinks to be her imperishable forms. The Rationalist is almost always convinced that, in his familiar phrase, the last stage of his war will be the struggle of Rome and Reason. The new science of sociological anticipation is entirely with them. Mr H. G. Wells foresees a decay of Protestantism and growth of Catholicism in the twentieth century; he announces to us that processions of shaven monks will be more familiar on the moving platforms of the tense cities of the twenty-first century than they are in the streets of Europe to-day.

In this state of public feeling the Protestant is apt to take alarm at every parochial increase of Catholicism, and join with trepidation in the common cry of papal

expansion. Little reflection is needed, however, to discover that this common expectation of an increase of Romanism does not rest on statistical inquiry, but on much frailer considerations. To the Positivist indeed it should be evident that, in sharing Roman forms, he has incurred a share in Rome's decay. Nor is the Rationalist more fortunate in the grounds of his conviction. Rome alone, he says, rejects the modern clamour for the use of reason in religious matters, and bids its followers establish their allegiance rather on the sentiment of faith and the dictates of authority. Where the corrosive action of reason is admitted, he urges, dogma surely decays; and the day will come when those who indulge private judgment will find the ground eaten from under them, and the more emotional will shrink in alarm into the temple of Romanism, there to meet the last tide on the massive rock of authority. The flaw of the theory is that its starting-point is wholly false. The Roman Church has more than once warmly rejected the notion that she asks her followers to rebuke reason and stand by faith alone. Her theologians in fact denounce as "Protestantism" the theory that faith is an emotion, and not a deliberate adhesion of the informed judgment.¹ Time after time the Church has compelled those of her apologists who inclined to depreciate reason to subscribe to the proposition that "reason precedes faith and prepares the way for it." Thus the whole Rationalist anticipation of her success is groundless and negligible.

In more specious language the historian and the social observer put forward their belief in the durability of Rome. The non-Roman Churches, they urge, are temporary and comparatively frail structures, built in a moment of heated dissent, out of the material

¹ "Theologia Dogmatica," H. Hurter, S.J., i. 472.

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of the older Church ; and they declare that the motive for this dissent and for the erection of separate Churches—the corruption of Rome—is gradually losing its force. Many ages ago the Romans doomed the great Flavian Amphitheatre to decay, and built churches and houses out of its denuded fabric. Their little structures are tumbling into ruin to-day, or have long since crumbled into dust, and the massive Coliseum rises in silent triumph over their puny remains. The pyramids of Gizeh have been despoiled by the builders of many ages ; but their enduring mass has looked down on the decay of one generation of despoilers after another. So, the social prophet says, will the colossal framework of the Roman Church look down on the crumbling fabric of the dissenting bodies.

But the spectacle of the Coliseum looking down on the shrunken churches at its feet is hardly a congruous figure of the situation. Rome has now far less than 200,000,000 followers : the Protestant Churches have some 300,000,000. Indeed the theory that the Protestant Churches are no more than embodiments of temporary revolts against passing abuses that were detected in an enduring system is a very superficial one. It accords neither with the broad features of religious evolution nor with the facts of religious psychology. Buddhism, Confucianism, Mohammedanism—nay, Christianity itself—had the initial character of a protest or revolt, yet the life-giving motives and the structures endure. In nearly all the great schisms of religious history the virility has passed into the dissenting body.

We must abandon all hope of forming a sound forecast of Rome's future on these speculative grounds, and approach the subject on the lines, and in the temper, of ordinary sociological research. The pro-

cedure is more profitable, if more laborious and less artistic, and the conclusion is far more interesting. One has to sift the literature of many lands for positive indications of Rome's position, but they are at length discoverable in sufficient abundance to yield a very safe, and a somewhat startling, conclusion. I may formulate at once the thesis that will be rigidly demonstrated in the following chapters.

Instead of showing signs of increase, the Church of Rome is rapidly decaying, and only a dramatic change of its whole character can save it from ruin.

Recent religious statistics assign, on the average, some 250,000,000 out of the 550,000,000 Christians of the world to the rule of the Vatican.¹ If this estimate were even approximately correct, we should find the utterances of the present head of the Roman Church not a little perplexing. A few years ago Rome lost the ablest pontiff it has had in modern times, and over his remains the Catholic press chanted a psalm of triumph for the progress that their Church had made since the death of Pius IX. The successor of Leo XIII., a simple, honest, courageous bishop, more endowed with piety than diplomacy, then took up his station at the Vatican observatory. Surveying Italy and the Catholic world for the first time from that peculiar eminence, and after his first consultations with the chief officials of his Church, Pius X. broke into a remarkable lamentation. Only in the dark visions of Revelation could he find anything like the

¹ Benham's *Dictionary of Religions* estimates the Roman Catholics at 220,000,000. The same figure is given by a Dominican priest, Père Sertillanges. On the other hand a pseudo-statistical article in *The Strand Magazine* (August 1906) gives the number as 353,000,000—100,000,000 more than the most zealous Catholic claims! The utter futility of all these "statistics" may be gathered from the fact that they all assign 36,000,000 Catholics to France, where there are certainly not more than 6,000,000.

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spectacle unrolled before him. Every movement of his age betrayed to his saddened eyes the activity of Antichrist. Such sombre passages as these occur on every page of his first encyclical to the Catholic world :

"The present most afflicted condition of mankind did exceedingly affright us. For who does not know that now, more than in all past ages, the society of men is stricken by a most grave and deep disease, which, growing daily graver and eating it utterly away, hurries it to ruin ?

"It must needs be that he who ponders on these things will fear lest this perversity of men's minds may be, as it were, a foretaste and a beginning of the evils that are to be looked for in the last days."

Such profound dejection on the part of the man who knows best the real strength or weakness of his Church cannot be encouraging to our prophets ; and we shall see, as we proceed, that this first lamentation was only the prelude to a career of tragedy, as Pius X. saw how his adoption of spiritual weapons, instead of the carnal devices of his predecessors, only accelerated the pace of the catastrophe. The main purpose of this work is to discover the grounds of the Pope's pessimism, and see if it be anything more than the bursting of too inflated a hope. After minute and prolonged research in English, American, French, Italian, Spanish, Dutch and German works and periodicals, some personal acquaintance with Catholicism in several countries and a correspondence with well-placed observers in most countries, I am able to give a fairly precise account of the present position of Romanism, and to compare this with its position about the middle of the last century. The result is singularly interesting. One finds that instead of having made considerable progress during that time, it has *lost nearly a third of its dominion*. Moreover,

the process of decay has been increasingly accelerated of late years, and the causes of it are of such a character that there is no reasonable ground for a hope of arresting them during the pontificate of Pius X. The familiar figure of about 250,000,000 represents faithfully enough what the Roman Catholic population of our planet *ought* to be (really 270,000,000) if the Vatican had done no more than retain its followers of eighty years ago, and their children. But the figures and facts I have gleaned from the literature of Europe and America show that at least 80,000,000 *must be deducted from this total*, if it is to express, in any reasonable sense, the actual number of Roman Catholics. This is indeed a moderate expression of the Church's loss, and it was the discovery of this appalling leakage from his Church during the brilliant reign of his predecessor that wrung that simple cry of distress from the uncalculating pontiff. Romanism has entered upon a remarkable phase of disintegration.

This summary statement will be fully vindicated in the course of the following inquiry. For the moment I will give only a few of the larger indications that may reconcile the reader to so sensational a declaration.

It is usually thought that the Roman Church is making progress at least in England and the United States. That is quite easily shown to be not merely untrue but singularly opposed to the truth. In the relevant chapter we shall find American Catholics complaining that there has been a loss of ten, fifteen and even twenty millions in the States in the course of the nineteenth century, and mainly in the second half of the century. As to England, I published some years ago in *The National Review* a careful analysis of Roman Catholicism which made it clear that there has been a leakage in this country of about

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2,000,000 during the half century. France, of course, figures at the head of the list. If it be true—a point we will discuss—that there are only some 4,000,000 sincere Catholics left in France, as Sabatier maintains, and the political situation seems to imply, the loss here since the Second Empire must be counted in tens of millions. Several millions must be added to the loss from Italy. North Italy is lost to the Vatican, and Central Italy is throwing off its allegiance. Spain and the Spanish peoples of South America add several millions more to the list of seceders; and the leakage in Austria, Germany and other countries will bring the total well beyond the figure I have given.

But the numerical aspect of the result is not the most important for the serious and disinterested observer. The real strength of the Church is far below what its shrunken arithmetical total would suggest, however low a figure we may adopt. Time after time we find that the Church is utterly unable to carry its most cherished designs in countries where even the corrected statistics seem to give it a preponderant strength. I need only mention the situation in Italy or Mexico or Austria. Catholic Italians are now encouraged to vote, yet they have only exhibited their pitiful weakness. Mexican and other Spanish American Catholics show a similar impotence. This and other circumstances warn us that the figures we reach must be examined from a further point of view. Their cultural value must be estimated. We must see what is the proportion of children in them, and what the proportion of those illiterate, or poorly literate, masses whose creeds are little more deliberate than those of children. I do not mean that we should apply any high cultural test, as in that case the failures would always work out at about eighty per cent., in

all religions and apart from them. But compare a more or less educated and alert democracy with a quite or nearly illiterate one. Contrast Piedmont or Lombardy and Calabria: Prussia and Bavaria: France and Spain. The result is very ominous for the Church, and profoundly important for the social prophet. It shows that fully eighty per cent. of the actual supporters of the Vatican belong to the illiterate masses of the population; and we shall further discover that, in proportion as education is given to them, they tend to discard their allegiance to Rome. When you go on to analyse the figures, where it is possible, into men, women and children, you find another weakness in Rome's 180,000,000 followers.

Further comment on the results of my inquiry must be postponed until the conclusion, but I may at the outset express a hope that the inquiry has been conducted in the spirit of the historian or the social observer. Rome is still one of the great spiritual powers of the world, and any appreciation or forecast of social forces that shakes off our insular limitations must know it accurately. It has now shrunk far below Protestantism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Hinduism or Mohammedanism, in regard to the number of its followers, but it is the second great force in what we vaguely call our Aryan world. Apart from comparison, indeed, its internal development is one of very great interest. Romanism of the older type is obviously doomed. How will it choose between its proud attributes of immutability and immortality? What is the real nature of the process that is enfeebling it, and how far is it likely to go? These are high questions, and they who would answer them must have a very sure knowledge of Romanism to-day. Noticing that people's estimates of its recent fortunes and its present position are always vague, and generally

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contradictory, I have gathered together what indications can be found, and present them in this essay.

For convenience of arrangement I take the chief branches of the Roman Church in three groups: the churches of the Latin world, the English-speaking world, and the Germanic world. This grouping, with its vague allusion to philological divisions, does not affect my conclusions in the least, and is only adopted for the purpose of making a clear and orderly presentation of my material. It need, therefore, cause no surprise if I do not adhere rigidly to it, or if the ethnographer decline to sanction it.

CHAPTER II

THE LATIN WORLD—FRANCE

THE distinction, if not antithesis, of Latin and Teuton is a familiar one to the student of religious development in Europe, but I employ it with a warning to the reader that he must attach no psychic significance to it. I put Italy, France, Spain and Spanish America together because they are the lands one thinks of above all as "Catholic countries," and have some bond of language. Such a bond, however, is often found to indicate an enforced and external unity; lightly linking races of the most diverse character. The Romans engrafted their culture on very different stocks in Italy, Gaul and the Iberian peninsula, and the later immigrations of barbarians increased the distinctness of the three races that we sometimes unite with such facility.

From the point of view of this inquiry, however, the grouping is convenient and natural. The religious history of Europe has somehow accentuated the distinction between Latin and non-Latin peoples. Poland and Ireland apart (for political reasons), the civilised world of the sixteenth century fell into two fairly clean halves after the earthquake shock of the Reformation. One almost sees the old frontier of the early Roman Empire standing out once more. The appeals and menaces of the Reformers have little power beyond that frontier to shake the allegiance to the old capital of the Western Empire; while to the north of it the land is easily fired with rebellion against

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the enervated Roman court. Here and there provinces wavered, but the counter-Reformation quickly came to strengthen the instinctive feeling of loyalty to Rome, the more natural master, and the Latin peoples became the Catholic Church of modern Europe.

For three centuries the maps of the Vatican have coloured France, Italy and Spain with the blue of incorruptible fidelity. From them the missionary propaganda could be energetically pushed beyond the frontier. There is, perhaps, no one feature that more impresses the student with the power of the Roman organisation than this never-wavering effort, through ten generations, to recover the "lost provinces." Millions of lives and incalculable devotion have been expended in the struggle. But Rome's attitude in the meantime toward the faithful Latin races is less edifying. In Spain, behind the shelter of the Pyrenees, secure in the general illiteracy of the people, the Church of Rome has retained to our own day the open sale of indulgences that inflamed the moral sense of northern Europe four centuries ago. In Italy the Vatican has smiled indulgently on the licence of priests and people, fostered a most injurious system of mendicancy and almsgiving, and kept the mass of the people in a state of dense ignorance. In France, until the Revolution, the higher clergy purchased the favour of the powerful by ignoring, or generously sharing, their scepticism, their licence, and their feudal exactions, and enjoined patience and ignorance on the mass of the people.

A day will come when historians will wonder how the Vatican ever acquired a reputation for statesmanship. In the small, momentary ruses of diplomacy it has usually been able to command the services of skilful men, but its whole management of the Latin races has been devoid of any large statesmanship. In

spite of its imposing profession of a view that ranges over eternal things, it has lived from decade to decade like an Oriental, and has singularly failed in prevision. Its belief for instance that the great *Aufklärung* of the eighteenth century was but a passing gleam, and that it would never dawn on the mass of the people in Italy and Spain, shows neither inspiration nor human sagacity. At all events, few other rulers could have any doubt about it to-day, yet the Vatican still acts on the belief of Gregory XIII. The Pope of the twentieth century rebukes intellectual advance with peevish references to Antichrist, and meets the social revolt of the workers with the old maxims of resignation to the poor and philanthropy to the rich.

It is hardly surprising to find that the reaction is proceeding rapidly. France is more effectively lost than Germany was in the sixteenth century. In Italy rebellion is spreading along a line that, to the thoughtful observer, threatens to go far; it is following in the wake of popular education. In Spain the more alert and better-educated provinces are seething with anti-clericalism, and the movement spreads in proportion as schools are opened or improved. The circumstance is not only in itself a grave indictment of the Roman system, but, showing as it does an intellectual rather than an emotional revolt, it gives more promise of permanence. Jesuit intrigues and rhetorical appeals are useless in face of such a movement. It is already plain that the energy of the reaction is in proportion to the length of time during which the Church held the people with the narcotics of ignorance and social apathy.

"Catholic countries" are disappearing from the map of the world. That is the issue of the next four chapters.

The first and most resolute of the Latin races to

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cast off its allegiance to Rome was France. Natural as the rupture seems to us who look back on the long preparation for it—on the disintegrating action of the encyclopædists, the dynamite of the Jacobins, the politic reconstruction of Napoleon, and the folly of Louis XVIII. and Charles X.—it was little expected in France half-a-century ago. Wayward and petulant as she had always been, the “eldest daughter of the Church” seemed to have returned to a docile temper. French troops guarded Rome against the faithless Italians. French missionaries were the glory and the hope of the Propaganda. French offerings filled most of the *caisse* at the Vatican. French bishops carried the doctrine of papal infallibility. France seemed more likely to remain Roman than Italy. Yet in the course of a single generation the Church of France has fallen. “It is disappearing day by day,” says a French bishop. “We are reduced to an insignificant minority,” says a prominent abbé.

How this dramatic fall has come about, and how far it is a real, and not an apparent, transfer of allegiance, is the first point of inquiry. No one, I think, questions the shrinkage of the French Church.¹

Its complete political impotence is too obvious to admit a doubt of its decay. But it is important to make clear what were the proportions regained by the Church under Napoleon III., and to what actual proportions it has shrunk in our time.

Some of the most recent authorities that one would

¹ The Catholic *Month* (March 1908, p. 230) says: “It is absurd to imagine that the present Government in France has to deal with a majority, or even a well-organised and substantial minority, of practical Catholics. The bulk of the people simply do not care about religion.”

be disposed to consult on the condition of Catholicism in France assign, in the conventional way, 36,000,000 out of the 38,000,000 (now 39,250,000) inhabitants of the country to the Vatican. Thus Dr Jurashek, in one of the finest statistical works of recent years ("Die Staaten Europas"), and the last edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (which makes additional confusion by describing the remaining 2,000,000 as Protestants, whereas the Protestants number only 700,000). How grave authorities come to endorse such ludicrous statements is one of the mysteries of "religious statistics." So long as thirty years ago, at the last religious census, one-sixth of the population of France refused to describe themselves as Catholics, and the increasing weakness of the Catholics at every election since that time makes it obvious that the number of seceders has enormously increased.

The serious student of French history is quite prepared to hear of the decay of Romanism in the country. In spite of a remarkable series of changes in its fortunes, as it rose or fell on the great waves of French political life, the Church has steadily declined, since the days of Voltaire. It would be difficult to say how low it really fell during the great Revolution. The revolt was so predominantly social, and the conduct of the higher clergy and the monks had been so flagrantly anti-social, that millions might show a bitter anticlericalism, yet retain their faith. Taine affirms that even in the sombre days of 1793 the bulk of the workers of Paris were Roman Catholics. We need not linger over the point. Whatever the loss may have been, Napoleon's reinstatement of the Church and rich endowment of the clergy made France a Catholic country once more. The ignorant masses returned to their *curés*, and the follower of Voltaire or Diderot found a less congenial world than he had

done under Louis XVI. The restoration of the Bourbons completed the recovery of the Church. Free thought had caused the Revolution, men said, and it must be rigorously suppressed. The dainty noble hastened to lock it up in his heart, and to join with the clergy in a fierce and penetrating inquisition. The Voltairean has not, as a rule, the stuff of martyrs in him, and he almost ceased to propagate his opinions. He did indeed nurse, in secret, an angrier flame of revolt than ever, as he shrank under the brutalities of the "white terror"; but the prevailing tone was such at Paris, so late as 1838, that Talleyrand and others had to submit to the rites of the Church in order to secure decorous funerals.

In 1830 we find Lamennais claiming that there are 25,000,000 Catholics in France. Probably the figure is exaggerated, as the Church was then entering upon one of its recessionary periods. Fifteen years of folly and abuse of power had ended in the July Revolution, which naturally initiated a fresh outburst of anticlericalism. But the Church was saved, largely in despite of itself and of the Vatican, by the brilliant group of writers who waged in its service, under the reign of Louis Philippe, one of the finest and most successful crusades it has ever witnessed. Veuillot says that to see a young man enter a church at Paris in the thirties made much the same impression as the entrance of a Mohammedan would have done. By the forties the tide had turned. "Are we assisting at the funeral of a great cult?" an official had asked in 1830. Ten years later the same official observed that Catholicism seemed to be entering upon a period of prosperity equal to that it enjoyed in the thirteenth century. The struggle between the Voltairean and the preacher was essentially one of rhetoric, and the preacher won. In 1843 the clericals had "only one real friend in the

Chambre"¹; after the elections of 1846 they had 146, and they were equally successful in 1848. Napoleon's rival in 1849 was making a great effort to secure the support of the clericals, and the ex-Carbonaro was forced to favour them. They continued to make progress throughout the Second Empire, though Napoleon's Italian policy injured them. While they complained that he let the Piedmontese overrun Italy, his defence of Rome gave an impetus to anticlericalism.

The Revolution of 1870 offered only a momentary check to the advance of the Church, for the ghastly struggle of 1871 now prompted many Liberals to regard it as an ally in the repression of Jacobinism. Following the example of Thiers, says Anatole France, the younger bourgeois were for pacific co-operation with the clergy; though the revolt was now spreading rapidly amongst the workers and the peasantry. We shall have frequent occasion to deplore the extraordinary errors of statesmanship that mark the history of Rome in the second half of the nineteenth century, but few have been more fatal to it than the great blunder of its attitude towards the third Republic. At that time (Mr Bodley rightly observes in his "Church in France") the Church was in a much better position than it had been for many decades; and the middle-class Liberals were prepared to act with it, in view of the rising menace of the proletariat. The Chambre formed after the elections of 1871 was the most Catholic that France ever had in the nineteenth century. More than 500 deputies sat on the Right, and only about half that number on the Left. At the

¹ "L'Église de France et L'État," by the Abbé Bourgain. I follow this zealous Catholic writer almost entirely from 1830 to 1880, so that the reader may not suspect me of exaggerating the Church's recovery in order to exaggerate its present fate.

census of 1871 only 85,022 of the population described themselves as of no religion, and 580,750 as Protestants. No doubt, such figures must be regarded with great discretion. We shall have frequent occasion to distrust or reject census declarations of religion. But the whole of the available indications point to the preponderance of Catholicism in the country. Privileges were accorded to the Vatican that had been withheld in the reign of the fanatical Charles X. The papal nuncio was consulted in the nomination of bishops, and the Vatican appointed them almost as it pleased. Mgr. Dupanloup was all-powerful at Paris. The Chambre voted prayers to be said in all the churches in France, and declared the project of building a church on Montmartre to be "of public utility." An extraordinary series of measures favouring the clergy was passed between 1871 and 1875. Bishops were put on the Conseil Supérieur de l'instruction publique, and priests on the committees of public assistance. Sabatier cannot be far from the truth when he says that the Catholics numbered 30,000,000 out of 36,000,000 at that time. Even in 1876, the last year when the religious qualification was inserted in the census paper, 29,000,000 described themselves as Roman Catholics, and in the circumstances the figures have a weight that no one attaches to such declarations in modern Spain or Italy for instance.

The country was overwhelmingly Catholic in the early seventies. The statistics of the religious congregations will, perhaps, serve best to illustrate this. I will deal more fully with these bodies presently, but may here note their growth as a symptom of the strength of Catholicism in the sixties and seventies. Many of these monastic and semi-monastic bodies were permanently illegal in France throughout the nine-

teenth century. Jesuits, of course, crept easily enough through the bars of Napoleon's Concordat. In the reign of Charles X. a zealous, astute, intriguing body spread throughout the kingdom under the name of the "Peccaminaristes." Every child knew that they were the followers of St Ignatius. But the other unauthorised bodies had been less bold. They had only 14,000 members in France in 1877. By the end of the century they had increased to 75,000, besides "authorised" monks and nuns. In the fifties their property was valued at 50,000,000 francs: by 1880 the value had grown—on a moderate estimate—to 700,000,000 francs. This does not mean that Catholicism increased after 1870, but it does show the solidity and generality of the religious sentiment on which they thrive.

However, I do not know of any writer who would challenge the statement that in the early seventies the Catholics numbered at least 30,000,000 out of 36,000,000. We have thus one of the terms of comparison. The next point is to show that to-day they are certainly not more than 6,000,000 out of 39,000,000. To establish this I rely almost entirely upon the words of the French clergy themselves—which alone would suffice—or of writers who regard this appalling loss with concern, and are not likely to exaggerate it. Laborious proof may not seem necessary to some, as the expulsion of the religious congregations and the disestablishment of the Church are so fresh in the memory. A vast change has obviously taken place from the days when (in 1871) the deputies of the Right were twice as numerous as those of the Left, and legislated freely for the bishops. To-day, though allying themselves with political groups (Antisemites, Monarchists, Nationalists, etc.), that are often not peculiarly Catholic, the faithful in

France have been utterly unable to arrest the most deadly blow that has been aimed at their Church since 1790. At a time when every man with a spark of real faith in him was urged to vote against the ruling power, when the strangest of comrades were welcomed if they would but help to overthrow Combism, we must assume that the whole force of Catholicism was mustered; and there was never a moment's doubt as to the issue. They only proved themselves to be a negligible minority of the electorate. The nation was shown to be overwhelmingly non-Catholic. With a generosity that contrasts finely with the use that Catholics had made of power whenever they recovered it, the new France calmly broke the links that had bound it to Rome for the greater part of its history. So tiny were the flamelets of rebellion that followed this, one of the heaviest blows inflicted on Rome since the Reformation, that the French authorities genially sent their *pompriers* to extinguish them.

But the Church in France had meddled with political matters, and a captious apologist might suggest that French Catholics voted according to their civic rather than their religious sense, in spite of ecclesiastical orders and the dire peril of their faith. In any case, it will be interesting to run over the many positive indications that are found of the extraordinary weakness to which the Church has been reduced. One cannot read without a movement of pathos as well as amusement the successive declarations of the French clergy during the last three decades. During the eighties they are full of hope and energy. Their attempts to foist a foolish "Henri V." on the country, or to embroil France with Italy over the Pope's temporal power, have led to a strong anticlerical movement, and Gambetta's "*Voilà l'ennemi!*" has sonorous echoes. The proclerical majority in the *Chambre* sinks to a

minority in 1881. In ten years their parliamentary friends have sunk from 500 to 80. But they are still buoyant, and fight with redoubled energy. Secular education, civil marriage, divorce and other "products of the pit" are passed in the *Chambre*. In 1885 (when the elections have a complication of Chinese trouble) the Catholics return 204 members to their opponents' 380, and the anticlerical measures continue. In 1889 they blunder again—into the adoption of Boulanger—and the Right rises to 211 members (against 364). In three months Boulanger is flying across the frontier, and they sink down the last slope. In 1893 they return thirty-five *ralliés* and fifty-eight Conservatives. There is "a violent crisis," the Abbé de Broglie says; and another clerical writer, Dr Élie Méric, admits that "the people have for the moment lost in some districts the serene docility of faith." In 1892 Leo XIII. had tardily advised them to support the Republic—"There is the only corpse the Church is wedded to," he is reported to have said, pointing to the crucifix—and this is all they gain. They fight on and blunder on—into the Dreyfus affair (1897)—and a chill of despair comes over Catholic writers, as the century draws to a close, and Waldeck-Rousseau opens the last act.

"After thirty years," says the Abbé Naudet ("Pourquoi les Catholiques ont perdu la bataille"), "the Catholics of France have lost everything but their money." Two years later they will complain that they have lost that. "The faith of Christian France is disappearing day by day," says Mgr. Turinaz ("Les périls de la Foi"). The clergy have fought the great battle since 1870 with supreme devotion. They have contested every inch of ground in the secularisation of the Republic. They have often, in spite of their better judgment, obeyed implicitly every order

from the Vatican. And they have suffered the most signal defeat that was ever inflicted on a French army.

That their political fortunes faithfully reflect the rapid decay of their Church will be quite apparent from the authorities I will now quote, which put the position of the French Church beyond cavil. In the year 1894 Taine made the first conscientious attempt to estimate the decay of Catholicism in France. A more admirable authority on the subject could hardly be discovered than this profound social student, the historian of France in the nineteenth century, the Positivist who regarded the decay of faith with genuine concern.¹ He collected, as far as possible from Catholic sources, a large number of statistics and facts bearing on the condition of Catholicism. He was compelled to come to the conclusion—he came to it with great regret—that there were only between 7,000,000 and 8,000,000 Catholics left in France, and that, of the adult Catholics, there were four women to one man. “The workman,” he said, “has shaken off the obligations of the Church, and the peasant is shaking them off” (p. 147).

To follow Taine’s researches in detail—and indeed all that follow in this essay—one must remember that the tests of Catholicism are more easily applied than the tests of membership of a Protestant Church. The Protestant may be absent from service three Sundays out of four, and from communion for many years, without our needing to refuse him membership of his Church. With the Catholic it is entirely different.

To omit mass on one Sunday, without grave excuse,

¹ The results of his investigation are given in his “*Origines de la France contemporaine*,” vol. vi. Throughout the present work all quotations from books of which the title is foreign have been translated directly and literally by myself.

or communion at one Eastertide, is a mortal sin, entailing eternal damnation. To this terrible dogma the Church is absolutely pledged. No man who really subscribes to the teaching of Catholicism can habitually neglect the Sunday mass, or the Easter communion; or, at least, only a very vicious minority can do so. The number of Catholics who attend mass on Sunday (with a proportional allowance for very young children and the ailing) is the real number of Catholics in any town or country; and it is the same with the "Easter duty"—the communion that *must* be received about Easter. Except in certain parts of Catholic countries, where the clergy are too timid to insist on the law, and connive at wholesale abstention from mass, those who call themselves Catholic and evade these duties are few in number and are not entitled to the name. This must be kept clearly in mind throughout our inquiry.

As far as Paris was concerned, Taine was assured by a Catholic prelate that only 100,000 of the 2,000,000 inhabitants make their *Pâques*, or receive the Sacrament at Easter; and of these four out of every five were women. In other words, of the whole population of Paris over ten years of age (the age when the practice of communicating usually begins) only one female in twelve, and one male in fifty, observed this decisive command of the Church. No doubt, a larger number attended mass on Sundays, though Mgr. Turinaz ("Périls de la Foi") found the number extraordinarily low; and no doubt many were still vaguely Catholic, yet did not even attend mass; but these figures of the Easter communion are generally regarded by the clergy as most conclusive. Paris, like most large Catholic cities, has long borne its religion lightly, and allowed momentary political gusts to chill it, to say nothing of other disturbances. Some years

ago I attended high mass at the Madeleine, and saw a Frenchman leave the church (and presumably forfeit mass, and incur damnation) because an extra *son* was demanded of him for the use of a chair in the nave. But when all allowance for temperament and tradition has been made, when the figures have been proportionately augmented by the sick and the young, it remains true that barely a tenth of the Parisians were Catholic in 1894. Three-fourths of its children were still baptised, and three-fourths of its marriages and burials were still of a religious nature; but such ceremonies have too festive and social a character to outweigh the grave tests of the Sunday mass and Easter communion. And the proportion shrinks every decade. For the rest of France, Taine found that only one woman in four and one man in twelve gave practical indication of belonging to the Church of Rome. "In many villages the high mass on Sundays is attended only by women, and those often few in number, one or two troops of children, and a few old men," he says. It was not merely the workers of the large towns who had left the Church. At the large village of Bourron only 94 out of 1200 inhabitants made the Easter communion; in 1789 the proportion of communicants in that village had been returned as 300 out of 600. In fine, Taine's inquiries amongst his Catholic friends yielded the general result that, of the adult population (or, rather, the population over the age of ten) of France about 5,250,000 fulfilled the duty which the Church imposes as a solemn condition of membership. About one-sixth of the population of France being under ten, we may add 1,000,000 or slightly more children, and we have the total number of real Catholics in 1894 as about 7,000,000.

I have taken next the clerical criticisms of Taine that I could discover, and other clerical pronounce-

ments on the subject. The Abbé de Broglie set out to oppose him, but he brought no different statistics. He merely objects that the figures "seem to be exaggerated," and that he will not accept them. But he incidentally confesses that there is a "violent crisis," and a "real danger." In many places in the provinces there are no more *pratiquants* than at Paris, he says, and the women are beginning to desert the Church. Amongst the workers there is a nucleus of "Catholic Socialists," which is "small in number but solid"; the rest of the workers have "passed from indifference to hostility"; even in the rural districts the number of "fervent Catholics" is small. He reconciles himself to the situation on the ground that the efforts of their opponents have drawn off only the large body of merely conventional Catholics and left the "solid core." We shall see presently something of the solidity of the core.

Dr Élie Méric ("Le clergé et les temps nouveaux") wrote before Taine, in 1892, with the obvious aim of soothing the Catholic laity under the stress of their situation. There is no actual decadence in France, he says, but "owing to the frantic efforts of the sophists the people have lost for a moment, in certain districts, the serene docility of faith" (p. 52). He offers consolatory thoughts to the faithful. The first is that, whereas the religious houses in France in the eighteenth century were—he quotes the words of a French bishop to the king (p. 509)—"the resort of infamous brothel-frequenter," they have now, in 1892, 160,000 strict inmates of convents and monasteries in the country. That consolation did not long survive. His second point is that the Church has gained in other lands far more than it has lost in France. This is the favourite retreat of the French Catholic writer. É. de Vogüé. G. Fonsegrive and Père Sertillanges.

make the same point, while admitting the heavy loss in France. Méric says that the Catholic population of England has risen from 120,000 to 1,700,000 in the course of the nineteenth century. We shall see that in England the Church has really lost in that time about 2,000,000 followers. Père Sertillanges says that more than 20,000,000 have been added to the Church in America in the nineteenth century. We shall see that that is more nearly the measure of its loss there. These writers cleverly conceal what is due to large movements of population; and then describe their opponents as "sophists."

A more candid and more recent (1897) French clerical writer on the subject is the Abbé Dessaine, in his "*Le Clergé Français au vingtième siècle.*" His chapters made their first appearance in the Catholic periodical *Le Peuple Français*, and his book is approved by the Bishop of Laval. M. Dessaine is frank. Taine's figures, he says, were too flattering to the Church; or at least its condition is worse in 1897. "Ecclesiastical vocations diminish from year to year in frightful proportions, and nearly all the bishops raise a cry of alarm" (p. 7). There have been heroic efforts made to save France, but "the results are in heartrending disproportion to the efforts made" (p. 16). If by Catholics one means those who *practise* the Catholic religion they are in "an almost insignificant minority" (*une minorité presque infime*, p. 17). The Church has been sinking for a quarter of a century. "The total of baptised Frenchmen who are absolute strangers to any practice of religion, indifferent to every religious question, except when there is question of a scandal or some other trouble, would be stupefying" (p. 17). There has been an "incredible loss of faith" in the provinces that were once noted for their religion—provinces that are far

removed from the centres of irreligion and are well provided with clergy, such as Brittany. "The women are nearly as bad as the men." In a "Catholic" district with 2300 inhabitants he found that only 200 went to church on Sundays. "In the large towns the proportion is still sadder." He was himself *curé* of an urban parish with 21,000 inhabitants. Of these less than 1200 went to mass on Sundays. In a town that was regarded by its clergy as "one of the best in France" he found that not 100 men entered the chapel on Sundays in a parish of 5000 souls that he knew well. The very name of priest "excites rage and ridicule everywhere." Finally, in 1897, the Catholic schools still stood side by side with the secular schools. But, while there were 2,271,000 boys in the "godless" schools of the Republic, there were only 409,000 boys in the religious schools.

And these terrible and pathetic confessions are true. Since that time the stalwart Bishop of Nantes, Mgr. Turinaz, has added to the "cry of alarm" with his little brochure "Les périls de la Foi." "The faith of Christian France is disappearing day by day" is his summary conclusion. An article by a Catholic writer in *La Revue* (January 1902) confirms the estimate. Mr Bodley ("The Church in France," 1906) does not attempt to express the numerical strength of the Catholics in the country, but he points to many indications of their weakness. The trouble about M. Loisy, and even about the disestablishment of the Church, aroused, he says, far less interest in France than out of it. The Catholics, he insists, began the third Republic in a better position than they had had under the second, but "identified themselves with the most inept political party that ever irretrievably wrecked a powerful cause" (p. 51). He notices that the province of Burgundy has for many years returned

only one Catholic to the Chambre amongst its twenty-seven deputies; and this one, M. Schneider, is regarded mainly as a large and philanthropic employer of labour.

So far I have quoted only Catholic or pro-Catholic writers, but there are points of interest in works by the anticlericals Yves Guyot and Anatole France that deserve consideration. Guyot, in particular, whose "Bilan social et politique de l'Église" contains a large amount of statistical information, has some authoritative pages on the religious life of Paris. A recent Catholic writer, M. de Flaix ("La statistique des religions à la fin du XX^{me} siècle"), boldly describes Paris as "the greatest focus of religion on the earth," and Lucien Arréat ("Le sentiment religieux en France") informs his Catholic readers that so late as 1897 they were ninety-eight per cent. of the population. One wonders what religious writers really hope to gain by such statements. In 1901 M. Guyot made an inquiry into the church accommodation of Paris, and a very generous calculation of its churchgoers. Paris had then seventy-one parish churches, and a population of 2,714,000: one church to 28,225 inhabitants! The eleventh *arrondissement* had 239,149 inhabitants and three parish churches, with seating accommodation for 3300 collectively. If we allow twelve masses to each church on a Sunday morning, and assume that, on the average, the churches are three-quarters full, it would still be true that only a little more than ten in a hundred of the inhabitants went to church. In point of fact M. Guyot found only 950 (of whom only eighty-nine were adult males) assisting at high mass in the three churches together on 25th August 1901. Allowing 300 for each low mass (an exorbitant allowance); he finds that, at the most, only one in forty-three of the inhabitants (and these are for the vast

majority women and children) of the eleventh *arrondissement* at Paris is a practising Catholic.¹

As to the provinces, he quotes the Abbé Crestey ("L'esprit nouveau"), saying that in many parishes only three attend mass—the priest, the server and the sacristan (p. 33), "in half the country parishes, at most, one quarter of the peasants go to church regularly" (p. 37), and "of 36,000,000 Catholics we must strike off 25,000,000," and of the remaining 11,000,000 to whom he would allow the name, a very large proportion do not practise (p. 36).

Anatole France ("L'église et la République") gives a few indications of the state of religion in the provinces. He quotes from Jules Delafosse (a deputy of the Right), a description of a part of Limousin, where neither men, women nor children go to mass (p. 104). They are all baptised, and show no hostility to the Church; but they seem to listen with quaint placidity to its command to go to mass every Sunday under pain of eternal damnation. It is not for us to object if the Church numbers them amongst her children. M. Anatole France also quotes a Catholic journal *Le Briard*, which made a careful inquiry into the subject. It found that of the 216,000 inhabitants of La Brie, a rural Catholic province, there were only 50,200 practising Catholics.

A more satisfactory knowledge of religious life in the provinces may be obtained from an article by Léonce Hays in the *Revue Catholique des Églises* (July 1907). Here the life of a whole department, and by no means one of the more advanced, is minutely

¹ He notices the fact that at Paris civil funerals are still only twenty-three (now twenty-five) per cent. of the whole. This merely reminds one of festive and ceremony-loving Japan, where a man is always ushered into the world by Shinto priests and out of it by Buddhists. We must rely on the graver tests.

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analysed by a Catholic writer. The diocese of Angoulême, which he studies, is coextensive with the department of Charente, with a population of 351,000. So remote is it from Parisian life that as late as 1898 five of its six deputies were Bonapartist. It has 340 acting priests, but "celebrating his mass every morning in a quite empty church, not administering the sacraments sometimes for months at a stretch, and finding only a moderate amount of religion in the small section of his people who do their Easter duty and hear mass on Sundays, the priest of Charente needs a great deal of energy to maintain his activity and his fervour" (p. 398). In one parish of 500 souls only fifteen to twenty go to mass regularly on Sunday, or to communion at Easter; many of the others hear mass occasionally, and a large number twice a year. Most of them have their children baptised, and have religious marriages and funerals, but "from mere custom." This parish is "above the average, rather than an exception, in the diocese." In many parishes the only males to attend mass are "the sacristan, one or two old men, and a few children." Vespers are attended by only four or five, sometimes fewer, persons in many parishes. Most of the peasants work on Sunday morning (which is equally forbidden by the Church under pain of eternal damnation). The only district which affords precise figures of Easter communions claims 1290 out of 9150 inhabitants. A few districts are slightly better, but most are much worse than this. In a parish of 400 souls no one made an Easter communion in 1904. A parish of 1600 had thirteen Easter communicants, including one male.¹ M. Hays concludes that only 5 per cent. of the males over twelve, and 25 per cent. of the girls

¹ The one man who figures in so many parochial lists is, of course, the paid sacristan.

and women, fulfil this very grave obligation of the Catholic Church in the whole department; and the number decreases of late years. As to those who *do* go to communion, "it seems that their faith is not very ardent." When a *curé* was about to administer the sacrament to a dying *paysanne*, he asked if she believed in the Real Presence. "*Ni zou cré ni zou décré*" (I neither believe nor disbelieve it), she answered. The whole department, almost, is in a condition of blank religious indifference, and it is at least an average department of France in regard to religious practices. It differs from most of the other departments only in the fact that it scarcely shared the Catholic revival in the middle of the century. In its actual proportion of practising Catholics, and its sorry exhibition of the character of the few millions that remain "faithful," it is typical. It is a complete error to speak of a "solid core" remaining after the Church's losses.

In conclusion I turn again to a pro-Catholic writer who gives a general estimate of the strength of Catholicism in France—Paul Sabatier, in his "*Lettre ouverte à S. E. le Cardinal Gibbons*" (1907). The American prelate had used language of great violence in regard to the "tyranny" of the French Government, and had trusted that the French nation would rise against it. Sabatier, one of those cosmopolitan Protestants who have even affection for the Church of Rome, and watch its losses with regret, made a rejoinder that gently exposed the extraordinary ignorance of the situation on the part of American—and, we may add, English—Roman Catholics. The action of the French Government he described as wholly just and proper in substance, and humane, if not generous, in form. And to justify the reoccupation of ecclesiastical property by the Government (when the Pope

had forbidden the French Catholics to form the associations to receive it that they were generally willing to form), he wrote this interesting paragraph, which I translate literally :

"As long as the Church was a public service, it was endowed, like all the other public services of the country ; if, as we are assured by the men who speak with authority on this point, *the number of French Catholics is now not more than three or four millions*, it is perfectly just that the endowments the Church had when she had *ten times that number of followers* should return to the State" (p. 21).

Here, from the pen of a writer more deeply sympathetic to Catholicism than any other man who does not actually share it, a writer in close touch with the Catholics and of great authority on religious questions, we have a terrible statement of loss sustained. Sabatier confirms my estimate that earlier in the century the Catholics numbered 30,000,000 at least ; he goes far below my estimate of their actual strength. He attributes to them a loss of 27,000,000 souls. On the most generous calculation possible, he cannot be more than 2,000,000 out. That leaves an indisputable loss of 25,000,000 for the latter half of the century.¹

No wonder that, scarce as vocations are, the priests are abandoning the Church for lay employment in large numbers. In one recent year (1901) 348 priests seceded from the Church, as Professor Frommel wrote in *The Examiner*. In October 1907 these seceding

¹ Through a London clergyman in touch with the Parisian clergy I learn that they claim there were 5,000,000 Easter communions in France in 1907. The number, no doubt, has been generously rounded. But, even as it is, it would mean a Catholic population of only about 6,000,000. The Protestant bodies: number about 500,000 followers. The population is 39,252,267 (in 1906).

priests found themselves strong enough to establish a monthly journal, *L'Exode*, "organe du mouvement : Hors de Rome," which gives interesting details of the disruption of the greatest body of clergy the Roman Church ever possessed.

In the case of France, then, we can make a fairly precise determination of the fortunes of the Church of Rome. Within half-a-century it has fallen from the position of a Church of 30,000,000 in a population of 36,000,000 to a shrunken body of (at the most) 6,000,000 in a population of 39,000,000. It is, of course, a mere popular fallacy that the population of France is stationary. It has steadily though slowly increased, while the number of the faithful has rapidly decreased. In conclusion we may find it instructive to glance at the causes of the shrinkage, and to see if the remaining body does really constitute the "solid core" that it is represented to do.

In view of the fluctuations of religious life in France it is especially desirable to notice the causes of the present decay. Is France once more merely lying in the valley between two great waves of religious success? Is the fourth revolution to be as temporary in effect as the first three? No; the careful reader of French history will perceive much surer indications of permanence in the present attitude of France toward the Roman Church. It is no longer the expression of a mere superficial Voltaireanism or a passing political resentment. The revolution has been singularly free from what foreigners are pleased to regard as French levity of character or explosiveness of sentiment. It has been a cold, judicious, slow and temperate dismissal of the Church from the life of the majority of the nation. Even those social students, like Bodley or Sabatier, who regard that dismissal with concern, describe it as just and inevitable. In mind and heart

the nation has definitely turned away from Rome; and the fault is largely Rome's.

In all the countries that we are going to consider the chief and general cause of the decay of Romanism is the spread of culture. It is in the darker provinces of the world that loyalty to the Vatican remains strongest, in the completely illiterate districts of Spain and southern Italy, in the south and west of Ireland, the valleys of Bavaria, the remoter tracts of Canada, in South America, and so on. The moment these provinces are lit with some real dawn of culture—the moment, not only what is called elementary education, but real freedom to read, impulse to read, and modern books to read, are granted—the loyalty begins to wane. It is found that the familiar dogmas lie outside the world of serious intellectual occupation: that you can count on your fingers the men of great distinction in history, science or philosophy who even nominally respect Catholic doctrines like transubstantiation or infallibility. The people are assured that these intellectual leaders are too proud to submit, and so forth, but their sound sense resents the threadbare device. The enlightened world has travelled beyond the Middle Ages. The awakening masses will follow them.

This is the broad interpretation of the decay of Catholicism in all lands, but there are special causes or conditions in each country. In France the chief of these were, probably, the life of the conventual communities, the interference of the clergy in politics and the despotism of the papacy. I have quoted a French priest who, amidst the losses of his Church, found consolation in the fact that 160,000 monks and nuns found sustenance still in France. He seems to have had no suspicion that here was precisely one of the grievances of the French laity; but three years later

Waldeck-Rousseau opened the historic debates concerning them. It was found by the Government that the religious congregations had accumulated enormous wealth in the course of half-a-century. At the beginning of the Second Empire their property was valued at 50,000,000 francs : by the end of the century it had attained the value of 1,000,000,000 francs.¹

Besides this huge capital locked up in mortmain, many of the congregations had enormous incomes. The French nation decided to put an end to this irritating and economically unhealthy state of things, and the orders were mostly expelled, after being allowed time to realise their property.

In order to appreciate fully how much the debates on the religious congregations contributed to the decay of religion in France one must understand, not only that the wealth was out of all proportion to the professed condition of the monks, and was largely withdrawn from ordinary circulation, but that the full application of it was cloaked in a suspicious mystery, and the acquisition and control of it were in many respects most offensive. English journals often manifested a misplaced sympathy with the monks, where a closer knowledge of the facts would have filled their columns with resentment. The question is a large one. I can do little more than suggest its extraordinary features. No monks or nuns—the Jesuits and similar associations are not monks—can own any property, either individually or collectively.

¹ This is the Government estimate, on which Catholic orators threw endless ridicule. But it is certainly far short of the true value. There were then 17,000 of these religious establishments in France, with an *average* of ten inmates. To put the total value of their real estate at £40,000,000 is to ascribe to them an average value of £500. As a former monastic trustee, and one well acquainted with monastic life on the Continent, I do not hesitate to say that this sum should be at least doubled.

To do so would be, in their belief, the most deadly sin they can commit. Who, then, is the owner of the property they hold? The debates of Catholic jurists on the point have a Gilbertian aspect, for, as a rule, they can find no owner at all. Some ascribe the ownership to the original donors, who fancy they have entirely parted with it: others to the Pope, who has not the remotest knowledge of or interest in it. For practical legal purposes one or two monks, or one or two discreetly chosen laymen—frankly described by French canonists as *prête-noms*—lend their names as legal owners, though it is well understood that this is a mere fiction. Conveyance, etc., is prudently conducted through Catholic solicitors in burlesque fashion. I have in this way bought and sold thousands of pounds worth of property for a few pence (which never changed hands) in the heart of London. If legal processes arise, the monks present themselves on oath as the legal owners. They are indeed enjoined by papal decrees that they “may with a clear conscience affirm, even on oath, that they intended to acquire the ownership and the right to dispose at will of the property in their possession according to the normal tenor of the civil law.”¹

Meantime, they are reading stories daily in their monastic literature of monks who were cast into outer darkness for possessing as much as a penny; and they make civil declarations, with an equally “clear conscience,” that they own no property at all—when, as in France in 1900, there is question of taxation.

These elusive operations of their casuists are usually clothed in the decent veil of a dead language,

¹ See the papal decrees in P. M. Marres, “De Iustitiâ,” p. 440, and Gury-Ballerini, “Compendium theologiæ moralis” (ii. No. 178); also the later chapter on Belgium.

and in non-Catholic countries are little appreciated. In France they are familiar enough, and are found even in vernacular treatises (for nuns) such as Craissons' "*Des communautés religieuses*," in which there are whole chapters on what are unblushingly called the *prête-noms*. The French Government knew well that it was these *prête-noms* who were referred to when the Benedictines declared that the property they used belonged to laymen; indeed after their expulsion the Benedictines were found to be offering £100,000 for a domain in England, and most of the other monks took great wealth in their emigration. The officials also knew that the monks were forbidden to invest their money in ordinary stock, and needed special permission from Rome in each case to do so. That a nation which was now overwhelmingly non-Catholic should feel impatience at these manœuvres of the religious communities in their midst can hardly be a matter of surprise.

But the French layman's impatience was stimulated when he found, or suspected, that this wealth was being transferred to Rome, or being used in the secret efforts to destroy the Republic. Mr Bodley will assuredly not be suspected of injustice to French Catholics—his work is marred rather by deep injustice to the more advanced of their opponents—and we saw his remark that "they identified themselves with the most inept political party that ever irretrievably wrecked a powerful cause," the Royalist cause. Even F. Brunetière admitted in the *Deux Mondes* that "*des imprudences avaient été commises sur le terrain politique.*" Indeed every attempt to clear the clergy of this charge would be an impeachment of their zeal. No one doubts that the position of the Church would be vastly changed by a return of the Orleanists. One would prefer to regard it as a point of honour

for Jesuits and Dominicans to intrigue for the restoration of their Church. But it was equally a point of honour for a republic that found itself thus attacked—found its army and navy filling with officers who enjoyed the guidance and help of Père Dulac and Père Didon—to make the intrigue impossible.

Thus the religious congregations contributed to the downfall of the Church of Rome in France. They performed no service in the least proportionate to the vast wealth they accumulated, and they were instinctively disloyal to the form of government that has proved best for the country. They ignored the Concordat, the unauthorised bodies growing far beyond the authorised (and useful) bodies; and so the Republic tore up Napoleon's Concordat, and bade the Church realise the true slenderness of its proportions.

The present "hors de Rome" movement has, therefore, far more serious grounds than any that preceded. It has every indication of stability and permanence. It remains for us only to glance at what the clerical writer calls the "solid core" that has been left behind, and see if its loyalty is such as to afford some security against further heavy losses. Unhappily for the Vatican, it is one of the most restless and recalcitrant bodies of clergy and laity in the Church, and the strain laid upon it by an unenlightened papal policy is very severe. During the debate on the Associations Bill in the Senate a Catholic senator, M. Dupuy, pleaded for his Church on the ground that it was at last moving with the advance of thought. He pointed to the liberty enjoyed by M. Loisy. Within a week or two a document came from the Vatican putting four works by the Abbé Loisy and two by the Abbé Houtin on the Index! Houtin and other scholarly priests, and

many laymen, at once left the Church, and Loisy is now rejected from it; later, when the French Government invited the Catholics to form *associations culturelles* for the purpose of taking over the property of the disestablished Church, two-thirds of the bishops decided to do so, and twenty of the leading laymen (Brunetière, De Mun, etc.) wrote a public letter in support of the project.¹ But the Vatican sent stringent orders that they must not enter into the Government's plan. M. Briand, anxious to make the position of the clergy easier, informed them that a simple annual declaration would suffice to enable them to use the churches. Again many of the bishops had already directed their clergy to comply when an uncompromising prohibition came from Rome. For ten years the French clergy had been hampered in their struggle by the unwise policy of the Vatican. It is recorded that Leo XIII. said to the Archbishop of Albi, when he came to pay his annual visit, "Well, monseigneur, is it to be schism?" "Ça dépend," the archbishop is reported to have said. Travelling in France in September 1905 I read in a Parisian journal an interview with the same prelate on the action of certain civic officials who had compelled a convent to dismiss a young lady who sought the veil, while her mother claimed her. The prelate fully approved of the nuns being compelled to give her up, and not obscurely declared his conviction that the day of nunneries was over. In September 1906 the *Matin*, a Catholic organ (quoted

¹ The decision of the bishops was taken just after the election of 1906. They knew that, while Cardinal Gibbons was calling for a civil war, and they themselves had made the most strenuous efforts to secure political support, the issue of the election was a further gain of fifty-eight seats by the Left! In the new Chambre 415 Republicans, Radicals and Socialists faced a paltry Opposition of 175 reactionaries. The Vatican must have known this

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in *The Daily News*, 9th September 1906), had an article on the Eucharistic Congress of Tournay, at which the papal legate (and chief candidate for the papacy) presided. "Not a sign of the three virtues of Faith, Charity and Humility was discernible in the gorgeous ceremonial," it said: "nothing but worship of the Pope in the person of his legate, Cardinal Vanutelli, nothing but incessant genuflexions and changes of robes. The whole thing was a parody of true religion. . . . Roman fetichism, not the Catholic religion."

And with these and a hundred other symptoms before his eyes Pius X. has moved blindly from one piece of despotism to another. Under his inspiration the last sparks of enlightenment are trampled out in the French Church. Every expression that shows a tendency to approach the scholarship of the greater theologians of Germany and England is bitterly assailed, and its author is driven into silence.¹ Between an Archbishop of Paris who believes the world is 6000 years old (Houtin says) and the Syllabus of Pius X. the educated Catholics of France are in sad straits, and their number steadily diminishes. A Catholic periodical at Lyons, *Demain*, in terminating its existence as soon as the recent Syllabus was published, said:

"After recent events, the intentions and ideas of the most sincere Catholics have been obscured and misunderstood to such an extent that it seems to us necessary to wait until tranquillity is restored before we resume our labours. . . . The decree of the Holy Office will annihilate critical exegetics in Catholic schools."²

¹ See the remarkable picture of the inner life of the French Church in Houtin's "La Bible au vingtième siècle."

² Two other French Catholic journals, *La Quinzaine* and *La Revue d'histoire et de littérature religieuses*, have also been suppressed, and a further three (*La vie Catholique*, *La Justice sociale*, *L'éveil*

French Catholics are to-day of three chief types : (1) the thoroughly and deliberately orthodox, who are few, (2) the Liberals, who are being driven out of the Church, and (3) the still large majority of conventional Catholics, who are only waiting to be affected by modern criticisms or grievances, and are daily diminishing. In this predicament, enfeebled in its resources, hampered by a foreign authority that refused to understand the times, and rent by the struggles between the progressive and the reactionary, the French Church is bound to sink lower and lower. There is not even in France the ambiguous promise of a future that the Catholic Church has in many other countries, where it will in time be summoned to an alliance against the advance of Socialism. It is, indeed, in these troubled political waters that the French clerical diplomatist fishes, with many other weary anglers. The ever-threatening split between Liberal, Radical and Socialist Republicans might give fresh life for a time to the drooping energies of the priests. But the Liberals of France can never enter into that alliance with the clericals that we may in time see them contract in Italy or Germany. It is by spiritual effort alone that the Church may recover any ground. Certain political contingencies might encourage it to make such an effort. At present it seems incapable of the exertion. It is either deluded with the new papal idea that strict fidelity to medieval

démocratique) are under discussion by the Catholic authorities as I write. The modern inquisition set up by Pius X. is equally busy in other countries. The *Studi religiosi* of Dr Minnocchi, the most cultured Catholic journal of Italy, has been forced to close its career, and the *Rinnovamento* of Milan has been put on the Index. In Germany Father Müller, editor of the *Renaissance* (Munich), has been suspended, and a review entitled *The Twentieth Century* has disappeared. So the "unity" of the Roman Catholic Church is to be restored.

standards, and absolute scorn of modern research, will ensure for it the intervention of a miraculous power; or, in its more enlightened representatives, it is wrapped in silent and mournful contemplation of the ruins of its once glorious edifice.

CHAPTER III

THE LATIN WORLD—ITALY

THE story of the decay of Romanism in the other Latin countries follows so closely the story of its fortunes in France that our task here will be to give positive indications of loss rather than historical explanations. The rationalistic culture that flourished in France in the eighteenth century is the first stage in the modern disruption of Catholicism. Strict as the Inquisition was, the works of the French writers passed the Pyrenees and the Alps, and began the disintegration of the faith in Spain and its colonies, and in Italy, where traditions of the Renaissance still lingered in cultured circles. The startling glare of the Revolution drew wider attention to them, and Napoleon's troops beat down for a few years the clerical barriers set up against them. Liberalism came to birth in the whole Latin world, and set about its centenarian struggle with the Catholic clergy and Catholic rulers.

In Italy the serious decadence of Romanism may be dated from the later sixties—as in France—when an almost united Italy made pressing overtures to Rome to enter peacefully into the national life. A light scepticism had spread amongst the middle class long before that time, but the Pope could have secured the neutrality of the ~~sceptics~~ sceptics and the enthusiasm of the faithful if he had appreciated the moment of destiny. He might have reigned over Italy, a co-ruler with the king, with more dignity and profit than he had ever done before. He chose to adopt an

attitude that has utterly failed in its design, and that laid a severe strain on the loyalty of millions. At once scepticism penetrated to a deeper level, and the rebellion began in earnest.

The Catholic temper of the nation had been sorely tried from the beginning of the century. The papal reception of the revolutionary outbreak had been as little enlightened as that of the Reformation by the court of Leo X. In the eighteenth century the echo of the thunder beyond the Alps had been heard with momentary petulance by the frivolous groups at the Vatican. Why should these turbulent, vulgar monks disturb so pretty and balanced a world, so refined an alliance of art and religion and culture? The story was repeated in the nineteenth century, with the same sequel. The rulers of the Papal States, and their "beloved sons" in the Austrian and Bourbon principalities, learned as little as Louis XVIII. did from the new quickening of the people's blood. At their restoration in 1815 they abolished almost all the reforms that the French had introduced and revived the older abuses. The Inquisition, the ecclesiastical method of administering justice, the restriction of the press, the crude old fiscal system, and many other evils, were restored. The new demand for popular education was met by restoring the Jesuits and entrusting the schools to their discreet management. Mr Bolton King, it is true, holds that Cardinal Consalvi moderated for a time the reaction that occurred under Pius VII. This is a statement of Ranke's, but it is vigorously discredited by Döllinger, and other historians. In any case Consalvi's efforts were soon thwarted, as all admit, by the weakness of the Pope and the violence of his advisers. "I don't want learned men: I want good subjects," the Austrian emperor had said. That was not a novel sentiment in Italy.

In the succeeding decades the life of the papal court and the administration of the Papal States were distinguished for all their old corruption. "A few scholars," says Mr King, "a few ecclesiastical statesmen of ability, and a few old men of simple pious worth, only set in blacker relief the general worldiness and frivolity of the Roman Court."¹ Bribery and corruption flourished to a frightful extent among the clerical administrators. It is true that the papal court was wealthy enough to refrain from imposing heavy taxation, but in all other respects the inhabitants, says Orsi, "paid for the honour of being ruled by the successor of St Peter by exclusion from all the advantages of modern civilisation."² Brigandage was so rife that 9000 soldiers had to guard the roads when the King of Prussia visited the country. The police were wholly occupied with the extinction of whatever sparks of higher ambition fell upon the land. One of their documents is known that enjoins a special surveillance of "the class called thinkers." In the provinces only 2 per cent., at Rome itself only 10 per cent., of the population attended school, where they received a miserable instruction, often for only two hours a day. Traffic in sacred things and sacred offices was open and flagrant: the public lottery was worked on Sundays in the interest of the Exchequer: all distinctively modern works, and even such journals as *The Times*, were on the Index. And while the indolent and sensual Gregory XVI., "absorbed in ignoble pursuits" (says Mr King), excluding even railways from his territory lest they do "harm to religion"—whilst this pontiff was characterising the new humanitarian thought in the most malignant terms, we find the poorer people living in "infinite

¹ "History of Italian Unity," p. 73.

² "Modern Italy," p. 127.

degradation" under the shadow of the Vatican, Rome generally "as immoral as any city in Europe," and Naples, with its 40,000 *lazzaroni*, disclosing "unfathomed depths of degraded life."

The action of Napoleon in Italy, beneficent as it was in social respects, had presented itself in too violent a form to the Catholic Italian to prove educative. But he had at least left the fair vision of a united Italy in the land, and his saner and juster administration could not be forgotten. These memories soon began to germinate in the minds of the brave and the thoughtful. Secret societies spread throughout the country. The famous Carbonari were by no means consistently anticlerical. They dreamed at times of a new papacy leading a regenerated Italy. But the feeling of political rebellion that they fostered was always apt to spread into the domain of doctrine, and materially aided the growth of the Voltairean scepticism of men like Confalonieri and the more profound religious revolt of the followers of Mazzini. Gregory XVI. had to complain in 1832 (Encyclical of 15th August) of "the existing widespread unbelief." Against that "unbelief" all the rulers of Italy, except the Sardinian monarchy, waged a bloody and implacable war. But the brutal measures of the Papal, Austrian and Neapolitan rulers, and the heroic struggles of the early Italian Liberals, cannot be enlarged upon here.

Pius IX. succeeded in 1846 to the rule of the Papal States. By that time most of the other European nations had entered seriously upon the work of social reform, but the inhabitants of the Papal States were, says Orsi, "still in the most absolute ignorance and squalor." For a few years the new Pope responded to the significant welcome that had been given him, and sanctioned a few moderate reforms.

But the sight of the fresh revolutionary movement that was coming down from the north, and the insurrection at Rome, from which he fled in terror, threw him into the arms of the reactionary cardinals. The state of things set up by the cardinals after the return from Gaeta was described by the English ambassador as "the opprobrium of Europe." We who know that Pius IX. was declared to be infallible a few years later, and is about to be canonised in our time, look on the spectacle with curious feelings.¹ We see a timid and nebulous pontiff, surrounded by a circle of prelates, not unlike the cordon of grand dukes round the Tsar, with a cardinal (Antonelli) at their head who was to leave a fortune of 100,000,000 lire and a natural daughter (Countess Lambertini) clamouring for a share of it, fencing off their profitable little kingdom from the spirit of the age by terrors of inquisition, regiments of police, the refusal of general education, and the drastic suppression of economic study. When in 1859 the Austrians were driven out by the allied French and Italians, and the dream of a united Italy illumined the mind of every patriot, the attention of the country became concentrated on the papacy. Mr King ventures to say they beheld "a power . . . clinging to its poor rag of earthly dominion, while it vented its screeds of impotent passion, and forgot bare morality in lust of revenge." Certain it is, at least, that "the Pope's unctuous patronage of iniquity was digging a gulf between the papacy and Italy," and the Vatican's reliance on foreign intervention

¹ Infallible, of course, only in dogmatic teaching. But a theory that would ask us to believe that a supernatural oracle existed at the Vatican, ready to give absolute inerrancy in such remote details as immaculate conceptions, yet unwilling to grant any assistance whatever in these more momentous affairs, is hardly entitled to respect.

only enlarged it. One has only to read a clerical historian like Balan to realise how Italy's serious defection from the papacy, on more than political grounds, dates largely from this fateful decade between 1860 and 1870. The notorious Materialist, Moleschott, expelled from Germany, found a congenial home in Italy, and spread his convictions there. The ex-priest, Ausonio Franchi, was made professor at the university of Pavia, and led a considerable party of Rationalists. Hegelianism was taught in the university of Naples. An ex-priest, Trezza, taught in the Istituto Superiore at Florence. Balan protests indeed that "the chairs at the universities, gymnasia and lycea were full of apostate priests." "Veramente," he concludes, after many pages on the growth of Rationalism in the sixties, "l'Italia dopo il 1860 parve terra di conquista dei ribelli a Dio."¹ How the misguided pontiff met the gathering storm is familiar enough. He issued the Syllabus. Theologians still dispute as to the technical fallibility or infallibility of this document, but if ever a pope intended to teach dogmatically, *urbi et orbi*, Pius IX. then did. Many of the theses he condemned are now truths that the Catholic apologist hastens to profess:

"At least there is some hope of the eternal safety of those who live outside the true Church.

"Every man is free to embrace the religion which his reason assures him to be true.

"Divine revelation is not perfect, and is therefore subject to indefinite progress, in harmony with the advance of reason.

"In certain Catholic countries it has been very

¹ "Continuazione alla Storia Universale," vol. ii. pp. 477-481:

"In truth after 1860 Italy seems to have been conquered by the rebels against God."

properly laid down that immigrant non-Catholics shall have the free exercise of their religion.

"The Roman Pontiff can and ought to be reconciled with progress, liberalism and modern civism."

The condemnation of such theses as these did not tend to close the ever-widening gulf.

On the political side the papal attitude was equally disastrous to Catholicism. It is said that the Vatican would now be prepared to make peace with Italy if the Leonine City alone (a very small strip of Rome about St Peter's and the Vatican) is conceded to it.¹ In the sixties such a proposal would have averted a whole generation of suffering and prepared an alliance of Quirinal and Vatican against Socialism that would at least have mitigated the actual losses of Rome. But the inspiration of the Vatican, whatever its source, has been consistently unfortunate. Pius IX. maintained the gulf between his interest and that of Italy by his violent insistence on a complete restoration of the Papal States. Leo XIII. restricted the demand to the city of Rome, but the nation had passed hopelessly beyond the point of entertaining such a proposition. Pius X. is furtively letting it be understood that the Leonine City will suffice him, but the nation is rapidly moving on to a point of indifference to the Vatican's good-will. The great blunder of the claim of temporal power led to others. Pius IX. withdrew sullenly into the Vatican, and refused to gratify Rome with the solemn or brilliant pageants which the ritual of St Peter's can provide. Leo XIII. saw the crude error of this attitude, and quickly reversed it; but he in turn maintained the prohibition to Catholics to take part in the general elections of the country. Pius X. has retracted the *non expedit*, but the last elections show how fatal the

¹ So King and Okey, in "Italy To-day."

long political paralysis has been to the Catholic forces. Finally, while Pius IX. missed the great opportunity of offering Rome, and taking his place as virtual co-ruler of the nation, Leo XIII. made an equal blunder in refusing the princely state and salary decreed to the Pope since 1870. The few million lire of the Peter's pence collection are a poor consolation for the spectacle that "affrights" Pius X. to-day.

With the history of the relations of Church and State in Italy since 1870 I need not deal, and I hasten to give positive indications of the losses sustained by the Vatican. The usual compiler of religious statistics finds his task a light one in regard to countries where the decennial census reports the religion of the inhabitants. If we follow his example, we shall find it difficult to understand the papal lament and the observations of every informed writer on the religious condition of Italy. At the census of 1901 the population was discovered to be 32,500,000, and of these no less than 97 per cent. (or 31,500,000) described themselves, or were described, as Roman Catholics. Even here, it is true, we find a significant change. Of the outstanding million, 65,595 (of whom 30,000 are foreigners) wrote themselves "Protestants" and 35,617 "Jews." "No religion" was entered on the census papers by only 36,092, whom we may take to be the more militant Freethinkers of the large towns. But we have in the end the remarkable item of 795,276 whose religion is "not known." Clearly these are seceders from Catholicism. As this item is almost a new appearance of the last two decades it is in itself a formidable evidence of leakage. In 1871 this class numbered only 48,000, while 99·7 of the population were "Catholics."

But no serious social student will fancy he has the number of the real adherents of the Vatican in this

census report or, if any do, the facts and figures we shall give presently must undeceive him. It is very well known how the indifferent commonly avoid the inconvenience that their heretical opinions might entail by the cheap device of writing themselves orthodox.¹ In Italy, where Catholicism has come to be quite consistent, in men's minds, with a complete disdain of Rome and all its ways, as well as a genial indifference to its moral theories, a little heresy on the less important questions of doctrine need not excite scruples. The educated Italian is a Catholic much as the educated Japanese is a Shintoist; while Socialism, which the Vatican has emphatically denounced as putting a man outside the pale, has made extraordinary progress amongst the masses. The entry of "Catholic" in the census paper very often means only that one is neither Protestant nor Jew.

The defection of the educated classes is pointed out by nearly every writer on Italy. King and Okey declare, in their most careful and authoritative work, that "there can hardly be any doubt, from the confession of the Catholics themselves, that Catholicism has small hold on the educated classes," and that "the professional classes and the great majority of the university students are, and have been for many years, either indifferent or hostile."² Deputies, they tell us, who attend mass when they are at home in the

¹ Another aspect of the matter comes out in such experiences as the following. A friend of mine had occasion to settle in Germany for a year. The vigilant police provided him with a form on which, amongst a hundred minute details, he was to declare his religion. "None," he promptly wrote. "Aber, das ist unmöglich," said the paternal officer. He was obliged to write some positive epithet on the paper. In Spain the officials count all who have been baptised as Catholics. We shall see, as we proceed, some most extraordinary corrections of census figures.

² "Italy To-day," p. 30.

provinces dare not do so at Rome, so general is the feeling that cultured men are no longer Catholics. Fischer, another cautious and authoritative writer, says that "indifferentism is, perhaps, more widespread amongst educated Italians than in the corresponding class of any other nation."¹ One of the latest and most authoritative French works on Italy tells the same story. The writer on the religion of the Italians says that almost every educated Italian will declare at once that religion "does not exist" amongst his class.² That these statements are justified will not be doubted by anyone who is acquainted with Italian life and literature. The best journals, magazines and works in the country reflect such a temper on the part of the cultivated community. Of the 9975 books published in 1900—the last year for which I have the figures—only 698 were religious works; and this list includes Rome. In 1894 Professor Haeckel, a notorious opponent of Catholicism, celebrated his sixtieth birthday. Amongst his gratulatory telegrams was this official message from the Italian Minister of Public Instruction:

"Italy, that you love so much, takes cordial part in all the honours that the civilised nations of the earth are heaping on you in commemoration of your sixtieth birthday. In the name of the Italian universities, which love you so much, and so much admire your undying work, I send you a heartfelt greeting and wishes for a long and happy and active career."

Four years later the Royal Academy of Science at Turin awarded the Bressa prize—a diploma and large sum of money—to Haeckel's "Systematische Phylo-

¹ "Italien und die Italiener," p. 417.

² "L'Italie Géographique," etc., ed. R. Bazin. The writer of the section on religion, a Catholic, who does not welcome the statement, is content only to pronounce it "exaggerated." There are, of course, educated Catholic Italians—*apparent vari*.

genie," as the most meritorious scientific work published in Europe between 1895 and 1898. A few years later again, we find the Ministry of Public Instruction offering its Collegio Romano for the holding of a Freethought Congress at Rome, and granting considerable privileges to the assembled enemies of the Vatican, a matter to which I shall return later.

Such facts as these, which could hardly occur in any other Christian country except France, fully substantiate Herr Fischer's estimate of the educated Italians. However they may describe themselves in the idle formality of the census, they have, to say the least, ceased to be predominantly Catholic. Such men as Lombroso, Sergi, De Amicis, D'Annunzio, Ardigo, Ferri, Ghisleri, etc., stand, in their several ways, for the thought of modern Italy. They are humanists and scholars. The narrow supernaturalism of the Vatican, enforced with medieval vigour and crudeness by the simple-minded pontiff, is disdained by them and their readers. The selfish clericalism of the Vatican, covering itself with thin pretexts of spiritual independence, offends their patriotism; and the impunity of their rulers and officials, involved as they are in a maze of standing anathemas, excites their ridicule. They have with them most of the informed minds of the country, and they smile at the Vatican's huge following of peasants, women and children. The few cultivated men who wish to remain Catholic are driven out, or chilled into silence. It is only two years since the ablest of them, Fogazzaro, had his greatest novel, "Il Santo," put on the Index, because it hinted that the avarice and stagnation of the Vatican are ruining the Church. The middle class is lost to the Church in Italy.

When we pass to the workers we find that a like rebellion is spreading amongst these with extraordinary

rapidity, and has already withdrawn, directly or indirectly, some millions of the proletariat from clerical influence. A new force has arisen in the country, which the Vatican dreads more than the accommodating scepticism of the cultured. If the decadence of Catholicism in Italy depended wholly upon intellectual criticism of its doctrines, the papal authorities would have little ground for their pressing anxiety. It is not merely that the bulk of their followers are still quite illiterate, and are likely to remain indifferent to intellectual issues for some generations. The more important point is that, as Professor Fiamingo observes, with the majority of the Italians religion is neither a judicial assent to doctrines nor a deep feeling in regard to personality. It is mainly a facile compliance with certain customs of immemorial antiquity. The generous observance of these external forms that he sees often disposes the traveller to think they have a deep inner inspiration, but a closer scrutiny will undeceive him. He will hear the Catholic fisherman laughingly call his neighbour a "Joseph" on account of some fancied resemblance of his child to the priest, with an implication that would shock a Protestant unspeakably. Their fishing and their crops depend on these magical rites; and their clergy have never pressed them heavily in the matter of God's commandments, if they have been somewhat exacting in regard to the "commandments of the Church." On such a temper, amongst grossly illiterate peasants, difficulties of science and history and philosophy have little effect.

Unhappily for the Church, France has directed into Italy a new current of interest, and withdrawn millions of the most intelligent workers from the Vatican's allegiance. The artisans are following the example of the Rationalistic middle class, and the peasantry

are beginning to join them. Merciful as the sun of Italy is to poverty, the transition into the new industrial order has been attended with much suffering. Leo XIII., in his later years, had told the worker that he who rebels against the present order of the world rebels against God, but other preachers were amongst them, conjuring up before them a vision of the fairer earth that might become the home of their children. Before 1860 the Italian authorities suppressed all study of economics—suppressed even private associations for the study. To-day Italy is one of the foremost nations of the world in it, and the reaction on papal influence is very great.

Nearly every modern writer on Italy lays great stress on the recent growth of Socialism. "It is possible," says Mr E. Hutton, by no means a sympathetic writer, "that the immediate future of Italy is in the hands of the Socialists, and, as I believe, it is certain that this is the case unless the king can bring himself to make peace with the Vatican."¹ Another writer who is antipathetic to Socialism, the Rev. Tony André, says: "Socialism is, in Italy, a latent danger, too grave and too threatening for the *élite* of the nation to do otherwise than study the means of remedy" (p. 185). King and Okey point out that Catholicism is "fast losing ground" in the northern towns where Socialism is strong. At Milan, "once a Catholic stronghold," the Catholic vote is now less than one-third of the Socialist vote at municipal elections. At Bergamo, a strong Catholic centre, the orthodox organ complains that "the Socialists are gaining ground and taking the working men and women from us."² "Socialism," they conclude, "barely existed in Italy ten years ago," but is

¹ "Italy and the Italians," p. 54.

² "Italy To-day," p. 30.

now "the most living force in Italian politics." Paul Ghio, in his recent "Notes sur L'Italie contemporaine," presses the same fact, and adds: "The authorities themselves are obliged to admit that the Socialist propaganda coincides with the progress of the education of the working classes and with the amelioration of their morality." He quotes a speech in which the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, Signor Galimberti, speaks with great praise of the Socialist efforts to kindle a "political conscience" in the masses, just after the Socialist Congress of 1902.

The impressions of travellers must be read with discretion, but I cannot forbear to relate one that gives a trustworthy estimate of the strength of Socialism in Italy. A few years ago I passed through Genoa on my way to Rome. As the train moved slowly down the last slopes, and I caught murmurs of "Genova," I turned to the windows. It was past midnight, but not a single light illumined the dark masses of houses beyond; one saw only the fitful glare of torches on fixed bayonets, as the troops marched by the train. I made my way through the town by matchlight, and found the hotels denuded of all but indispensable servants. And when the sun flashed on the town the next morning I found it in the most complete idleness imaginable. Not a train could be moved on the line; not a boat dare stir from the harbour. Not a limb would bend in the town without permission. The very washerwomen, working gaily in the white marble basins in the slums, had strung overhead a protesting banner: "Obbligate di lavorare." The whole town lay under the spell of some power antagonistic to that of Church or Government, at whose 20,000 troops the workers smiled grimly. The Socialists at Milan had declared a general strike.

Such experiences, however, are apt to lead to superficial and incorrect judgment—the kind of judgment that the traveller often forms as to the religious condition of Italy when he witnesses great religious festivals, and is ignorant that these are often maintained by the commercial interest of non-Catholics, or are mere outbursts of gaiety. Let us turn rather to the more prosaic teaching of statistics. The Socialists made their first appearance at the polls in Italy in 1895, when they registered 60,000 votes. In 1900 the number rose to 164,000; and 1268 communal councils were captured by them. In 1904, a few weeks after the general strike by which they had paralysed trade and so intensely exasperated the middle class and all who catered to foreign visitors, they polled more than 320,000 votes.¹ An increase of 450 per cent. in nine years is a formidable phenomenon.

But let us examine the figures a little closer. Until 1904 it had been papal policy to forbid the Catholics to take part in the general elections, but at the beginning of that year Pius X. urged them to be more sensible of “their duties as citizens.” This was intended and construed to be a withdrawal of the

¹ The figure is sometimes quoted with an insinuation of scepticism, so I went through the returns in the *Giornale d'Italia*, and found it correct. The Socialists lost seven seats, in the general exasperation against them, but it is their total vote that counts for our purpose. There are twenty-seven Socialist deputies in the Camera to-day, besides thirty-seven Radicals and twenty-one Republicans, who are equally anticlerical. I may observe that the programme of most of the Italian Socialists is merely what we should call “advanced Radicalism,” but the Vatican is irreconcilably opposed to it, and every man who adheres to it has quitted the Church. A recent Italian writer of distinction, Dr Murri, insists emphatically on this. Socialism, he says, “has made its very system and law out of opposition to the Church and religion,” and “Socialism organises *irreligion*” (his italics, “Battaglie d’oggi,” iii. 137).

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non expedit (the direction not to vote), and a Catholic electoral campaign was set afoot. The result was very instructive. In the first place the withdrawal of the *non expedit* made no appreciable difference in the number of voters. Both Liberal and Socialist votes were sufficiently increased to account for the 4 per cent. rise in the total number of votes cast. In the next place, as 62·7 per cent. of the electorate voted, and the proportion is only 63·5 at the municipal elections, at which the Catholics were accustomed to vote, it is clear that few now abstained on principle; though doubtless many did from ignorance and apathy. Yet we find that the Socialists alone (who "organise irreligion") numbered a fifth of the entire voting electors, or 320,000 out of 1,600,000. But as the Radicals and Republicans differ from them only in their economic ideal, and are equally estranged from the Church, we must associate them with the Socialists for the purpose of our inquiry; and we saw that they returned more than twice as many deputies to the Camera as the Socialists (fifty-eight to twenty-seven). To these we must add further the middle-class Liberals, who have generally rejected the papal teaching (as Murri fully confesses) and the whole of the Freemasons, who have close upon 200 lodges in Italy. It will thus be seen at a glance that the Church has lost the allegiance of four-fifths of the *élite* of the nation, the literate and enfranchised class. In this, as we shall see, clerical writers like Murri fully concur.

Let me put the situation in another way, as it is very important to consider the question of literacy or illiteracy in a country in which secession from Rome has always followed upon education, and the work of education is being rapidly extended. Of the 31,000,000 described as "Catholic" in the census at

least 11,000,000 are children under fifteen. Of the remainder more than 10,000,000 are women and girls, whose education has been particularly neglected in Italy; though the women of the towns are largely following their husbands out of Romanism to-day. Of the 7,000,000 or 8,000,000 men (over the age of twenty) 44 per cent. are illiterate. There remain some 4,000,000 or 4,500,000 literate and mature males. Of these—if the analysis of the voters be applied, as seems proper, to the whole class—the Vatican has certainly not the allegiance of 1,000,000. Dividing Italy into zones, as we must, we find that the northern provinces (which have 40 per cent. of the whole population) are quite dominated by the anticlericals. The central provinces may be said to be at least fairly divided in clerical and anticlerical influence. The southern provinces are solidly Catholic. Now, according to the official returns, the illiterates are only 28·3 per cent. of the inhabitants in the northern provinces; 51·5 in the central provinces; and 69·7 in the southern. In Piedmont, which is predominantly anticlerical, the illiterates are only 17·69 of the population; in Calabria, which is wholly Catholic, they are 78·70 per cent.

This is a sufficiently terrible state of affairs for the papacy, but it is not the whole truth. It must not be imagined that the Vatican has control of anything like all the woman, children and peasants of the country. In the northern towns the Socialistic and other seceders now generally take their wives and families with them, and they are winning the illiterate peasants of the countryside. The Socialists, for instance, began to work in the rural districts in 1897. At the Socialist Congress of Bologna in 1901 there were represented 704 peasants' leagues, with a total membership of 144,078. And the militant Free-

thought campaign, which is carried on from Milan and Rome, has also considerable success among the women and peasants, and provides schools, festivals, ceremonies, etc., for the children.

These facts sufficiently explain, not only the laments of Pius X., but a large number of social incidents which show the absurdity of the current notion that Italy is still Catholic to the extent of 97 per cent. The general tone of the Italian press, the number of anti-Catholic journals—the bitter and satirical *Asino* of Rome claims to have 1,000,000 readers, and it has a rival in the *Papagallo*, besides the more serious daily *Azione* (Chiasso), Ghisleri's daily *Ragione* (Rome), a weekly *Ragione* (Lugano), the *Tribuna*, the Socialist *Avanti* and *Secolo*, and others—and the spirit of the better Italian literature, are utterly inconsistent with such a belief. Indeed, incidents are constantly occurring in the social and intellectual life of Italy that show how far the enfeeblement of the papacy has really proceeded. I have mentioned a number of these, but there is one—the holding of the International Freethought Congress at Rome in 1904—that will repay a closer examination.

The *Annual Register* for 1904 rightly observes that “the most noteworthy features of the year in case of Italy were the beginning of a decided *rapprochement* between the State and Church, and birth of an heir to the House of Savoy.” It is well known that the accession of Pius X. to the papal throne gave some hope that peace would at length be concluded between the Quirinal and the Vatican, and his election was followed by many interchanges of courtesy that seemed to foreshadow an agreement. That such a *rapprochement* would be very welcome to the Italian Government, in view of the spread of Socialism, needs no proof; and Pius X. was known to

lay little stress on the temporal power. In these circumstances the Vatican heard of the proposed congress, and issued a vehement protest against the holding of it at Rome. Yet the Government did not merely ignore the Pope's protest; it offered the Italian Freethinkers the Collegio Romano for their meetings, it granted a reduction of 60 per cent. in railway fares all over Italy, and other remarkable privileges to any who should attend the congress, and it was only prevented by the king's urgent request from sending the Minister of Public Instruction to open the congress! As it was, the Syndic (Mayor) of Rome sent his Assessore to address these heated rebels against the papacy, and assure them that Rome was (to quote his words) "a fitting arena for the noble struggle of the human intellect in which they were engaged," and that the issues of the congress were "among the most important that can be conceived." He gave facilities for a triumphant procession of the 8000 congressists, with bands and banners, to the breach in the Porta Pia wall on the very anniversary of the fall of the papal power, and threw open every national monument to the congressists.

As this congress was essentially anti-Catholic, and had for its chief aim the deliberation of measures for the disestablishment and destruction of the Church in all the Latin countries, the significance of the official attitude cannot be ignored. It means that the congress represented a very strong and widespread feeling in the country, and so must be received as hospitably, to say the least, as the largest Catholic pilgrimage to Rome.¹ And a glance at the preliminary proceedings

¹ English people (whose journals generally made no mention of this extraordinary event) may appreciate it by trying to imagine their Government lending the Imperial Institute for the holding of a Freethought Congress, and the London County Council deputing

of the congress suffices to show that the Government were right in their appreciation. Some 8000 delegates attended—4000 Italians, 2000 Spaniards, 1000 French, and 1000 German, Belgian, Austrian, etc.—and 400 Italian societies (pedagogical, industrial, political, etc.), and 160 Masonic lodges sent telegrams or letters of adhesion to the congress. But the most striking fact was that 95 Italian municipalities (*municipi*)—including Aquila, Benevento, Bologna, Cosenza, Livorno, Mantua, Milano, Pavia, Pisa, Padua, Orvieto, Rimini, Spoleto, Urbino, Terni, etc.—sent official representatives, or official letters of adhesion, to this emphatic and triumphant demonstration against the Vatican. It would be difficult to imagine a more instructive indication of the extent of the “away from Rome” movement in Italy. In a hundred municipal councils of northern and central Italy the anti-Catholics have so secure a majority that they can officially support a proceeding which was more bitter to the Vatican than anything else in Roman life for many a year.

If further proof be desired of the defection of the middle class and the artisans of Italy, with a high proportion of their wives and children, it will be found in the writings of the Catholics themselves. I have not the abundant literature of this kind to select from that I had in dealing with France, but it will be sufficient to quote an important work, recently published, by Dr Murri, one of the chief Catholic protagonists. Murri's “*Battaglie d'oggi*” is weighty, and has been issued by the *Società Italiana Cattolica*. It candidly acknowledges throughout that the situation is such as

its chairman to attend. The character of the congress was such that the Pope closed the Vatican for a week, and afterwards ordered an expiatory service in all the churches of Rome—to Rome's intense amusement.

I have described it. "The educated classes here," he says, "are hostile to us: that is a fact of which it would be mischievous to fail to see the gravity. It is a notorious fact of modern times" (i. 83). The rise of the middle class has, he says, culminated in "a movement of intense hostility to the Church and the Faith," and this spirit is found "in the university professor no less than in the humble reader of the *Tribuna*, in some village of the central Apennines" (p. 84). It will be noted that where the foreigner speaks of "indifference" this Catholic leader sees "intense hostility"; and that the "classe colte" in whom he finds it quite predominant, range from the scientist to the literate peasant. The chief reason for this wide dissidence is, he admits, "the difference in level (*dislivello*) between the clerical culture and that of even the moderately educated classes of Italy" (ii. p. 9). The whole literature and drama of Italy are "pagan," he says. There is no Christian literature at all—"only books fit for children"—and it "would be ridiculous to speak of Christian art." I may add that, since Murri's work was published, the one great writer the Catholics had, Fogazzaro, has been put on the Index for telling the *curia* some plain truths. The Catholics need and desire a university: Murri quietly disdains the ecclesiastical colleges at Rome. But State and nation are hostile to the idea, and the progressive Catholics are too few and poor to found one.¹

This is Catholic Italy, as seen in our own day by one of the most strenuous and devoted leaders of the faithful. It entirely agrees with and confirms the estimate I have formed on the many indications I have given. All these indications imply that, in the words of this Catholic leader, the literate Italians are

¹ Murri himself, a priest of great authority, and secretary to an important cardinal, has since been suspended; so has Minocchi.

overwhelmingly opposed to Romanism. As one half of the population over the age of six (that is to say, about 14,000,000) are now literate, the reader may draw his own conclusion. For my purpose modesty is desirable, and I assess the loss to the Vatican in the last fifty years at 6,000,000. Italian life and literature are unintelligible unless we grant this.¹

Nor must it be imagined that a momentary advantage has been taken of clerical somnolence. Not only is the ecclesiastical organisation still vast, powerful and wealthy, but it has made devoted efforts during the last ten years to arrest the spread of the revolt. A corporation that includes 258 archbishops and bishops, 68,844 priests, 48,043 monks and nuns, and 12,129 sacristans (besides the workers in dependent industries, professions, etc.), with a safe revenue (half from glebe lands) of 32,000,000 lire, is a formidable force. This army, moreover, has met Socialist activity with a remarkable development of social and philanthropic work amongst the peasantry. In spite of all its efforts the leakage increases year by year. Its leaders indeed help the work of their opponents by their ill-advised pronouncements. Leo XIII., who for a time patronised the "Christian Democrats," came in the end (January 1901) to pen a most mischievous

¹ As my estimate implies the essential anticlericalism of the Socialists, Radicals and Republicans, I have sought confirmation of it from the most cultivated and distinguished of the Italian Socialists, Enrico Ferri. He assures me that the Socialists (who "number much more than 500,000"—my estimate) are "irreconcilable adversaries of the Church," and that this applies also to "the Radicals and Republicans." The suffrage being extremely limited in Italy, he reminds me, the huge collective vote of these three groups expresses only a fraction of their strength amongst the people. And to these we must add the Freemasons, the Free-thinkers, the unorganised indifferentists, and the great bulk of the middle class.

declaration on social work. Pius X. addressed the workers from the start in the language of Gregory XVI. and Pius IX. He may gain the Quirinal, as his predecessor gained the Kaiser; but he has lost the artisans of Italy.

The present Pope's denunciation of the moral condition of Italy is another cause of dissatisfaction and contempt. The morality of Italy has signally improved during these decades of defection from Romanism, and is highest in the non-Catholic provinces. For the whole country the number of convictions has sunk from 458,262 in 1899 to 428,634 in 1903; and the diminution is greatest in the north. For the whole country, again, the proportion of illegitimate births has fallen from 7.35 per cent. in 1881 to 6.02 per cent. in 1904. The Roman province is one of the worst in this regard, having a percentage of 20.3: the northern provinces are the best. There is still an extraordinary laxity amongst the Catholic population, from the prelate to the peasant. I found a curiously obtuse moral sense amongst the peasantry of a solidly Catholic district in the south, where I had the advantage of observing them through the eyes of residents (friendly to them) who have known them for years. On the other hand a writer, not hostile to Catholicism, in *The Church Quarterly* (October 1902), tells that he heard an Italian prelate lamenting that a certain distinguished cardinal had not received the tiara at the last conclave. When the writer protested to the Italian that the cardinal was a man of "conspicuous immorality" the prelate impatiently exclaimed: "You Anglicans seem to think there is no virtue but chastity." I myself heard it familiarly stated, as a matter of common knowledge, by officials at Rome that the cardinal in question (whom I easily recognise) kept a mistress at a

villa not many miles from the Vatican to which he aspired.

Thus the Roman Catholic Church has suffered in Italy the loss of at least a fifth of its adherents, and those the more alert and thoughtful part of the nation. King and Okey conclude their impartial inquiry on the point of religion by saying that "probably the great majority of the peasants should still be counted Catholics." That will, doubtless, be the verdict of every neutral observer: it is, in effect, the verdict of militant Catholic priests like Murri. But the peasants also secede rapidly. In twenty years, in an ever-increasing population, the clerical army has shrunk from 76,560 to 68,844, and in the north at least the priests lament that their chapels are half empty. "Decay" is writ large over its whole action and organisation. There is only one possible way in which the Italian Church can arrest the decay in some measure. Its fulminations have touched so lightly the mind of Italy for forty years that they have lost even the interest of melodrama. Its social and philanthropic work has failed to compete with the glowing phrases of the Socialist orators. It must enter into a political alliance with the Quirinal. As in Germany, rulers and statesmen will welcome its co-operation in the checking of Socialism and Radicalism by spiritual menaces to the peasant—if the Vatican is sagacious enough to offer the alliance before its power over the peasant is too seriously undermined. Individualist sceptics could, no doubt, be induced to suspend their objections to clericalism (as in Spain) and unite with the Church against a common enemy. There may be a concentration which will break up some of the older groups.

In estimating the possible issue for the Church of this alliance, it must be borne in mind that in Italy

moderate Socialism is not a mere artisan movement. It has leaders, and adherents amongst the most cultured writers and most learned professors in the country. It is not many years since we were startled to hear that D'Annunzio himself had publicly associated with them. It has long counted amongst its disciples such men of science and letters as Lombroso, De Amicis, Ferri, Ferrero, Graf, Guerrini, Ghisleri, Pascoli, Chiaruggi, Batelli, Pantaleoni. This means a large following amongst the cultured. The struggle will not be merely one of peasants and artisans against the middle and upper class. Further, the Church is, as I write, blindly eviscerating itself of its own cultured elements. Murri is suspended, Minocchi excommunicated, Fogazzaro on the Index. The "modernists" defy the Vatican with their famous *Programma*, and merely change the titles of their prohibited magazines. The Italian Church will soon be a body of 20,000,000 illiterates and children, controlled by an army of 200,000 clerics and dependent laymen. But the light breaks even on the mind of the peasants, and, when they awake, they will join the great rebellion.

CHAPTER IV

THE LATIN WORLD—SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

THE serious inquirer into the fortunes of the Church of Rome in divers countries invariably approaches each section of his subject with a fresh optimism. He has probably set out in his investigation under the influence of that belief in its constant progress which is pressed on him from every side. The moment he begins to reflect, however, events so clamant as the recent revolution in France bring over his mind the first shade of scepticism, and he soon finds that the French Church is but the crumbling ruin of the fabric on which the philosophers of the eighteenth century led the first assault. But he is assured that the failure is purely local, and that beyond the Alps Catholicism still sees a whole nation bow in awe before the presentation of its solemn mysteries. He passes to Italy: and again he meets the Voltairean scoffer, the intellectual critic, and the democratic rebel. He finds Italy spurning the rule of the Vatican in ominous proportion to its mental development, and few but the dense, sensual peasants of the southern provinces really submissive to the papal commands. Then Roman prelates tell him that the real home of Catholicism, the land from which the Gospel will again set out on its triumphal march, is in the Iberian peninsula and South America; and he takes up the thread of his inquiry with a stronger prepossession than ever in favour of Rome.

Deferring to the next chapter the inquiry into the condition of Romanism in Spanish America, we have

now to investigate its fortunes in Spain and Portugal. It need hardly be pointed out that the position is in many respects exceptional. A recent German writer has insisted that the Iberian peninsula is, psychically, "a bit of Africa." One of the most sagacious and philosophic observers of modern Spain and Portugal, he concludes that in the peninsula we have one of the most singular phases of the religious struggle of our time: a semi-Oriental people struggling against modern ideas, not so much out of attachment to the religion they assail, but because they threaten the very basis of its life, its quietism.¹ However, we have a healthy distrust of the too philosophic impressions of German travellers, and no doubt Herr Passarge makes too much of the former presence of the Arab in Spain. The situation is peculiar enough without regarding any theory of racial inheritance—peculiar in geography, in history, and in cultural value. Only in the Catholic south of Italy or America can we find equally dense and general ignorance. Of the Portuguese 78·6 per cent. are unable to read: of the Spanish 68 per cent. And nowhere else in Europe can we find an equal exhaustion from warfare, revolution and persecution.

Yet Passarge, like nearly every other writer on Spain and Portugal, bears witness to the advanced decomposition of the Church of Rome in the Peninsula. It is "full of superficial Freethought," he says, from his Protestant point of view. The notion that the Spanish and Portuguese are still solidly Catholic is as mythical as we found the same idea to be in regard to Italy. Vast corporations of clergy and religious are fighting the growth of heresy: ruling powers have their own reasons for permitting the abnormal illiteracy, and encouraging the intolerant bigotry, that check its progress; yet Spain and Portugal are smouldering with

¹ "Aus Spanien und Portugal," by L. Passarge.

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rebellion against Rome, and any decade in the first half of the twentieth century the gust may set in that will raise a flame only second in magnitude to that we have witnessed in France, and probably more intense and unsparing. Millions have completely abandoned their allegiance to the Vatican, and millions more are well on the way to abandon it. Of this we shall see abundant proof in the course of the present chapter. Educated Spain is no longer Catholic: illiterate Spain rebels with the first tincture of letters.

SPAIN

The superficial traveller who appraises the religious life of Spain by the processions and ceremonies he has witnessed at Seville usually has little difficulty in securing the assent of his reader. Indeed, it may be confessed at once that a peculiar discretion is needed in reading accounts of Spanish life. Of two friends of mine who know Spain well, one, an American, who has lived there for more than a decade, affirms that the country is still purely medieval in regard to religion; the other, a highly cultivated Spaniard, avers that only 25 per cent. of his countrymen go to church, and that the greater part even of these have no real religious belief. Of two writers on Spain that I consult, one, an English traveller, suggests that 95 per cent. of the Spaniards are sincere Roman Catholics: the other, a devout and cultivated Spanish Catholic, says, "there is more indifference and practical atheism in Spain than in any other country in Europe!" And our encyclopædias and other works of reference, with their usual irresponsibility on this point, assign 17,500,000 out of the 18,000,000 of Spain to the rule of the Vatican.

The course of this chapter will amply show that the

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more optimistic writers have either had their experience restricted to some exceptional outlying district—as in the case of my American friend—or have only glanced at the surface of Spain's life—as in the case of the English traveller (to whom I return later). But in order to approach the examination with a fitting sense of proportion we must glance at the history of religion in Spain since the beginning of the nineteenth century. If the traveller in Spain were equipped with this knowledge, he would be less disposed to build on isolated occurrences and superficial ceremonies; but he is very rarely acquainted with that remarkable story.

To a point the story is the same as in the case of France and Italy. French scepticism found an easy, if restricted, ground in Spain. Educated Spaniards saw their impoverished country fastened on by a parasitic tribe of nearly 140,000 priests, nuns and sacristans (to 10,000,000 people), and welcomed the Voltairean estimate of their worth. But the clergy were content to fence off these few reading folk from the masses, and knew that the vast illiterate body of the people were ignorant of the meaning, and distrusted the very sound, of such words as reform and progress. The French invasion smoothed the way for more French literature, and the easy rule—or virtual rule—of Godoy, who was "bitterly opposed by the ecclesiastics and the mob" (says Major Hume), encouraged the spread of culture and facilitated that of heresy. The devastation wrought by Napoleon's troops in the Peninsula, and the seething hatred of everything French that it evoked, naturally aided the cause of the clergy. But by the time of the fall of Napoleon Liberalism was fully born in Spain, and prepared to enter, as in the other Latin countries, into the long war with clericalism

and absolutism. From that time onward there has been a powerful body of Radical heretics in the country.

But the Spanish Liberals had an even more difficult task than those of Italy. They had to deal with the most brutal and unscrupulous of the restored rulers after 1814; they had one of the richest and most powerful clerical corporations in Europe to combat; and they had about them a people so dark in mind, and so steeped in medieval feeling, that it could welcome a tyrant with the cry: "Down with liberty! Hurrah for chains!" The first Spanish Cortes (of recent times) was set up in 1810. The lawyers and literary men who abounded in it were very largely imbued with French ideas, and, though they swore to tolerate no faith but Catholicism in the land, they abolished the Inquisition, curtailed the power of the clergy, and framed a constitution. But the national hatred of France was rising year by year, the monks and clergy were working at fever-heat, the revolutionary wave was ebbing all over Europe, and, in the general reaction, Ferdinand returned to Spain. How he duped the Liberals, and tore up the constitution he had promised to maintain, is common matter of history. Briefly, the "white terror" assumed a complexion in Spain that shocked even Louis XVIII. and Metternich. With swift and savage treachery, with the enthusiastic support of the monks and clergy, he turned on all who betrayed the slightest leaning to Liberalism. The Inquisition was restored, and a great network of additional spies was spread over the country. The prominent Liberals were at once flung into prison, or barbarously executed, or driven from the land; and then began a minute and merciless inquisition into men's opinions. The state of things

at Madrid was akin to that at Paris in 1793. "A premium was put upon information, and a secret police penetrated into every household in order to discover the secrets of consciences and to purge Spain of every Liberal element. Neither age, sex, virtue nor poverty afforded protection against these terrible commissions: wealth alone sometimes saved one from death."¹ Great numbers of men of culture and character were executed; their wives and daughters, delicate Spanish ladies, were sent to herd with the criminals in the galleys for not denouncing their husbands or fathers. Over the provinces a "Society of the Exterminating Angel," having relations with all the leading bishops and all the monasteries, carried the terror in its most ruthless form. The death penalty was passed against any Spaniard who should dare even to mention the constitution; the bare possession of an English Liberal newspaper was punished with ten years' imprisonment in the deadly jails of Spain. Yet—it is well to remember this when one is tempted to speak of the innate indolence of the Spaniard—Liberalism triumphed after six years of this appalling repression, and again in 1822; and it needed the intervention of a large French army to restore Ferdinand to power. In spite of French counsels of moderation he at once recommenced the terror. "Modern civilisation has seen no such instance of brutal, blind ferocity as that which followed the arrival of Fernando in Madrid. . . . It was sufficient for a person to have belonged to the militia, or even to be related to a known Liberal, for the most inhuman tortures to be inflicted upon him by the unrestrained populace. . . . Not even the most bloodthirsty wretches of the French Reign of Terror equalled the President of the Military Commission at

¹ G. Hubbard, "Histoire contemporaine de l'Espagne."

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Madrid."¹ Hubbard puts it that "under the ministry of Victor Saez, the king's confessor, the hangman seemed to be the most active instrument of power." "The Cambridge History" (vol. x.) observes that "the reaction was more violent, blind and cruel than in 1814." And the revival of Liberal ideas in Europe in 1830 led to fresh brutality, so that the repressive period lasted until the death of Ferdinand in 1833.

A glance at this fearful chapter in the history of modern Spain is essential for a proper understanding of the religious situation to-day—indeed, of the whole predicament of Spain. From 1814 to 1833 many thousands of the more cultivated and energetic Spaniards were executed or banished, and what is euphemistically called its "quietism" was brutally impressed on the Spanish character. Culture was proscribed, and the civilisation of the land was put back half-a-century. Only two journals were published at Madrid, and they merely reflected the temper of the despot. Colleges and universities were closed; and the great schools of bullfighting appeared in their stead. To have passed through twenty years of such a rule as Ferdinand's is a sufficient explanation of the comparative weakness of the anti-Roman movement in Spain to-day; nor—the reader will learn with surprise—is the reign of brutal repression yet over in the country. But I will touch briefly the later story of anticlericalism in Spain before I enlarge on the present situation.

The Carlist disruption was the second factor in the exhaustion of the nation, but it indirectly brought relief to Liberalism and helped to spread anticlerical

¹ "Modern Spain," p. 256, by Major Hume, who will not be suspected of bias against the clergy. He is well within the mark when he observes that the monks and clergy were "responsible for much of this atrocity."

ideas amongst the people. By one of those tragic errors that marked Rome's conduct in the Latin countries throughout the nineteenth century the clergy sided with Don Carlos, the late king's brother, who promised to continue the methods of Ferdinand if the crown were secured for him. The Liberals therefore found themselves in the novel position of supporting the legitimate sovereign against a usurper and a rebellious clergy. Greatly as the queen's party disliked them, the withdrawal of the nobles and the stricter Conservatives to Don Carlos prepared the way for a Liberal majority in the Cortes and the passing of anticlerical measures. Even the mass of the people were now turning against the monks and learning to spell the word progress. The Jesuits and the monks were suppressed, the press was liberated, and the anticlerical propaganda proceeded briskly.

From 1833 until 1873 we have a series of heated and revolutionary conflicts between the Liberal and Conservative elements, with alternating victory, but the anticlerical cause steadily gains. The revolutionary wave of 1838 washed over the Pyrenees to some extent, and again the Conservatives made a drastic clearance of heretics, political and religious. The Liberals returned to power in 1854, framed a new constitution, and, after granting compensation, sold the Church lands. This provoked a reaction and counter-revolution in 1856; but the Liberals returned in 1858, and were driven out again in 1866, when a fresh persecution was set afoot. Decrees were passed, says Major Hume, "such as would have shamed Ferdinand VII." and the most shameless tyranny was rampant once more. Yet within two years the various progressive bodies united, and effected a successful revolution. For a time they tried a new

dynasty in Amadeo of Savoy, but his foreign ways displeased, and in 1873 the Cortes proclaimed a republic by 258 votes to 32. It was wrecked by the army, and Alfonso XII. was placed on the throne. For some years the godson of the Pope kept the Liberals in check, though he made only slight concessions to the reactionaries, but from 1880 onward Liberals and Conservatives have alternated in power ; though not so much by the will of the electorate as by mutual agreement to divide the spoils of politics.

It will be seen that this brief sketch of the history of anticlericalism in Spain disposes one to examine the present position of the Church with greater discretion. For nearly a hundred years there has been a powerful body of cultivated Freethinkers and Freemasons in Spain. They have attained to power in the Cortes time after time, though the consciousness that the vast majority of the nation, totally illiterate and fanatically Catholic, were ready at any moment to be fired by priestly oratory set limits to their anticlerical legislation. In spite of the fearful persecutions that were directed against them during more than a quarter of a century, nearly 10,000 Spaniards described themselves as "Freethinkers" at the census of 1877, and it was well known that these were only the bolder members of a very much more numerous body. An impartial German authority, Wilkomm, declared that indifferentism was general in Spain in the early eighties, and that religious bigotry was known only in the remoter provinces. No one, indeed, disputes that the Church, with its opposition to progress and education, its Inquisition and its sanction, if not encouragement, of the most brutal persecution of its critics, had, a quarter of a century ago, lost the allegiance of more than half the cultivated men of Spain.

Curiously enough, the only serious difference of opinion is in regard to the fortunes of the Church in the last twenty years, when it has suffered such heavy losses in France and Italy. Mr Houghton (article "Spain" in the recent supplementary edition of the *Ency. Brit.*) affirms that Wilkomm's estimate of the religious condition of Spain in 1886 is by no means applicable to the Spain of to-day. He fancies that under the moderate rule of Alfonso XII. and under the Regency the Church has recovered most of the ground she lost between 1868 and 1877. But the number of professed Freethinkers was much higher at the census of 1887 than it had been in 1877, and Mr Houghton himself adds that they "were known to be much more numerous [than the figures suggest], especially in the middle and lower classes." In point of fact the number of seceders has grown enormously in the last three decades, and to-day serious Spanish Catholics are appalled at the situation.

Let me first of all point out one or two features of Spanish life that account for the comparative reticence of seceders from the Church, and add difficulty to our inquiry. The first of these is that the age of bloody persecution is not yet over in Spain. That is a serious statement to make when authorities like Major Hume declare that "the day of religious persecution and tyrannical priestcraft is past for ever, and Catholic Spain is as free as Protestant England" ("Modern Spain," p. xi.). Now, even in Madrid, the Protestants are less free than Catholics were in London more than a century ago. They are not allowed to advertise their services, or to make any official appearance in public. As late as 1894 the opening of the Protestant chapel of Madrid caused an alarming outbreak, and had to be postponed for months. But this treatment of English residents is nothing to the

treatment accorded to native rebels. "Spanish codes," says Mr Houghton, "still contain many severe penalties, including fines, correctional prison and penal servitude, for delicts against the State religion, as *writers and journalists frequently discover when they give offence to the ecclesiastical authorities*" (*Ency. Brit.*: "Spain"). That Mr Houghton is right I have found ample proof. I have been informed by a friend who lived for many years at Santa Cruz, and was perfectly familiar with the people, that not many years ago a young Spanish journalist of that town was put into prison, without trial, for anticlerical observations. He was personally known to my friend, who declares that he was transferred to a Spanish fortress, where the horrible conditions set up consumption, and he was at length discharged—without a shadow of legal process—to die a few weeks later. Except in regard to the death, the story was confirmed to me in every detail by a well-informed Spanish journalist. In outlying parts of Spain no form of trial is even affected in such cases. A word from the bishop to the civil governor is enough.

But offences of this kind are now usually hidden under a false charge, and that, no doubt, accounts for Major Hume's impression. A case of the most flagrant and horrible character occurred at Barcelona so late as 1896. An isolated Anarchist outrage in 1895 had led to the torture of many suspects, and, on the confessions wrung from these in the delirium of the most exquisite pain that could be devised, a number of innocent men were executed. This led to fresh outrages in 1894 and 1896. After the latter, military law was proclaimed, and some three or four hundred men of all shades of political opinion (except Conservative) were driven to the terrible fortress of Montjuich. There were few violent Anarchists among

them. They were mostly Republicans, Socialists, Freethinkers and Freemasons; but all ordinary judicial forms were suspended, and the clergy and governing class took occasion to punish all who were obnoxious to them. With one exception—and he was a Carlist, and brother of an Anarchist—they were all anticlericals. The Director of the Polytechnic Academy, Professor Tarrida del Marmol (professor at the School of Arts and Crafts, cousin of the Marquis of Mont-Roig), was amongst the number, though he escaped, through influence, after six weeks in the horrible jail. His sole offence was anticlerical propaganda. Of the others many were submitted to tortures that seem not to have occurred even in the medieval imagination. Cords were tied on their genital organs, and, under the control of Spanish officers, they were subjected to a pain as intense as it was repulsive. Some were fed for several days on salt fish, and refused a drop of water. They were scourged until their bodies ran all over with blood. They were prevented from sleeping or resting for several days and nights by the whips of the soldiers and jailers. They were flung into the sea, time after time, and only rescued at the point of death. And the torture only ceased when they would sign a paper declaring that some obnoxious anticlerical or political heretic was “an Anarchist.” Europe was, of course, informed that they were all “Anarchists.”¹

¹ See the full account in Prof. Tarrida del Marmol's “Inquisiteurs Modernes.” It may help the reader to understand modern Spain if I say that Anarchists *are* very numerous in the country, but these must not be confounded with the thrower of bombs. Their aim is the peaceful propaganda of the political and economic ideal of Prince Krapotkin and Professor Réclus. However, only a fraction of the Barcelona “Anarchists” belonged even to this school. Nearly all of them abhorred outrage.

More recently still (1906-1907) a case has occurred at Madrid

So much for the "freedom" of modern Spain. It is a country where you do best to respect the clergy externally, whatever you may think in your own mind. But the times are changing, and there is already a wider network of anticlerical societies spread over Spain than in any other country.

The second feature I would point out is that in Spain the religious issue is much obscured by political complications. Lower depths of political Liberalism have revealed themselves—Socialism, Republicanism, Anarchy, etc.—and this has led to a tendency of the historic anticlerical Liberal party to co-operate with the moderate Conservatives, and to compromise on religious questions. I have drawn no conclusion—as I did in the case of France—from the frequency with which the Liberals are "returned to power." It is notorious that in Spain there is "no sincerity or reality in the pretended antagonism of the political parties," as Major Hume puts it. Assuredly there is an antagonism of principles in regard to the Church, but the elections are shamelessly controlled by the party in power, and changes of government are due to a genial understanding between them that if either party is kept out of office too long it will give trouble. Both parties now face a rising body of more advanced thought and a serious menace to their system, so that the political divisions, once so clearly

itself. A cultivated and high-minded Spaniard, F. Ferrer Guardia, was arrested in connection with the attempt on the lives of the king and queen. The Madrid magistrate wanted to dismiss the charge as frivolous, but the procurator fiscal intervened, and for twelve months pressed for sentence of death (by garroting) against Ferrer, who remained in jail. Ferrer's real offence was that he had spent his life and fortune in erecting secular schools in Spain, as the procurator not obscurely hinted. He is a man of culture and of great humanity, and is as notoriously opposed to violence as Tolstoy.

religious, now throw less light on the subject of our inquiry.

The cultivated middle class remains Rationalistic, but it may conceal or ignore the clerical issue when it has more material interests to defend against the anticlerical Socialists and Republicans. This circumstance is of vital importance in seeking *expressions* of dissent from Rome in modern Spain. Just as we saw that the Liberal bourgeois of France were led by proceedings of the Communists in 1871 to moderate their anticlericalism and coquet with the Church, so in Spain to-day the rise of a deep Radicalism, with its menace to their economic interests, imposes some reticence on the Liberals. Their consciousness of the corruption of their political machinery, which the Extremists fiercely assail, increases this tendency; and as the Church of Rome is inveterately opposed to these new democratic movements, and they to her, we must expect a certain amount of compromise on religious issues.

Yet these facts only enhance the significance of the many indications one finds of the condition of Spain. As in the case of Italy, statistics of churchgoing and Easter communions are not available. Nor does the strength of Protestantism help us much. In the Latin countries it makes little and laborious progress.

The German pastor at Madrid estimates the total number of Protestants in Spain at 12,000, and these are mostly foreigners. Professor Unamuno is endeavouring to lead native religion into a form akin to Lutheranism, but he has few followers in this respect. However the whole literature of the subject testifies that the men of Spain have for the most abandoned the Church, and that to-day their wives and families often accompany them. After a careful search amongst writers on Spain, in Spanish, French,

German and English, I do not find one of any weight to support the statement that Mr Houghton makes in the supplement to the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. One popular English writer, Mr Bart Kennedy ("Tramp in Spain"), does indeed strongly confirm it; but as Mr Kennedy acknowledges—nay, boasts—that he set out on his short tour through Spain with no other equipment than a revolver, a passport and a complete ignorance of the language, most people will not wonder that he came to the singular conclusion that the Spanish peasants are the happiest in the world, and their religion and clergy are amongst the chief sources of their happiness. A more serious English writer, Mr R. Thirlmere ("Letters from Catalonia," 1905), might be adduced as a qualified supporter. But as throughout his work, especially in the valuable special chapter on this point, Mr Thirlmere quotes the Spaniards themselves as uniformly saying that "the Jesuits are contentedly moving towards their own ruin and towards the ruin of the whole Roman Church" (p. 292), that "recent events have made the Spaniard, if anything, more of a Materialist" (p. 294), that "the doom of the Church has already been spoken in this land" (p. 296), and that "the Church knows she is doomed in Spain" (p. 437—and this, he says, is repeated by "nearly all he meets"), he turns out to be a strong supporter of my own conclusion. He seems indisposed to welcome it, yet apparently could find none to tell him otherwise. When he states, as his own estimate, that Spain is "a land where, *to woman at least*, Christ still lives," and that the Church gets money mainly through the women, whose husbands "curse their fervour," I need not dissent. The men of Spain are predominantly anti-Catholic or indifferent.

Other writers are explicit enough. "The bigotry one reads of in the Spanish wars of independence,"

says Passarge, "has given place to a sort of religious indifference, if not, as is the case in Catalonia, which is quite full of modern ideas, to a superficial Freethought" ("Aus Spanien und Portugal," 1905, p. 3). In the chief church of Barcelona he found very few men, and those poor and aged. Sarrasi ("L'Espagne d'aujourd'hui") gives the same estimate. In the rural districts, he says, the priest generally acts as mayor, and is the only literate person in the place, so that the men are dependent on him, but "in the large towns the power of the clergy has greatly diminished." The artisan and the professional man generally "are now free from their earlier prejudice" (p. 82). In Andalusia, the lotusland of the superficial traveller, the poor impatiently declare Catholicism "the religion of the rich," and are "beginning to dislike the clergy." The most serious American writer I find says:

"Though an earnest advocate of religious toleration, Castelar never neglects the observance of his Church, and shows deep religious feeling in his writings. In this it is to be greatly regretted that his followers are few [yet he was the Conservative leader]. In Spain, at the present day, there is a marked absence of real religion. The enlightened classes have emancipated themselves from the priests, and at the same time from their belief in the essential truths of Christianity; while the peasantry seem to combine irreligion with superstition. Spaniards never will become Christians after the American or English model; and it may be doubted if they will ever go back again as a nation to anything like the form of Christianity *they have repudiated and outgrown.*"¹

When we turn to native writers we find complete confirmation of these observations of foreigners. A few years ago L. Morote published a series of interviews he had had with the statesmen and writers of his country ("El Pulso di España," 1904). Their general disdain of the Church is very marked, and

¹ "Spain in the Nineteenth Century" (1898), p. 389, by Elizabeth Wormeley.

even the Catholic leader, Nocedal, exclaims to him : "We have abandoned the moral and spiritual interests of the world—those of Catholicism." All the others leave religion out of account in the quest for uplifting agencies, and look to education, political reform, etc.

Equally convincing, in a very different way, is the recent work of Ramon de Torre-Isunza ("La Verdad a S.M.El Rey," 1902). This fervent and philosophic Catholic writer turns his work, which he addresses to the king, into a profound lament on the decay of religion in his "dying country." He is far from anticlericalism, and equally far from fanaticism; some remarkable combination of the Church and modern culture is, he thinks, to save Spain. But he says repeatedly : "Our country is marked by more indifference and practical atheism than any other in Europe. Religion has power only over a very few consciences amongst us. Catholicism exercises no real influence over the manners of the people" (p. 165). What Catholics there are, he says, are mostly "bad Catholics," and "our religiousness is reduced to a pharisaical formalism, so much the more immoral as it is hypocritical" (p. 168).

Another native writer, Gotor de Burbaguena, says : "The clergy are rushing, as if impelled by some external force, to their own destruction" ("Nuestras Costumbres," 1900, p. 19). Meeting the impressions of travellers like Mr Kennedy, he exclaims :

"At first sight it might be thought that we are Catholics. . . . What a deception! What an empty affectation of sentiments we no longer entertain! What a hypocritical submission to a practice that we despise in the depths of our soul" (p. 265).

He points out, as all do, that on weekdays "the only people at church are women, and those generally of advanced age" (p. 266), and that men generally go

to church only when their wives are importunate, even on Sundays.

These citations are typical of the passages one finds on this subject in the various classes of Spanish literature. They show that the educated men of Spain are in the same condition as the educated men of Italy, and that the workers, in proportion as they receive education, follow their example. All that I have said of the literature of Italy applies entirely to the literature of Spain. It reflects the feeling of those who read. I pick up at random, in a store of cheap Spanish books, one that has on its paper cover a long list of the books chiefly circulated by Sempere y Ca., the Tauchnitz of Spain. Of ninety works on the list—novels, drama, history, philosophy, etc.—sixty are translations from the most prominent anti-Christian writers in Europe. The religion of most of the others is unknown to me, but I recognise *ten* anticlerical Spaniards and *one* Catholic. I run my eyes over the shelves in the store: Perez Galdós, Blasco Ibañez, Renan, Zola, Voltaire, Strauss, Haeckel, Draper, Spencer, Darwin, Ibsen, Heine, Réclus, Tolstoy—it is a complete gallery of heretics. Perez Galdós dominates Spain, as D'Annunzio does Italy, or Zola did France; and he is an ardent anticlerical and Republican. In 1900 he produced a play, *Electra*, at the Teatro Español at Madrid. It has no great dramatic merit, but it is a spirited and uncompromising attack on Catholicism. It invited Spain to turn away from the priesthood, and look for salvation to science and naturalism. At the end of the first act, and especially at the close, it was greeted with frantic applause. It aroused so much enthusiasm in Madrid and the provinces that it has been widely credited with a great share in securing at the next election the return of the Liberals with a strong anticlerical pro-

gramme. At Barcelona, not long afterwards, a drama (*Paternidad*) was presented that concentrated in its few acts the fiercest and darkest charges that have ever been made against the Jesuits. It was enthusiastically cheered; and, at a call for the author, a Catholic priest (Segismondo Pey-Ordeix) walked on the stage in clerical dress. At Madrid a bench of magistrates compelled a rich convent to give up a young lady (Sen. Ubao), whom a Jesuit confessor had secretly conducted there.

But we can attain to greater precision in determining the losses of the Church in Spain. In the first place we have the powerful political bodies that are distinctly anticlerical. The character of the Liberals may be gathered from the words of a resolution that was passed at a Catholic congress, and forwarded to the Archbishop of Toledo. It pledged the Catholics never to buy or read the Liberal journals, specifying "*El Imparcial, Liberal, Heraldo de Madrid, Pais, y otros de ese genero.*" The Republicans, Socialists, and Anarchists, who share between them the bulk of the artisans and a large number of the peasants, are even more emphatically anti-Roman. Then there are the Freemasons. Their strength to-day I have not been able to ascertain, but I find a Catholic statement of their strength twenty years ago, when the power of the Church was greater. In 1883 they had 399 lodges in Spain, including 29 at Cadiz, 25 at Madrid, 20 at Murcia, 16 at Seville and 14 at Valencia!¹ We may conjecture how numerous they are to-day.

¹ "La Massonería España," by T. M. Tirado y Rojas (1892). Of Masonic heterodoxy on the Continent it is not needful to speak. In regard to Liberalism I may add that in 1886 a priest wrote a pamphlet entitled *El Liberalismo es pecado* ("Liberalism is a sin"). Another priest wrote a criticism of this, and he was promptly put on the Index and referred to his bishop by the Vatican for correction.

We may indeed describe the whole popular movement in Spain to-day as emphatically anticlerical. A remarkable illustration of this occurred in the autumn of 1902, when a Rationalist-Republican journal made an effort to draw the attention of the Spanish workers to a Freethought congress that was to be held at Geneva. The journal (*Las Dominicales*) was able, when the time came, to give a list of more than 1000 Spanish societies that sent formal support and funds to this violently anti-Catholic congress. A very large proportion were Republican, Socialist or Anarchist (in the philosophic sense) societies, but the details of the long list are curiously indicative of the real feeling of Spanish workers. Industrial, pedagogical and co-operative societies figure in it. Several associations of workers in the remote Canaries telegraphed their adhesion. Many women's societies are included. Indeed, one of the Spanish Freethought journals, *La Conciencia Libera* (of Malaga), is edited by a woman, Señora Sarraga, and has a large circulation amongst women. In the Madrid Freethinking paper *Las Dominicales*, one reads weekly of secular marriages and baptisms, and other indications that the women and children of Spain are abandoning the Church. Secular schools are spreading all over Spain, educating the children of the Freethinkers and Republicans without religion. The Escuela Moderna at Barcelona has 130 pupils, and recently gave a festival to 1700 pupils of affiliated schools. There are thirteen such schools in Barcelona, ten in Madrid, and some in most of the large towns and in many villages.¹

¹ These schools are far superior, as a rule, to the government schools. The Escuela Moderna provides them with a series of thirty-one text-books, many by distinguished writers. Dr Odon de Buen, Perez Galdós, and other writers are directly interested in them. A few sentences from a statement by Señor Lozano of

From all these indications it will be seen that the conventional idea of Spain must be abandoned. The situation rapidly approaches that of Italy, and creeps on toward that of France. Much nearer the truth seems to be the estimate given me by a Spanish writer who has paid especial attention to the subject. He affirms that of the adult males of Spain only from 25 to 30 per cent. go to church, and that even the majority of these go merely to escape importunacy or for some other external consideration. We need not press the latter point; and the former seems to be in accord with the other authorities I have quoted. It means that of the 4,000,000 or 5,000,000 adult males in the country only about 1,000,000 are

Madrid will show how little the average traveller knows of Spain:

"Twenty-five years ago scarcely anybody in Spain dared venture to speak against the Church. The publication of *Las Dominicales*. [his journal] was regarded as a national scandal. Excommunications, prosecutions, fines, threats of murder, the actual assassination of one of its principal writers—nothing was spared. To-day, instead of attacking us, the Church has to defend itself. More than a hundred Republican journals are decidedly Freethought in character, and the immense majority, if not all, of the Republican societies, of which there are thousands, are Rationalistic. All the societies of Republican, Socialistic, Anarchist and Co-operative character are Freethought societies. For example, at Sabadell, a large industrial city, the whole of the societies and institutions have often appointed me as their delegate at International Freethought Congresses. There are small villages buried away in the mountains, like Prado del Rey (Cadiz) where the majority of the interments are civil interments. In San Vicente de Alcantara (Badajoz) the mass of the people are Freethinkers. In districts like Penalsordo (Badajoz), where I had no idea that even a single Freethinker existed, secular marriages are celebrated, at which the people attend *en masse*, while the strains of the Marseillaise lend music and sentiment to the ceremony." Republicanism is very powerful also. At the last general election it returned three members for Madrid, including Perez Galdós.

Roman Catholics, and these are for the most part illiterate.¹

When we take further into account the movement amongst the women and the transfer of children, we must assess the Church's loss in Spain at 3,000,000 or 4,000,000. The Church's loss means, we must remember, almost the full strength of Liberalism, Freemasonry, Republicanism, Socialism, Anarchy, Freethought, native Protestantism, Spiritualism and the secular schools of the country, besides a mass of unorganised indifferentism. I do not see how it is possible to estimate this collective body at less than a fifth of the population; my Spanish informants insist that it is much more. And it must be remembered that this body of seceders accounts for the greater part of the literate portion of the population—which is only 6,000,000 out of 18,500,000. In the illiterate mass of 12,000,000 (with a minority of the literates) the Vatican may take what pride it will; but they will be literate by-and-by.

It must be borne in mind that the increase of clerical activity in Spain of late years has other than Spanish causes. It is a very poor fallacy to see in it

¹ This includes, of course, 50,000 priests, monks and sacristans, and the large number of workers dependent on Church life. *The Missionary Review of the World* (April 1902) estimates the full clerical corporation at 154,517. There are, besides, 91,226 beggars in Spain, who are all parasites of the Church.

Mr Isaacson, in his "Rome in many Lands," gives several valuable quotations in support of the conclusion I have reached, but he omits to give dates, and I cannot verify them. He refers to an article in *The Church Times* that describes infidelity as quite general in Spain. He further quotes *El Correo Español*, a Catholic paper, as saying that only 1,500,000 of the men and 3,500,000 of the women of Spain are now Roman Catholics. He seems to overlook the children, however, when he adds that the remaining 13,000,000 are indifferent to religion. In any case this Catholic estimate assigns to the Church double the loss that I do.

a reinvigoration of Catholic life in the country. From the early eighties, when the French Liberals first began to put pressure on their Jesuits and other religious, there has been a series of monastic migrations across the Pyrenees. The loss of Cuba and the Philippines threw a fresh flood of clerics and monks upon the mother country. There were in the Philippines 1500 secular and regular clergy, and it was calculated that the Church drew 113,000,000 *pesetas* annually from the islands. All this absorbent body has now been added to the struggling clerical corporation in Spain. The Concordat of 1854 was especially modified in their favour, and they have begun to acquire property as they did in France. To these are now added thousands of fresh conventual immigrants from France, since the suppression of convents there, so that there are now more than 80,000 priests, monks and nuns working or teaching amongst the population. This comparative increase of late years—though the number is little more than half what it was a century ago—merely means that the Church has failed in other parts of the world, and they are concentrating upon Spain.

There are signs that the men of Spain will pass before long from indifferentism to hostility. In July 1906 Lopez Dominguez, an anticlerical, became Premier, and announced a programme that included freedom of worship, the secularisation of education, the recognition of the civil marriage of Catholics and the regulation of the right of (conventual) association. He was met by so fierce a storm (almost entirely raised by the women and the clergy, says the *Annual Register*) that he was forced to resign. But with the growth of education and, possibly, the emergence of the young king from the narrow clerical world in which he has been reared, it will become less possible

for the bishops (several of whom were prosecuted even in 1906) to describe the Premier of the country as "Diocletian" in their pastorals, and to meet his constitutional procedure with intrigue at the palace and riot in the country. The work of educating Spain is proceeding, though very slowly. Education was declared compulsory in 1857. By 1877 it was calculated that about 4,000,000 (out of 16,500,000) could read and write: in 1887 the number was about 5,000,000; and to-day it is *believed*—all Spanish returns are untrustworthy—to be about 6,000,000 (in 18,500,000). The support of the schools is laid almost entirely on the local authorities, and they generally refuse to provide or maintain them. Only about £1,000,000 sterling has been spent on education in three years by Government and municipalities. There are now 24,000 schools in the country, with 1,600,000 pupils, and, though the teachers are wretchedly paid and the instruction is generally ridiculously poor, the light is slowly breaking over Spain.

It is ominous for the Church that anticlericalism spreads everywhere in the path of education, but she has postponed reform until it is too late. Decade by decade she has fought the application of the education law of 1857, and she obstructs it to-day. But if there is one point on which serious reformers of all schools now unite in Spain, as one clear means of lifting their unfortunate country out of the situation that gives so sombre a shade to their writings, it is "Enseñanza"—primary education, especially. It will be given in spite of the Church, and that will be fatal to her.¹ A spirit akin to that of France in 1900 will arise in the

¹ I do not, of course, forget that nearly a third of the nuns of Spain are engaged in teaching. What Spain needs is not instruction of the type given in those schools, but of the type given in the rest of Europe.

country. Catalonia already chafes at the 2300 conventual establishments it somehow supports; Barcelona murmurs angrily under its burden or 165 spacious homes of idleness, some of which cost hundreds of thousands of pounds. The nation at large will come to read, in the stirring pages of Perez Galdós ("Episodios Nacionales"), how for a quarter of a century the clergy aided the brutal repression of every effort to bring Spain into line with the general advance of Europe. It will open wide eyes to the fact that they have tolerated clerical practices, such as the sale of indulgences, that the rest of Europe thought to have been abandoned by Rome three centuries ago. In that inevitable awakening of the Spanish people it will fare ill with the Church of Rome.¹

¹ NOTE ON THE SALE OF INDULGENCES.—I called attention to this religious practice in modern Spain in an article in *The Contemporary Review*. I there explained that for seventy-five *centimos* the Spaniard buys, at the book-store or of a priest, a *bula* (a paper signed and sealed by the Archbishop of Toledo) granting a plenary indulgence to himself (after confession), or one offering him a plenary indulgence for a dead relative; or for fifty *centimos* (5d.), one granting him permission to eat meat on nearly all the fast days of the year. I need hardly observe that the Church does not profess to "sell" them. You give her an "alms" (for herself, as the *bula* declares, not for the poor), and she gives you the indulgence. Every year a special decree is received by the archbishop from the Vatican authorising this monstrous practice, fresh *bulas* are printed and issued, and a troop of medieval heralds announces the fact on the streets of Madrid. But there is a fourth and more infamous *bula*—the "thieves' *bula*." This egregious document, which costs one *pes.* fifteen *centimos* (1s.), assures the buyer that if he has any ill-gotten property in his possession, of which he does not know the name and address of the owner, he may retain it and consider it his own, in consideration of his "alms" of a shilling to the clergy. One *bula* covers twelve shillings' worth of property, and any number of *bulas* may be "taken out" up to fifty. If the value of the stolen property exceeds 735 *pesetas* (about £30), "application must be made to us for a fitting solution of the case," says the archbishop's *bula* gravely. It is difficult to conceive a more cynical document written

PORTUGAL

The condition of religion is so notoriously similar in Spain and Portugal, and the population of the latter is so much smaller than that of the former, that it is unnecessary to make a minute inquiry into the remainder of the Peninsula. I am aware that a great deal of hostility exists between the two countries, and they dislike the habit of bracketing them together. But there is so close a parallel in their histories and their cultural conditions that the situation of the Church is the same in both countries.

Portugal, it will be remembered, was the first kingdom to expel the Jesuits in the eighteenth century. The work of the Marquis de Pombal was, however, undone during the reign of Maria I., and the defection from Rome began, as in Spain and Italy, with the infiltration of the ideas of the French philosophers. Towards the end of the eighteenth century "the educated classes were brought up in the doctrines of the Encyclopædists," says Morse Stephens (Portugal). But the spread of French culture was limited, not only by the general condition of dense ignorance, but by the early hostility of Portugal to Napoleonic France. The Freemasons did indeed welcome Junot's troops, but the nation at large soon joined with England in a fierce opposition to everything French. The king had fled to Brazil—where his son was grand master of the Freemasons—in 1807, and a few years after Napoleon's

in religious language. A full account of these *bulas*, with facsimiles and translations, is given in "Romish Indulgences of To-day" by "Fulano" (an English minister living in Spain, I believe), and I have taken care to secure copies of the *bulas* and verify the facts. The strain that these facts put on the apologetic powers of the English clergy may be seen in Father Sydney Smith's "Are Indulgences sold in Spain?"

fate, the Liberals obtained power, forced the regency to summon the Cortes, abolished the Inquisition, and framed a constitution on modern lines. This constitution was endorsed by John VI., on his return, and the Liberals generally held their own in the struggle with the clericals until John's death in 1826. His son preferred to remain Emperor of Brazil, and left the throne of Portugal to his daughter, with Dom Miguel as Regent.

At this juncture the clergy and reactionaries made a bargain with the usurper something similar to the unlucky alliance of the Spanish clergy with Don Carlos. Dom Miguel secured the throne with little trouble, as he swore to respect the Liberal constitution. "That he took the oath as a political necessity and with the secret reserve of his legitimate rights is practically certain," says "The Cambridge History" (vol. x. p. 321). "His subsequent actions showed that he did not regard his oath as binding on his conscience; his Jesuit training would make it easy for him to rest content with the absolution of the Church for a breach of faith committed on behalf of the good cause." Here again the misguided clergy allied themselves with brutality and deception, and heaped up the fearful account they would have to face when the inevitable hour of general enlightenment should come. A reign of terror only surpassed by that at Madrid set in. "Death to Liberals and Freemasons" was the first principle of the authorities and the clergy from 1828 to 1832. A large number of the more progressive Portuguese (some historians say 17,000) were executed, as many more were deported to Africa, and some 30,000 were consigned to the jails of Portugal. Under the stress of this sanguinary and treacherous persecution the Radicals of all schools united, Don Pedro was invited to cross over from

Brazil, and the crown was, in 1834, restored to his daughter.

The restoration was a fresh triumph for Liberalism and a heavy blow for the Church. Tithes were abolished, monastic property was confiscated, and for a time all the monasteries and convents in Portugal were closed. But it is needless to pursue the story throughout the long series of revolutions and counter-revolutions. The anticlerical party has maintained its position, and the educated Portuguese are to-day no more Roman Catholic than the educated Spaniards. Several of the quotations I have given (as, from Passarge's "*Aus Spanien und Portugal*") apply explicitly both to Portugal and Spain. Guyot ("*Le bilan de l'Église*") even holds that Portugal is "more emancipated than Spain," and the distinguished Lisbon journalist and pacifist, Magalhaes Lima, makes the same statement. But the mass of the people are even more illiterate than the Spaniards, and there is less effort being made to educate them. In 1878 the illiterates were 82 per cent. of the population: to-day the proportion has only been reduced to 78·6 per cent. In 1900 there were only 240,000 pupils in the elementary schools of Portugal, though education has been declared compulsory since 1844.

On the other hand there are 93,979 parish priests to the population of 5,423,132—a parish to every fifty people! With this enormous and wealthy corporation working for the Church, and with the mass of the people at a lower cultural level than any other nation in Europe (except Russia, perhaps), we cannot expect more than a general secession of the educated class, and a proportionate growth of anticlericalism amongst the more insurgent political bodies. In proportion to the population, Rome has lost heavily in Portugal, as in the rest of the Latin world. But

as the total number of literate and adult males is not more than 500,000, the number of seceders will not greatly swell the total. Enough to say that the Church has lost more than 50 per cent. of the Portuguese who can read, besides large numbers of workers, and that the revolt grows with the spread of education.¹

¹One positive indication has come under my notice. Chance put in my way an official Masonic document giving the number of lodges in Portugal and Portuguese Africa in 1905. The Spanish work I quoted above ("La Massonería en España") declared that there were only two Masonic lodges in Portugal in 1883. This official document gives the number of lodges in 1905 as 105! And the Portuguese Freemasons are especially pledged to anticlericalism.

Another indication is found in the strength of Republicanism, which seems to be curiously underrated outside Portugal. Not only have the Portuguese Republicans five journals in Lisbon alone (the *Vanguardia Mundo*, *Paiz*, *Voz Publica* and *Lucta*), and several in the provinces, but they have a very considerable following amongst leaders of culture. The directorate of the movement consists of Professor Machado, Señor D'Almeida (ex-deputy), Señor Costa (a distinguished lawyer), Señor Gomes (doctor of law and well-known sociologist), and Señor C. D'Almeida (an influential physician). The party includes savants like T. Braga, J. P. Sampaio, P. Zelles, D. Luite, etc., and poets like G. Junquero and G. Leal, and many professors, authors, etc. The idea that it consists of obscure groups of uneducated workers is ludicrous. In Spain the same party includes men like Perez Galdós, Spain's greatest writer, and Señor Salmeron (ex-rector of university).

Add the Freethinkers, who are very strong, the Socialists, the Anarchists, and the unorganised seceders, and it will be seen how much the Church has lost in Portugal.

CHAPTER V

THE LATIN WORLD—SPANISH AMERICA

A SIMILAR but more interesting study confronts us when we turn to consider the teeming millions of Spanish America. The Catholic historian of earlier days, seeking some earthly indication of the plan of Providence in allowing half of Europe to secede from the Church, never failed to direct his readers' attention to Central and South America. There a new Catholic nation had arisen to compensate the Church for her losses in the Old World. From the prairies of North America to the Strait of Magellan the devout Spaniards and Portuguese had overrun the land, and peopled it with loyal followers of the papacy. Nor did the new provinces seem to be threatened by the rise of a sturdy spirit of independence and cultivation in the farther north. The chain of the Andes might have been drawn across the frontier of Mexico for all the influence that early "Americanism" seemed to have on the slumbering populations to the south. The characteristics of their motherlands were preserved with a fidelity that has few parallels in the history of colonisation. Great illiteracy, gross superstition and despotic clerical rule seemed to be their unchanging features.

The population of Spanish America to-day is about 65,000,000. Of these the Catholic writer claims some 60,000,000, after making a vague allowance for obviously unconverted natives, Jews, Protestants, Positivists, declared Rationalists, etc. It may be granted at once that more than one-fourth of the

whole Catholic population of the world is in Spanish America. But what a population it is! One-third of the 60,000,000 are aborigines or negroes, who very largely elude every test of civilisation. They rise gradually from a state of complete wildness, in which even the most ardent apologist would shrink from recognising Catholicism, to a state of incomplete civilisation in which Catholic doctrines mingle light-heartedly with pagan beliefs and practices. A third more are half-castes, with, to a very great extent, a half-caste civilisation. Less than one-third are whites, and these whites, apart from certain classes of foreigners, are at a lower cultural level than Spain and Portugal. Of the 65,000,000 about 53,000,000 are densely ignorant and illiterate. And of the remaining 12,000,000 (whites and half-breeds) the majority of the men, we shall see, are either indifferent to, or intensely hostile to, the Catholic Church.

It may be a matter of indifference to the Church, from its point of view, whether its followers are literate or illiterate, civilised or uncivilised. To the social observer, and especially to those who would forecast the future, it is a point of vital importance. He will be quite prepared to find that these unthinking masses, absolutely cut off from the thought of the modern world, totally ignorant of the movements that are taking place in religious life, have not stirred very far from their traditions. Their fidelity is the mere quiescence of an inert mass, not a discriminating choice to remain Catholic. The serious problem for the social observer is to discover the attitude towards Catholicism of the educated one-fifth of their teeming population. And the moment he approaches this problem he discovers what he has discovered in Italy and Spain. Of the cultivated minority the Church of Rome has lost a good 50 per cent. in the course

of the last century ; and her losses increase with each fresh extension of education. It is not too much to say that she had lost 7,000,000 or 8,000,000 inhabitants of the chief countries of Spanish America.

This will be amply proved by a detailed inquiry into the religious position in each of the larger states, but a few general observations of an historical nature will be useful to the reader. Broadly speaking, the development in Spanish-America has kept pace with that of the other Latin countries. Liberalism was born there, of French (and partly North-American) ideas, at the end of the eighteenth century. The state of the monasteries, the selfishness of the clergy and the medieval nature of the Spanish religion, provided the usual rich soil for it. The small educated class was soon widely infected with it. Throughout the century it has faced storms of clerical opposition that have driven its roots deeper into the soil. The extension of the middle class gave it greater extension ; and the recent spread of education has, as ever, carried the feeling of rebellion in its wake. Voltaireanism, Freemasonry and Positivism have attained large proportions ; and now Socialism and popular Freethought are making fresh ravages amongst the people.

Let me recall, in a few words, the beginning of the trouble in Spanish America. To show how peculiarly prepared the vast territory was for an anticlerical movement at the close of the eighteenth century I will quote a paragraph from our standard history :

“The complaint occurs throughout that the clergy are recruited from two sources: some are the outcasts of Spanish parishes and monasteries: others are creoles, either idle and dissolute men driven by disgrace or want to take orders, or else men put into religion by their parents with a view to getting a *doctrina*, or Indian parish, and making a fortune out of the Indians. The rule of

celibacy was generally evaded; religious duties were hurried through, and the instruction of the Indians was reduced to an absurdity; amidst general immorality in the towns, the regulars set the worst example, making their monasteries places of licence and pleasure."¹

To the thoughtful minds that were chafing under these conditions there came the stimulating news of Washington's fights and of the Declaration of Independence; and a few years later the report crept stealthily from province to province that Europe was aflame with revolution, and the Church destroyed in France. At once the Church redoubled the precautions it had long taken to exclude all ideas of progress.

"It had," says an American student, "prohibited the teaching of the arts and sciences, restricted education to the Latin grammar and the catechism, and limited the public libraries to the writings of the Fathers and to works on civil and ecclesiastical jurisprudence. It had even prohibited the study of modern geography and astronomy, and forbade the reading of books of travel. It discouraged the study of the higher mathematics, and condemned all philosophical inquiry and speculation as heresy. It had even placed under the ban such innocent fiction as 'Gil Blas' and 'Robinson Crusoe'; and there had never been a book, or a magazine, or a newspaper in the whole country that was not conformed to the strictest rule of the Roman Index."²

The ecclesiastical censor now became more vigilant than ever. Printing presses were refused even to towns of 50,000 inhabitants, and imprisonment was freely inflicted on those who sought to disseminate the new ideas. At length the news came that Napoleon had destroyed the Spanish monarchy, and that the King of Portugal had fled to Brazil; and the Liberals

¹ "Cambridge History," vol. x. p. 252. It is somewhat curious to reflect that the great work planned by Lord Acton has proved a veritable mine for the critics of Catholicism.

² "The Columbian and Venezuelan Republics," by W. L. Scraggs, p. 128. The above passage is written with reference to the whole of Spanish America in the eighteenth century.

gathered everywhere under the banner of revolution. By the year 1810 the War of Independence was raging from Mexico to Chile. How in the course of fourteen years the revolution conquered throughout America, and the various republics were set up, is a matter of general history. For my purpose I have only to note that the clergy generally opposed the revolution—a few creole priests aiding the rebels here and there—and, when the work was complete, found themselves facing a powerful anticlerical party in each of the new republics. The Spaniards were finally driven out in 1823, and, when the French Bourbons proposed to assist them, President Monroe laid down his famous doctrine of non-interference from Europe. Portugal recognised the independent empire of Brazil in 1825.

The story of the Hispano-American States has been, notoriously, one of internal conflict and revolution throughout the nineteenth century. This struggle has been one of clerical and anticlerical, as well as of opposed political ideals and conflicting ambitions. Episodically the clerical Conservative party has triumphed so far as to have recourse to drastic and sanguinary repression. In view of the enormous proportion of illiterate followers of the clergy, the wonder is that their opponents have ever held power at all. Yet in most of the states they have alternated regularly in power with the Conservatives, and have—as we shall see—permanently disestablished the Church, and carried other measures that the clergy bitterly opposed, in more than one republic. The century has witnessed the triumphant spread of their ideas amongst the small cultivated class, and the power of the clergy has weakened decade by decade. This will be apparent enough if we take a brief glance at each republic in turn.

MEXICO

Mexico, with a population of some 14,000,000 (the official returns are incomplete), of whom less than 3,000,000 are whites, and some 12,000,000 are completely illiterate, must remain for some time a "Catholic country." Its faith is the faith of light-hearted children, and is generously interwoven with ancient beliefs and practices that are often wholly repugnant to Catholic ideals. Your Mexican will go to mass of a Sunday; and, as he goes, he will throw a kiss to the god of his fathers in the blue sky above. So recently as 1901 the Archbishop of Mexico took courage to suppress the *verbenas*, or native celebrations of Holy Week, which began with religious ceremonies and ended in wild debauch: a relic of Aztec days that the Church had winked at for three centuries. There are to-day "Christian" tribes of Indians who will not allow the priests to assist at some of their rites. A people that, in its pre-Christian days, was familiar with oral confession and communion, monks and nuns, and Easter rejoicings, would feel little breach of religious continuity, save for the abandonment of bloody sacrifice, in adopting Catholicism, when such proceedings as the *verbenas* were permitted. Mexico is very Catholic, "but very far from orthodox," says Prince Roland Bonaparte, in his monumental work on the republic.

Yet Mexico is no exception to the rule, throughout the Latin world, that the educated class is generally lost to the Church. The present position of the Church in the country bears ample witness to this fact. It is entirely separated from the State, and all religions are equally tolerated. Indeed, "the constitution as now established," says Mr Tylor, "re-

presents the complete overthrow of medievalism." The clergy cannot become deputies or senators, and even those characteristic outgrowths of a Catholic soil, monasteries and convents (which flourished even in ancient Mexico), have long been suppressed. It is true that a few still have a precarious existence in certain districts, but that the law is no idle form was shown in 1901. A clandestine convent in Mexico city was denounced to the police, and, though the nuns were of a rigid and devout order, the place was closed and the nuns humanely dispersed. In the following year a priest was summoned before a magistrate and severely admonished for wearing a clerical garb in the street. Other laws enact that no ecclesiastical body can acquire landed property in Mexico (their property was nationalised in 1859); that the cemeteries, hospitals and registers of births and deaths must be in the charge of laymen; that no civil functionaries need attend religious ceremonies, and so on.¹

This remarkably advanced condition of legislation in Mexico, and the complete powerlessness of the Church in face of it, tells plainly enough the heterodoxy of educated Mexico. It is a Roman Catholic country only in the sense that its vast population of illiterates still observe Catholic forms. And if we glance at its history we understand the position. It is a series of Freethinking and anticlerical leaders that have, in spite of clerical opposition, lifted Mexico

¹ A Mexican lawyer, F. P. Garcia, has issued a work ("Codigo de la Reforma") that gives the long list of anticlerical laws passed in Mexico since 1855. All these laws are still in force, and applied when necessary. They are known as the "Reform Laws." The writer, who seems to be a Catholic, speaks of them as the "Deluge." Prince Roland Bonaparte ("La Mexique au début de XXme. siècle") hints that many Liberals may, one of these days, press for the re-establishment of the Church *solely to obtain a firmer control of it.*

into the promising position it holds to-day. Lying so close to the British colonies, Mexico was bound to be one of the first Hispano-American provinces to feel a stir of modern life. The initial revolutions (1808-1821) were largely a creole revolt against Spanish rule, and creole priests often figured in them. They succeeded in ousting the representatives of Spain, but "plunged the country back into barbarism" ("Cambridge History") by their unloosing of the bonds that held the uncivilised masses in check, and there were many years of Anarchy. In the later fifties the Liberals obtained a decisive power, under the lead of the native lawyer Juarez, and framed a constitution. The Church was disestablished, all conventual institutions were suppressed, and, with some compensation, the ecclesiastical property was sold for the national service. Juarez was emphatically anti-Catholic. "I should like Protestants to take root in Mexico," he said to Justus Sierra, "and to win over the Indians; they want a religion that would oblige them to read, and not waste their savings in candles for the saints."¹

His drastic legislation did not tend to moderate the unceasing war of the Colorados and Blancos. For a time the latter returned to power, with the help of French troops, and set the Austrian Archduke Maximilian on the throne of Mexico. Within four years the Colorados swept him from the throne, and restored the republic under Juarez, who remained in power until his death in 1872. His successor, Lerdo, is described ("Mexico: its Social Evolution") as "ironically foreign to all belief, though he had a religion of the greatness of the country." Once more, and for the last time, the clerical party set up their war of women and peasants; but a third great Liberal, Porfirio Diaz, came to power in 1877, and his party has proved too

¹ "Mexico: its Social Evolution" (an official work), vol. ii. p. 423.

strong to be shaken by clerical opposition for three decades. The anticlerical measures of Juarez and Lerdo were confirmed, and have become a settled part of the constitution of Mexico. Porfirio Diaz assumed the presidency of the republic for the seventh time in 1904.

These historical outlines sufficiently reveal the condition of thought in Mexico without any minute investigation of churchgoing or other religious customs. In no other Latin country except France has the anticlerical party passed so many of its ideal measures, and in no country have those measures been so long and so firmly established. Mexico's constitution is a flagrant and standing defiance of the Syllabus and the papal doctrines. Clearly, of the 2,000,000 literate Mexicans the great majority are lost to the rule of Rome, and the loss of power and political prestige is the most serious that its hierarchy has sustained in the nineteenth century. We have again to make the distinction that everywhere does so little honour, and offers so poor an outlook to, the Vatican. It is entitled to claim only the vast illiterate body of half-breeds and natives, of very unorthodox religious practice, together with most of the educated women and a small minority of the educated men. It has lost its hold on the mature mind of Mexico. And now that the liberals are earnestly prosecuting the difficult work of education the outlook is dark for the Church. There is little in Mexican Catholicism to withstand the shock to which the popular mind will be exposed when the literature of the modern world is opened to it. Already there are 871,000 children in its schools (718,715 of whom are in government or municipal secular schools), and the number increases. But with a population that is pure Indian to the extent of 38 per cent., and of mixed blood to a further extent of

43 per cent., the work of education is difficult. As it proceeds, the rebellion spreads amongst the half-breeds and natives. Indeed the fine old race that the Spaniards so seriously arrested in its development has given more than one brilliant statesman and writer to Mexico. They have now a system of elementary education that is free, obligatory and secular; to the 12,000 government schools there are only 346 Church schools. Rome will not count many more years on its 12,000,000 illiterate (and largely semi-civilised) followers.¹

BRAZIL

The largest and most important of the southern republics, the United States of Brazil, presents features to the inquirer into religious conditions that closely resemble those of Mexico. Its population of more than 17,000,000 consists to the extent of nearly two-thirds of illiterate and uncivilised or half-civilised masses—Indians (800,000), negroes (2,250,000), half-castes (11,500,000), etc., on whom the Catholic religion was forcibly imposed long ago, and who have not the mental vitality to count as serious adherents. Yet, with this inert mass of 14,000,000 illiterate followers at their command, the clergy have to live under a constitution that they bitterly resent in many of its chief features. The Church has been disestablished for

¹ Protestantism makes some progress in Mexico, and is encouraged by many officials. At the census of 1895 there were 42,259 Protestants and 70,000 of no religion. But these figures must be taken like those of Spain. I read in some Spanish-American journal an account of the taking of such a census amongst the illiterate. It was explained to them that the alternatives to "Catholic" were "Jew" and "Protestant." They very quickly replied that, though they "did not like the priests," or "set little store by religion," they must be put in the first category.

more than twenty years, civil marriage is recognised and common, and Protestantism and Positivism thrive in full security.¹

The situation can only be interpreted in the same way as the similar situation in Mexico. The brain of the republic is *not* Roman Catholic. The stronger and more cultivated elements of the white population have very largely withdrawn their allegiance to the Vatican, and gone over to the Freemasons, the Free-thinkers, the Positivists, the Protestants or the Spiritualists. The Church's following consists, to the extent of 90 per cent., of the native Indians (many tribes of whom are quite uncivilised and have only the thinnest veneer of Catholicism), the *mestizos*, the negroes (who were imported for the slave-market until 1853) and the mulattoes.

I have stated that the Portuguese royal family passed to Brazil (then a Portuguese colony) in 1807, and that in 1822 Brazil declared itself independent, and named the king's son (a Liberal prince) its first emperor. Liberalism and Freemasonry had, therefore, a favourable soil in Brazil, and, though the milder circumstances gave them a less anticlerical tone than was usual, they made considerable progress. Dawson observes that in the seventies "the lower ranks of the priesthood were uneducated, and real interest in religion had largely been confined to women and the lower classes" ("The South American Republic," p. 484). At the election of 1881 there were sixty-eight Liberals returned against fifty-four Conservatives. The situation was peculiar from the

¹ The reader must remember that, according to the Catholic Church, civil marriage is *invalid* in all Catholic countries where the decree of the Council of Trent is promulgated; and it is *always* a mortal sin for a Roman Catholic. The institution of civil marriage is, therefore, a most important indication.

extent to which the cultivated seceders from Rome embraced Positivism. Nowhere in the world have the followers of Auguste Comte obtained the power that they exercised in Brazil at that time. There was a Positivist centre in the Camera, with a strong following in the country,¹ and measures that the clergy strongly opposed were successfully carried. In 1888, when deputies complained that they could not take the oath, the Camera declared it to be non-obligatory for any who described themselves as non-Catholic. Rodrigues explains that the vogue of Positivism was due to the mathematical and scientific schools that arose in the new regard for culture, and that were largely captivated by the ideals of Comte. The first Positivist society was founded in Brazil in 1876; by 1881 they had twenty members in the Camera, and in 1882 these were increased to forty-five.

The revolution of 1889, when the emperor was peacefully deposed (largely on account of the clerical intrigues of his daughter), and the United States of Brazil set up, was very largely due to their influence. Dawson attributes the spread of Republican ideas in the army, which determined the change of government, to the writings of the Positivist Professor Benjamin Constant. At all events the new constitution, no less than the dismissal of the Catholic ruler, shows the conspicuous preponderance of anticlerical elements. The Church was disestablished, liberty of all cults assured, civil marriage instituted, and the claims of the clergy almost entirely ignored. Besides illiterates, mendicants and soldiers in actual service, all monks were excluded from the exercise of the suffrage, on account of their vow of obedience to a superior.

The persistence of such measures to our own time, distasteful as they are to the hierarchy, is ample proof

¹ See "Religiões Acatolicas no Brazil," by J. C. Rodrigues (1904).

that the majority of the electors—the literate males over twenty—remain outside the Church; and they are reinforced by some 150,000 Protestants (there are 70,000 Germans in Brazil) and 50,000 Maronites (Syrian Catholics). The mass of the people remain Roman Catholic, in their peculiar way, but in the seaport towns, which are mainly white, the Church has lost effective control. So long as it can resist the education of the natives, and the Liberals are so little in earnest about it, the Church will retain its power over the illiterate and grossly ignorant 14,000,000, with a small minority of the educated. Brazil has the unhappy distinction of being illiterate to the extent of 84 per cent. of its population, yet only 2 per cent. of its population attends school (as against 10 per cent. in the Argentine Republic). The difficulties of schooling in so wide a territory, with so high a proportion of uncivilised Indians and negroes, are very great; but the work proceeds slowly, and anticlerical propaganda follows in its wake. Travellers find the same indifference to religion and hostility to the clergy as amongst the illiterate peasants of Spain. The better Indians and half-castes are beginning to realise how the clergy have refused education, and hindered their development. The negroes are learning that, through the supineness of the priests, they remained slaves longer in Brazil than in any other country (until 1871). For our purpose it is enough to find the anti-Catholic element so strongly entrenched in the voting class. Rome has lost power and educated followers to the same extent as in Mexico.¹

¹ Mr Isaacson writes in his "Rome in many Lands": "Of the one-fifth [2] who are educated only the smallest proportion adhere to any form of religion whatever. Statesmen, lawyers, physicians, army and navy officials have almost to a man rejected the historic Christ, and have turned to infidelity and Positivism. In one city

In addition, the Church in the Argentine is now facing the menace of a rising Socialist movement, that makes much progress amongst the working men and women. In 1902, when a projected divorce law was in the Chamber, the meetings of the Catholic women in opposition to it were answered by meetings of Socialist women, and the Bill narrowly escaped passing into law (by two votes). It was a test question, and revealed the complete division of forces in regard to religion.

When we reflect further that there are in the Argentine Republic only 1019 churches (according to the latest enumeration I can find—1895) we realise the enormous losses of the Church. This means one Catholic church to about 5000 people! As there are only some 30,000 Indians in the republic, and about 1,000,000 Spaniards and Italians, the figure shows a remarkable decay of Catholicism. Incidentally, it throws some light on census declarations of religious belief. At the date (1895) when the number of Catholic churches was returned as 1019, and the number of the white population as 4,044,911, the census results gave the number of Roman Catholics as 3,921,136 (with 32,000 Protestants and Jews)! Such figures are ludicrous. As was stated in an Argentine journal at the time, the natives merely mean that they are neither Protestants nor Jews. The educated citizens are divided as is usual, and in this case the anticlericals have a larger following than elsewhere among the workers and the women. An English merchant who has spent many years in the Argentine tells me that the men have overwhelmingly abandoned the Roman Catholic faith.

COLOMBIA

Colombia, with a population of 4,250,000, is one of the states in which the indigenous element includes some hundreds of thousands of uncivilised Indians. Its history shows a long and bitter struggle between clericals and anticlericals, in which the latter have frequently had the advantage. The republic was formed by the great Liberal Bolivar in 1822, after a three years' war of independence, and the familiar struggle dragged on for many decades. By 1862 the Liberals became powerful enough to disestablish the Church, confiscate monastic property, disfranchise the clergy, and set up secular schools. The strength of the seceders from Rome may be estimated from the fact that they maintained these features of the constitution for twenty-two years. The most violent efforts were made by the clergy to overthrow their opponents. Parents were excommunicated who sent their children to the government schools, and in 1876 the clericals even ventured upon an unsuccessful revolution. It was not until 1885 that the clergy were readmitted to the franchise.

Liberalism maintains its strong position amongst the educated, but the elementary instruction is poorly provided, and secondary schools are very largely controlled by the religious bodies. The Church of Rome is the established religion of the country—though other religions are freely permitted—and rules the great mass of people. One of the chief American writers on Colombia, Mr L. Scraggs, describes the capital of Colombia (Bogota) as the most conspicuous in America for the number of, and attendance at, its religious ceremonies. But he adds that "there is more drinking and general dissipation amongst the

greater part of the remainder. I have already observed that there are keen rebels against the Church amongst these Indians and half-castes, when they are educated, but their cultural condition in Guatemala is very low. The illiterates are 90 per cent. of the population, and only 2 per cent. are found in elementary schools. Amongst the small cultivated population the Church has lost very heavily. No religious communities are allowed in the country, and all cults are free. President Cabrera was one of those who supported the anti-papal congress at Buenos Aires in 1906. There are only 12,000 whites in Guatemala; but, on the other hand, great numbers of the Indians are below the level of all serious religion.

ECUADOR

In Ecuador, whose population of 1,250,000 (reputedly) is usually counted Catholic, there are some 200,000 Indians without a tincture of civilisation or Christianity, 500,000 *with* a tincture, and 450,000 *mestizos* with a larger tincture. There are only about 100,000 whites. The people are illiterate to the extent of more than 90 per cent., and the school population is very low. Ecuador was the only republic to condole with the Pope in 1870. But with education the rebellion grows. Civil marriage, the bane of the clergy, is instituted, and "the circumstances," says Rozpide, "have changed to such an extent that the Ecuadoreans now, in spite of the violent and natural opposition of the clergy, can have civil marriage before the officials both in the towns and the rural parishes" (p. 192). The educated men are predominantly anticlerical. Half the natives have no

Christian creed, and the remainder, it is said, worship the dragon as freely as the archangel on their altarpieces.¹

The anticlerical Veintimilla led a revolt in 1876, and became president in 1877. Many anticlerical measures were passed, but he showed symptoms of dictatorial ambition, and was beaten in 1883 by an amalgamation of Catholics and constitutional Liberals. The parties have alternated in power (and in military opposition) since that time, but education has been laicised, tithes abolished, the Church brought under the control of the State, and the founding of new religious communities and immigration of foreign monks forbidden. The latter measures were passed in 1904, and reflect the present situation. More recently the president has urged a scheme for again disestablishing the Church.

CUBA

Cuba is, from the nature of the case, one of the least Roman Catholic of the Spanish-American countries. The nearness of the political struggle with Spain to our own time has kept alive the opposition to Spanish religion. There is, says an American writer, "an almost universal indifference to religion apparent everywhere in Cuba."² One finds towns of from 10,000 to 30,000 inhabitants with only one chapel, the writer says, and the priests explain that the Cubans are indifferent to religion and will not build chapels. As far back as 1883 there were 166 Masonic lodges in Cuba,³ and they counted for much

¹ Stanford's Geography, "South America": an admirable authority on native religion in South America.

² *Missionary Review of the World* (April 1902).

³ "La Massonería en España," by Tirado y Rojas (1893).

in the rebellion. The brutal methods of the Catholic Spaniards to suppress the rebellion did not improve the condition of the Church; nor does the free intercourse with the United States to-day. Catholicism has lost its hold on the better class (though this is sadly decimated by the protracted war), and has only a feeble control, with its scanty chapels and clergy, over the 1,878,951 people—64 per cent. of whom, however, are illiterate.

PERU

The population of Peru (4,609,999—in theory) consists to the extent of 57 per cent. of native Indians, who are described as nearly all Christians, but little civilised; though Carpenter describes some 350,000 Indians, at least, as entirely non-Christian and uncivilised. The half-castes form a further 23 per cent. of the population. The cultural level is very low, and even to-day only 2·86 per cent. of its population attends its schools, such as they are. The statistics of vice (of illegitimate births and drink) are amongst the worst in America, and the country generally is very retrograde. It is now the only republic that has not granted liberty of cults, though a certain liberty exists in practice. The Liberals are not so powerful in Peru, though of late years they have won some measures (such as the recognition of the civil marriage of non-Catholics). Dawson ("South American Republics," ii. 132) says that they do not find clericalism so onerous as in the other republics, and so create less trouble. Of late years, however, more Radical parties, more definitely anticlerical, are growing in power, and the prestige of the Church is more seriously threatened. The Liberals unite with moderate

Conservatives against them, and there is not the clear clerical issue that one finds in other states. However, the history of Peru shows much the same alternation of power and continued strength of the anticlerical party amongst the educated population as in the rest of South America. Mr Isaacson observes that the educated Peruvians are generally "sceptics and materialists."

CHILE

In Chile the Liberal party has greater traditions of success than in Peru. From the time of the national assembly that terminated the War of Independence in 1822 there have been bitter and equal contests between the clericals and anticlericals.¹ A coalition of Liberals (whom Carpenter describes as more numerous to-day than the Conservatives) and Conservatives ruled from 1861 to 1874, and the anticlericals merged into the more radical Liberal Democratic party. In 1881 the anticlericals were powerful enough to institute civil marriage and registration, the secularisation of cemeteries and freedom of religion. Domingo Santa Maria held office for five years in face of a fierce clerical opposition and was succeeded by another Liberal, Balmaceda. In the civil war that Balmaceda's conduct provoked in 1890 it must be borne in mind that the clericals had the support of the dissentient Liberals. A Liberal president was again elected in 1901, but the actual president is Catholic.

However, the political struggle in Chile is not so much one of clericals and anticlericals, as of Radicals and moderates, and merely reveals the usual strong body of seceders from Rome amongst the educated.

¹ See M. R. Wright's "Republic of Chile."

The Church rules the vast bulk of the illiterates, and only 3·7 per cent. of the population (3,205,992) attend school. Some 50,000 of the natives are classed as *bravos*, or un-Christian and uncivilised.

VENEZUELA

Venezuela is one of the three states that were wrested from Spain by the great Liberal Bolivar in the early wars, and has had a powerful anticlerical party from the start. There has been the usual conflict, with the usual alternation of success. Guzman Blanco, another strong anticlerical, ruled from 1870 to 1889 (personally, or through subordinates), and has left his impression on the legislature. The whites are divided to-day in the customary way, but the population (2,600,000) is largely made up of Indians (only partly civilised), half-castes, negroes, and mulattoes, and is generally illiterate.

BOLIVIA

Bolivia also has a high proportion of Indians (920,000), half-castes (486,000) and negroes, in its population of 2,250,000. Culture is at the lowest level, only 2 per cent. of the inhabitants attending school. Yves Guyot unkindly remarks that "its public libraries contain only a few Jesuitical works: the rest have been stolen." Church and State were separated in 1862, and convents suppressed; and an armed revolt excited by the clergy was crushed by the Liberals. The ignorant mass of the people may be described as more or less Catholic, but whole tribes of the Indians are devoid of religion, and heresy is very advanced amongst the educated minority. Even

on the census papers some 24,000 described themselves as non-Catholic. There is at least the usual majority of seceders amongst the educated adult males.

HONDURAS

The population of Honduras (587,500) consists mainly of aborigines and half-castes, in every degree of uncultivation. The small educated white minority has the same historic anticlerical party as the other republics. All religions are free, and the Church receives no support from the State. Education is *secular*, as well as free and obligatory, but the school population is only 7 per cent. of the whole.

SALVADOR

The population of Salvador (a little over 1,000,000) includes only about 100,000 whites (or 20,000 *pure* whites), with 250,000 Indians. The rest are *mestizos* (half-caste). But the educated minority have a strong anticlerical element. Monasteries are suppressed, civil marriage is instituted, and education is in the hands of lay teachers. Culture is very low, however, and the masses are nominally Catholic.

SANTO DOMINGO AND HAITI

The population of Santo Domingo (500,000) and of Haiti (1,425,000) are almost entirely black or mulatto. About 700 schools suffice for the two republics. The people are described as "nominally Catholic," but the blacks are addicted to the darkest and grossest

practices of their native religion. There are only a few hundred Europeans, and the cultural level is of the lowest.

NICARAGUA

Nicaragua has a population of 500,000, at the same very low cultural level. There are only 323 schools. The mass of the people are Indians, negroes and half-castes. Indeed, the Europeans only number about 1200. In the circumstances, a school population of 17,000 is promising. But many tribes (amounting to 40,000) are quite uncivilised, and the vast majority are grossly ignorant.

PARAGUAY

Paraguay (635,571—mostly Indians and *mestizos*) has not only nearly 100,000 uncivilised Indians, but its half-caste population has largely lapsed from Catholicism since the departure of the Jesuits. There are a few hundred whites, and the country has been reduced to a very low level by its appalling wars. About 400 schools, of a kind, are attempting to diminish the general ignorance. A large proportion of the population has never been Christian, or has ceased to be; and there is the usual Liberal element.

PANAMA

Much the same may be said of the new republic of Panama. Its population of 400,000 is made up of Indians, half-castes and negroes (40,000), at all levels of uncultivation. They are nominally Roman Catholic. The whites are very few in number.

COSTA RICA

Costa Rica, with its 386 primary schools to 330,000 people, is in a slightly better position. Some 4000 of its Indians are *bravos*, and there is a fair proportion of negroes and half-castes. But the white population is large. The Catholic Church is established, and has the adhesion of the vast majority, but other cults are free, and the small educated minority shows the usual division.

THE PHILIPPINES

The Philippine Islands may be associated with the South American races as the last fragment of the Spanish Catholic world. Missionaries describe the islands as predominantly Roman Catholic in the northern half (seven tribes), pagan in the centre (2,500,000) and Mohammedan in the southern half (seven tribes). The educated Spaniards in the colony are divided into priests and monks and Freemasons. "The first thing we send to the Philippines are monks, who are insatiable," said the Catholic statesman Castelar. Then come military men and officials, who generally joined the 180 Masonic lodges of the islands (with 25,000 initiates). The Church is said to have derived 113,000,000 *pesetas* a year from the colony: the State only 66,000,000. Educated Filipinos naturally rebelled against this kind of religion, and, save for a mass of uneducated natives, who follow whatever religion is imposed on them until it is displaced by another, the islands are lost to Catholicism. The total population is unknown, and may be anything between 6,000,000 and 12,000,000, of whom

between 1,000,000 and 2,000,000 are nominally Catholic.

To sum up the facts in regard to the religious condition of the Spanish-American world is no light task. Even from the better-ordered republics like Mexico the official returns are confessedly very imperfect, especially in regard to religion, literacy and extent of population. Taking an average of the estimates given, we may assign to these races a total population of about 65,000,000. Of these at least 53,000,000 are quite illiterate and densely ignorant, passing in large numbers below the vague line of what we call civilisation. One would not grudge the Vatican the allegiance of these 53,000,000 *en bloc*, but certain reserves must obviously be made. Several millions are quite uncivilised, and cannot be included in any serious religious statistics. Further, we saw that in many of these states there is not a church to 4000 people, and, in such scattered rural populations, this means that the greater part can only be called Catholic in a somewhat ludicrous sense. With these reserves, and recollecting the indifference we have found among the urban natives in many parts, we may assign some 48,000,000 of this wholly illiterate, childlike and imperfectly civilised mass to the Vatican. And that is more than one-fourth of its entire following!

On the best figures available, and taking the average where they differ, I find that 81 or 82 per cent. of the whole Spanish-American population is illiterate. This leaves about 12,000,000 or 13,000,000 literates, including the very large percentage of foreign merchants, etc. In the peculiar circumstances of the Spanish-American world about 8,000,000 of these will be adult males, and the

serious question for the social observer is, how far the Church of Rome has retained the allegiance of these, as (Germans, etc., apart) they are nearly all of Catholic origin. We saw that (as Carpenter observes in his "South America") the voting strength is predominantly anticlerical. In most states the clergy can only obtain power by summoning to arms the ignorant and pugnacious natives. They are to a great extent repressed by anticlerical legislation of long standing. I do not see how this can be understood if less than 5,000,000 of the adult and literate males have ceased to be Catholic. When we further take into account the secessions among the literate women (so conspicuous in Brazil, Uruguay, Argentine, etc.), the growing anticlericalism amongst the illiterate workers and half-breeds, the rise of democratic anticlerical bodies, and the immense loss of natives since the fall of Spain and the impoverishment of the clergy, it must be said that the Church has lost some 8,000,000 followers in the Spanish-American world in the course of the nineteenth century, and is losing more rapidly than ever in the twentieth. And of the 50,000,000 whom we may with some show of decency assign to it, 90 per cent. are illiterate, and are amongst the most ignorant peoples of the civilised world.

SUMMARY FOR THE LATIN WORLD

A few words will suffice to summarise the conclusions to which we are impelled by this mass of indications concerning the religious condition of the Latin world. It must be recollected, however, that strict formulæ correspond very ill to the fluidity of real mental life. One cannot draw a rigid line between the faithful and the rebels to any

creed, and this is especially difficult in the Latin nations. Religion being so largely a matter of compliance with external forms, we seem at first to have an excellent test in the observance of these forms (such as attendance at mass on Sundays), but such observance is found to have innumerable degrees, in spite of the drastic Catholic law, and is often associated with other unmistakable signs of a decay of faith. I have been content to strike off those descendants of Catholic parents whom it is clearly impossible to regard any longer as members of the Roman Church, from their defiance of its gravest precepts, their active hostility to its interests or their complete indifference to its fate at critical moments. I leave tens of millions in the category of "Catholic" who would certainly fail to respond to any serious test. With this admonition I venture to tabulate the results of my inquiry for the Latin world:

COUNTRY	POPULATION	NUMBER OF CATHOLICS	NUMBER OF SECEDERS
France . . .	39,250,000	5,500,000	25,000,000
Italy . . .	32,500,000	26,000,000	6,000,000
Spain and Portugal	24,000,000	20,000,000	4,500,000
Spanish America .	65,000,000	50,000,000	8,000,000
	160,750,000	101,500,000	43,500,000 ¹

¹ Note that this does not mean 43,500,000 non-Catholics. I leave out of account here the many millions lost to the Church in France before 1870, and the uncivilised millions of South America, besides immigrant Protestants, etc. It has not been possible to determine the proportion of the loss in Italy, Spain and America since 1860, but the 18,000,000 loss indicated belongs overwhelmingly to the last half century. In each case native seceders put the figures higher than I do.

In the light of the preceding study there can be little doubt that before long the Church of Rome will have lost half its strength in the "Catholic countries" (taken collectively). But the numerical statement, formidable as it seems, is not the worst indication of the Church's loss. For all impartial observers the relative percentage of literates amongst the faithful and the seceders is a more appalling circumstance. In each country, and each part of each country, the secessions are in strict proportion to the spread of education, as I have fully shown. The number of seceders includes only a very small percentage of children : the number of the faithful is largely built up of them. The seceders are *literate* to the extent of 90 per cent., and include the great majority of the educated men in the whole Latin world. The faithful are *illiterate* to the extent of 85 per cent. ; grossly ignorant to the extent of 70 per cent. ; imperfectly civilised to the extent of at least 20 per cent.

CHAPTER VI

THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING WORLD—GREAT BRITAIN

THERE is a touch of pathos in the consolation that Latin Catholic writers have found amid the desolation that has fallen upon their Church. From Paris to Rome, from Madrid to Buenos Aires, the comforting assurance circulates that the Church has regained, across the Reformation frontier, all that she has lost in Catholic lands. Even so sagacious an observer as Ferdinand Brunetière declared to his coreligionists, after a visit to the United States, that the increase of Catholicism in that country was "the characteristic phenomenon of the end of the nineteenth century"; while England is regarded as substantially won for the Vatican. Is not the conclusion forced on one? There were not more than 100,000 Catholics in the United States or in England a century ago. To-day, they say, there are 1,500,000 in England and 10,000,000 in the United States. Statistics do not lie.

Statistics do not lie, but those who use them have been known to convey wholly inaccurate impressions with them, and here is assuredly one of the most flagrant cases of such procedure. The English-speaking nations being amongst the most literate in the world, any large gain of allegiance in them would certainly restore the social balance in favour of the Vatican. The complete liberty and the pacific conduct of controversy that distinguish them would make such a gain yet more honouring and agreeable. But the truth is that, throughout the English-speaking world,

the losses of Rome are precisely of that magnitude that French Catholics ascribe to its gains, while the real gains are insignificant. Apart from France, the Roman Catholic Church has *lost more heavily in the English-speaking world than it has done in the Latin world.*

The central fact of the situation, when we survey it impartially from the social point of view, is the dispersal of the Irish throughout the Anglo-Saxon communities. This fully accounts for the apparent increase of Catholicism in England, America and Australia. The millions that have appeared in these lands owing an allegiance to the Vatican owe their existence to no subtle magic, but to a process that is very familiar to the social student—migration. If 1,000,000 Irish Catholics have immigrated into England in the course of the nineteenth century, it can hardly be deemed preternatural that the Catholics of England to-day number 1,250,000; the remarkable thing is that, with the normal growth of population, they do not number 2,000,000 or more. So in regard to the United States and Australia, the other chief destinations of the Irish emigrants. The fact is that in 1801 the population of Ireland numbered nearly 5,500,000. As the population of England has quadrupled since that date, we assume the same, at least—since the present deliberate restriction of the English birth-rate does not extend to Ireland—for the people of the sister isle. But the actual population of Ireland is 4,458,775. Where are the missing 1,000,000? They are the body of the Roman Catholics of the United States and England to-day. Add to them a constant inpouring of French, Italian and German Catholics: the descendants of the Catholics of 1800: and the converts that have been won from the other Churches. The question for the social observer then becomes,

not "Where have the Catholics come from?" but "Wherever have they gone to?"

This must be the leading idea of any serious study of Catholicism in the English-speaking world. It is usually overlooked by the Catholic writer, but my aim is less partial and more scientific. But I may briefly dismiss Ireland itself from our study before I proceed.

Of the 4,500,000 inhabitants of Ireland, 3,310,328 are described as Roman Catholics. This is the population of Roman Catholic descent, and certainly very few of these would care to be described as having left the Church. Let us put them all to the Catholic total; but let us understand on what condition we do it. In 1900 the number of Catholic marriages in Ireland was 14,795; the number of non-Catholic marriages was 6535. That is by no means the proportion demanded by the above figures. But the real situation in Ireland cannot be expressed in figures. I have no wish to reflect on my father's country, but it is surely notorious that, largely literate as Ireland is, it is one of the most uncultivated and ignorant among the literate peoples. The elementary education given is of the narrowest type, and it leads to no further cultivation at all for the vast mass. Poor, light of spirit, little interested in ideas, having the most meagre literature in the world in proportion to their literacy, geographically isolated from more progressive peoples, despotically ruled by a very numerous and generally ignorant clergy, the beliefs of the Irish Catholics are not very important from the standpoint of this essay. What is notable is that amongst the more alert classes rebellion is steadily growing. Mr McCarthy ("Priests and People in Ireland," p. 577) divides the Catholic population into ten parts. The cultivated tenth go to church, but it is "doubtful if any of them really and

fully believe in what the priests call the Faith." No one who has mixed much among them, or read their literature, will doubt this, with a little modification. The circulation of Mr McCarthy's own works—one of which ran to a tenth edition in two years—justifies it. Two further tenths, Mr McCarthy says, fume against the clergy, but are generally orthodox. The remaining seven-tenths are quite orthodox, but culturally negligible. Mr McCarthy holds that they are "going, morally and intellectually, from bad to worse."

However, few of them leave the Church, and it is entitled to claim 3,000,000 followers, at least, in Ireland, on the terms I have indicated. It is more interesting to follow the millions who have quitted their native home, and entered the more stimulating atmosphere of foreign lands. At home they had priests of genial temper and strong political sympathy, and they were, as a rule, ignorant of any serious alternative to Catholicism. We shall see what happens when they pass from their hothouse of faith into the normal air of modern life.

Some day, perhaps, a historian will take up the graceful pen of Gibbon, and write the full story of the remarkable spiritual power that succeeded to the empire of the Romans. Not the least interesting chapter of his work will be that which deals with the fortunes of the Church in Britain during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Possibly he will compare the episode with Julian's brilliant effort to extend the frontier of the empire once more at the very time when it was crumbling into decay. He will at least tell of superb generalship, of exalted legions, of an incipient triumph, and of a joyous illumination of the Eternal City; and then of disaster and failure, of the dearth of generals and of dispirited

legions, of the last grim concentration in face of the enemy.

Little more than ten years ago, as one of a group of priests, I listened to Bishop Paterson gravely expressing a hope that the conversion of England would not come too suddenly, or we priests would be overwhelmed in the flood of converts. The familiar phrase is heard less than it used to be in Roman clerical circles; nay, it is even being blamed as one of the causes of the admitted disaster. About the very time when I was listening, with incipient scepticism, to the naïve hopes of the Bishop of Emmaus, Lord Braye was writing that no progress could be made until that phrase was laid aside and the expectation of a speedy and large change in English feeling was abandoned. The clergy now know that they are fighting a stern fight to preserve, not to extend, their domain in England. They can count to-day barely more than one half the number they *should* have, if they had merely held their own, without making a single convert. The Church of Rome has lost more heavily in Great Britain than in any other country except France; and in no other case is it so easy to establish and determine its loss with such entire certainty.

The chief purpose of this essay is to estimate the losses that the Church has suffered during the last half century, and in the case of England the leakage has occurred almost entirely during that period. But it is advisable to glance at the earlier half century, as we have done in other cases, in order to understand the situation of fifty years ago.

The estimates of the Catholic population of Great Britain at the beginning of the nineteenth century vary between 50,000 and 100,000, and the Catholic writer accepts one or other version according to the task he has in hand. Through the dark years of the

lamentable prosecution to which they were subjected many thousands of Catholics bravely endured their hardships, and remained loyal to their faith. Lancashire had a large native Catholic population that clung with northern stubbornness to its beliefs, and sheltered the outlawed priests, who ministered furtively to them. London, too, contained a good sprinkling of Catholics. The long-continued coercion was wearing them down—the Catholic historians admit that they diminished in number in the course of the eighteenth century—but they were more numerous than is generally believed. An official return that was made to the House of Lords in 1780 put the number at 69,376, and that figure may be taken as a minimal expression of their strength. It was not yet safe for many to avow their belief openly.

In 1791 the Act of Toleration was passed, and their heaviest burdens were removed. Catholic writers usually treat the point with some looseness and inaccuracy, because they are always bent on maintaining the fiction of a great native growth of Catholicism in the nineteenth century. One would be glad to think that a mere return of our fathers to humane feeling dictated the measure, but the truth is, of course, that the outbreak of the French Revolution gave a new direction to their ideas. In 1789 the stream of refugees set in from France. Catholicism was so essentially one with French royalism that the sympathy of the nation could make no distinction. In its growing hatred of the anti-papal Republicans across the Channel, its new perception of the charm of French character and its warm feeling of hospitality to the refugees, England lost half its bitterness against the Church, and the surviving Catholics moved more freely. The culmination of the Revolution in 1792 drove out a further army of Catholic nobles and clergy,

and the cause of the Church gained proportionately in England. Abbot Gasquet says that 8000 French priests fled to England in 1792, and that collections were made for them in every (Protestant) parish church in the country. The effect of all this on the fortunes of English Catholicism may be imagined. Milner's biographer (intent, as usual, on magnifying the subsequent native growth) says there may have been 70,000 Catholics in England in 1803. There must have been more than 100,000. The French clergy were not idle during their ten years' stay in England—many remained until 1814—and there had been 70,000 Catholics in 1780. Moreover, the emigrations from Ireland increase notably after the troubles of 1798.

Let us say that the century opened with 100,000 Catholics in this country and a quicker vitality amongst the older faithful. By 1814, Gasquet says, there were 49,800 Catholics in London alone, with thirty-one priests and eleven chapels. An official Roman document puts the number at 200,000 in 1826, but this seems to be optimistic. If we accepted all the figures quoted so lightly by Abbot Gasquet it would be singularly disastrous for his cause. He says, for instance, that Bishop Griffiths estimated the Catholic population of London in 1829 at 146,000 (in a population of 1,500,000). As we shall see that they do not reach that number to-day (in a population of 6,000,000, and after eighty years of strenuous proselytism) the inference would be appalling. However, Catholicism made slow and stately progress during the thirties under its four vicars apostolic (increased to eight in 1840), and its quiet and rather Gallican intellectual leaders (such as Lingard). Catholic emancipation was won in 1829, and by 1840 there were 463 chapels in England and Wales.

Then there set in the famous movement from the Anglican Church to the Roman that gave rise to all the inflated hopes of the following decades. The conversion of Newman in 1845 gave the Church the finest advertisement it has ever had in England. Catholics were dazed with their sudden fortune. In 1850 we find a list to 200 converted Anglican clergymen; before the end of the century Cardinal Vaughan extended the list to 556 (though that is less than the number of French priests who had left the Church in *five* years), and added 256 lawyers (the next most susceptible group, it appears) and physicians and "about a hundred admirals, generals and field officers" — mainly the latter, one presumes. To complete the ornamental part of their gains during the sixty years I must add (from Mr Gordon Gorman's "Converts to Rome") 32 baronets and 417 members of the nobility. In the train of this gilded band went a large number of ordinary men and women. What the total gain to the Church was it is impossible to estimate. I have not the least wish to restrict the figures, as—if the reader will pardon the paradox for the moment—the larger the list is the heavier will prove to be the net loss of the Church. Mr Gordon Gorman has laboriously compiled a directory of converts. He describes them, somewhat airily, as numbering "nearly 10,000 per annum" so late as 1900, when the stream had begun to trickle rather pathetically; but, though he ranges over the records of sixty years, he gives the names of only about 4000.

But it will prove unnecessary to estimate the number of converts from the English Church if we turn back and consider the fortunes of Romanism from another point of view. Prestige the Church won, and wealth and culture, from this remarkable accession of fine and

sensitive men and women, but its great increase in numbers has come from a very different quarter, and one that is too often overlooked. Up to this point I have almost entirely followed Catholic writers such as Abbot Gasquet ("Short History of the Catholic Church in England and Wales"), Mr Percy Fitzgerald ("Fifty Years of Catholic Life") and W. T. Murphy ("The Position of the Catholic Church in England and Wales"). Now, when I reach the real turning-point in their Church's fortunes—the Irish invasion—they wholly fail me, or say next to nothing about it. To mention it might detract from the legendary air of their story, I suppose. It is no wonder that Irish Catholics like Mr Davitt (*Freeman*, June 1902) scornfully retort that of the 1,750,000 (?) Roman Catholics in Great Britain only 100,000 are English. Even less partial observers like Mr H. G. Wells seem to have missed this element of the situation when, on the ground of the *apparent* increase of Catholicism, they predict a great triumph for it in the twentieth century.

The moment we take account of the Irish immigration the situation of the Roman Church in England entirely changes. Until 1851 the returns of emigration were not properly analysed, but there was a continual exodus from the end of the eighteenth century. The population of England nearly doubled between 1801 and 1841: the population of Ireland rose only by 50 per cent. In the next ten years it *fell* from 8,175,124 to 6,552,385, instead of rising to 10,000,000. The terrible famine of 1847 scattered its home-loving people over the English-speaking world. More than 2,000,000 emigrated in three years, and millions have since followed in the familiar paths. In those days of sluggish sailing ships and extreme poverty a very large proportion of the emigrants could do no more than reach Liverpool and spread slowly over the

north of England, where tens of thousands of their countrymen already lived. It appears from the official figures that only 780,000 Irish entered the United States between 1840 and 1850, so that a very large proportion of the emigrants must have come to Britain—many, no doubt, to leave for America when they had earned a little money. At once Catholicism received an immense accession of numbers in the north, and many of the more enterprising and less distressed emigrants pushed on to London. At the census of 1881 it was found that there were then living in England 781,119 persons who had been born in Ireland; and, as most of these had come over more than thirty years before, a fresh generation of Irish-born Catholics, very frequently the outcome of mixed marriages, had appeared. The net increase must be put at 90 per cent. at least; in other words, there were at least 1,500,000 Irish immigrants and their descendants living in England.¹

Now the distress had fallen more severely upon Catholic Ireland than upon the north, but we will allow the ordinary proportion at that time—about one-fifth—for Protestant emigrants. The result is that, on the most moderate reading of the official statistics,

¹ It may be useful to trace the growth of the one of these families which is best known to me. In the late forties my paternal grandfather settled in Macclesfield with his wife and three children. Two of the children married—both married Englishwomen—and had fifteen children. In 1881 the five immigrants of the forties were represented by sixteen living individuals; they are now represented by more than thirty living members—in spite of the fact that a third of the children in the first and second generation remained unmarried, and that the proportion of children in the third generation is only three per family. I know scores of these immigrant Irish families that have become even more extensive. The percentage of mixed marriages is very high, and at each such marriage there is a rigid stipulation that all the children shall be Catholics.

by 1881 the Catholic Church in England had received the addition of 1,250,000 ardent believers from the sister isle; and this point the Catholic historian usually overlooks!

Indeed, Catholic arithmetic is the most deadly of boomerangs. I noticed that Abbot Gasquet assigns 146,000 Catholics to London in 1829. As the population of the city has increased fourfold since then, and there has been an enormous immigration of Irish, Italian, French and German Catholics, and a most intense proselytic activity, what should they number to-day? They *do* number about 120,000. Another Catholic writer (*Month*, July 1885) computes that there were 800,000 Catholics in England in 1841. As the population of England has more than doubled since 1841, these should now be 1,700,000; and to them we should add (to date) 2,000,000 Catholics of Irish descent, and some 300,000 French, Italian and German Catholics. This would give an actual Catholic population of 4,000,000, without counting the "10,000 per annum" converts! In point of fact, the Catholic population is about 1,200,000. Mr Murphy quotes with apparent approval this comment of the Census Report on Education on the religious census of 1851 (in which the Catholic authorities supplied the number of *worshippers* as 395,303): "The total number of persons of this faith cannot be less than one million, and probably exceeds that number." If that is true—as it certainly is—their population to-day should exceed 3,000,000, instead of falling below 1,250,000. Finally, Father Werner ("*Orbis Terrarum Catholicus*") gave the Catholic population in 1888 as 1,359,831; which is much more than it numbers to-day, though far less than it ought to have been even twenty years ago.

Let us do their arithmetic more soberly for the

only remembering, that the Catholic population tends to increase more rapidly than the non-Catholic, partly because it lies mainly among the improvident poor, partly because the Catholic Church forbids under mortal sin any deliberate restriction of offspring, and partly because it claims *all* the children when one parent is a Protestant. In 1841 the Catholic population must have been, by normal growth and immigration, at least 300,000; to-day it should be at least 700,000. To these must be added a half century of conversions, or a fairly full stream from 1841 to 1908. I do not think we could put these and their descendants at less than 200,000. Catholics further claim—I think rightly—300,000 French, Italian, Spanish, German and Polish immigrants, or their descendants. Thus we get a total of 1,200,000. Then there are the Irish Catholic immigrants, who number at least 1,000,000. When we remember that most of them were here before 1860 (later emigrants going mostly to America or Australia), and bear in mind their rate and manner of increase, we must count them to-day as numbering about 2,000,000. We saw that they numbered 1,250,000 twenty-eight years ago. This gives a total of 3,200,000. And since the Catholics of England and Wales actually number not more than 1,200,000 (as we shall see), we find *a loss of two millions*, instead of the remarkable growth that some writers affect to discover.

In this conclusion I am fortunate to have the support of more than one Catholic writer. The work of Mr Murphy to which I have referred was a prize essay on the position of Catholicism, issued in 1892 by the Catholic "Fifteen Club." The preface, by Lord Braye, is painful reading. He says: "We preach the truth of God, undivided, undefiled, there is none to listen: any or every religion constructed by man, and

avowing itself only human, boasting of fallibility—that is to say, untruth—any and every such is accepted by the English people. Debt has fallen like a blight on our impoverished means of evangelising this land.”

The whole preface is a lament and an appeal to Catholics to descend from foolish dreams to hard realities. Mr Percy Fitzgerald seems to take as his estimate of the actual Catholic population the figure given by Baumgarten—1,381,000 for England and Wales. A pamphlet published at Angers (*La décadence Catholique*, by “Patriote”—issued in English by Mr Kensit) quotes Father Mitchell, of Westington, as saying from the pulpit that his Church has lost 1,000,000 souls in forty years; and a writer in the *Month* as saying: “A few years ago we reckoned up 1,362,000 Catholics: that was about 1,000,000 less than we expected.”

It is, indeed, easy to show that the Catholic population of England and Wales has fallen below 1,250,000. First let us consider the Catholic population of the Metropolis, where the proselytising agencies—the leisured communities of Jesuits, Oratorians, etc., the finer churches, the social pressure, the employment of the press, etc.—have exerted their utmost influence for half-a-century. Few people are aware how subtle and devoted the campaign has been: few are aware how extraordinarily slight the result is, and how small a proportion of London’s population is Roman Catholic. Probably in no other part of the world has the policy of bluff been more successful. Yet in this case the most positive figures are available, and there can be no question about the conclusion. Speaking, some years ago, from a recollection of clerical days, I said that¹ when Bishop Vaughan became Archbishop of

¹ See my “Twelve Years in a Monastery,” ch. xiii., and my article in *The National Review* (August 1901).

Westminster, he, in a flush of confidence, took a census of his diocese (which includes the greater part of London, Essex, Middlesex and Hertfordshire). The result was not made public : it showed that of 200,000 nominal Roman Catholics in the diocese, at least one-third never went to church. My recollection of clerical gossip is confirmed in Mr Fitzgerald's book (p. 336). He says that on some of the census returns the total was 200,000 ; in others it was only 156,000. The difference is the difference between nominal and real Catholics, faithful and obvious seceders. Mr Fitzgerald is ingenuous enough to dwell on the difficulties of taking the census, and to describe the clergy as *exploring the courts and alleys* to ask if people were Catholics. The kind of Catholic who has to be sought in his home, and asked if he is willing to call himself a Catholic, is a strange adherent of a Church that binds him under pain of eternal damnation to attend mass every Sunday. But the clergy were not so foolish. I happened to be giving clerical assistance to a priest in an east-end London parish on the Sunday when he filled up his census paper. "How many Catholics have you?" was the first question. He replied : 6000. There were known to be about that number of Irish-Catholic descendants in the district. "How many go to church?" We made careful observation, and found that less than 1000 (and these were mostly children) complied with that characteristic test of Catholic belief. To the further question, how many youths attended mass, he replied, almost cynically, about 5 per cent. In this one parish alone more than 4000 were lost to the Church. And this, broadly, is the condition of East London, on either bank of the river, from the Tower to Tilbury. A zealous priest I know started a mission at Bow Common. In the first three streets he explored he

secured 120 children of lapsed parents. He dare not search farther. At Barking there were 200 children in the schools, and not 50 adults (instead of 800) at mass.

Mr Charles Booth ("Life and Labour in London," last volume) has been singularly indulgent in this part of his work. He finds the poor Irish "with few exceptions Catholic, and generally attached to their religion." The student will find a more informed account of them in Father Morris's "Catholic England in Modern Times" (p. 79). The descendants of half-a-million Irish Catholics are rotting, morally and spiritually, in the slums of our cities. While those fine churches have been built which Lord Brayne regards with marked aversion, while the silken nets have been plied without ceasing among the more comfortable classes, they have been neglected to an appalling extent. Mr Booth, of course, lacked the technical knowledge to deal adequately with this side of London's life. He observes, of a large section of the middle class, that they may "fairly be regarded as good Catholics, though they habitually neglect the Sunday mass and the Easter duty" (both binding under a strict assurance of eternal damnation); and he does not improve his statement when he adds that they "probably fast habitually." Very few Catholics in England fast at all—it is not urged on them; and if he means abstinence from meat, which *is* urged, the neglect of this would be a less serious matter than the neglect of mass.

The Sunday mass is *the* test of Catholic belief in Great Britain, and, as far as London is concerned, we can apply it with rare precision. The famous census of churchgoers taken by *The Daily News* in 1903 gives the number of Catholics who attend mass in London on the average Sunday. The full total of

morning attendances was 96,281. As only very young children (the strict obligation begins at the age of seven, but children of four or five commonly attend) and those who are absolutely prevented by employment (domestic servants must demand permission) or substantial illness are excused, we must take this figure to represent 80 per cent. of the real Catholic population of the Metropolis. If it be claimed that there are many "bad Catholics" who yet cannot be regarded as seceders, we may point out, in recompense, that the number includes many "twicers" (communicants) and very many non-Catholics (at the more ornate services). There are certainly not more than 120,000 Catholics among London's 6,250,000.¹

In the Metropolis, therefore, where the proselytic activity has been greatest, the Catholics number *less than one in fifty* of the population. I know parts of England where they do not number one in a thousand (Buckingham, for instance); but in Lancashire and West Yorkshire the proportion is far higher, and we must apply different tests for the whole country. The first of these standards of measurement—one that is pressed on us by the Catholic—is the number and increase of the clergy. There are 3534 priests in England and Wales (*Catholic Directory*, 1908).

¹ Mr Mudie Smith gives the number of evening attendances as well as morning, and then deducts 38 per cent. as "twicers." In a Catholic church *each* evening attendant is a "twicer" (or else a Protestant); and a certain number who attend the high (or sung) mass have already attended, to communicate, at an earlier mass. Also, there is always a higher proportion of strangers at Catholic ceremonies than at non-Catholic. I may add that of the 96,000 only 25,000 were men. The women numbered 42,000 and the children 29,000. In the evening only 7000 men attended Catholic chapels, and a large proportion of these would be non-Catholic! The census was spread over many months, and may safely be taken to represent the average Sunday.

As there were only 493 in 1837 this figure is regarded with much complacency. When we recall the Irish invasion the increase has a more natural aspect, but there is a great deal more to be said. Some 150 of these clergy are invalided or "retired"; I know of one who assists Atheist organisations out of his clerical pension. More than 1000 of them are monks, and the bulk of these do little or no parochial work. A glance at the *Catholic Directory* is instructive in this respect. The large list of London priests includes, one finds, 20 priests at the Cathedral, 20 Jesuits at Farm Street and 28 at Roehampton and Wimbledon, 17 Salesians at Battersea, 14 Oblates at Bayswater, 13 Oratorians at Bayswater, 13 Passionists at Highgate, 11 Dominicans at Haverstock Hill, 11 Franciscans at Forest Gate, and so on. The great majority of these do no parochial work, or share a small amount between them. In the country the non-parochial clergy are still more numerous. The Jesuits have nearly 100 in their colleges, the Benedictines nearly 100 in their abbeys, and there are the "sleeping communities" that have been exiled from France. Possibly 2300 priests are fully engaged in parochial work in England. If we allow the high average of 500 souls to each priest, this will give less than 1,200,000.

The number of Catholic chapels (including "stations" where mass is not always said on Sundays) in England and Wales is 1736—about one-tenth those of the Methodists. On the face of the matter, this helps us little, as the congregations vary from a score to several thousands. I have often said the Sunday mass to congregations of less than a dozen. At Buckingham (population 3000) the only outsider who attended was my gardener, who propitiated my rivals by stealthily attending their service as well. But the figure is very

instructive in one sense. There are 165 Catholic chapels in London, and the number of Catholics we have found to be rather less than 120,000. That is a ratio of 720 per chapel (including infants, etc.). Now, it seems to be an extremely generous proceeding to apply that ratio of a crowded city to the whole of England and Wales, since the busy churches of Lancashire and Yorkshire are balanced by the tiny rural missions. But let us do it. It yields a Catholic population of 1,215,200. We may take that as a maximum for England and Wales.

We get precisely the same result from the marriage-rate. In the years 1856-1865 the ratio of Catholic marriages to the 1000 was 46 (Mulhall's *Dictionary of Statistics*). It has sunk slowly and gradually to 41 per 1000, the figure which the Registrar General gives for the last five years (Annual Return—the same figure is given in *The Statesman's Year Book* for 1897). That would mean that the Catholics are a fraction over a twenty-fifth of the population, or 1,300,000 in number. But a large deduction must be made for mixed marriages, which are common. No Catholic ever marries except in a Catholic church—there is the customary threat of eternal damnation for doing otherwise—and so the Protestant partner must go there. This slightly reduces the percentage, and again gives 1,200,000 as the maximum Catholic population. Marriage in a Catholic church is, in practice, the safest and most generous test of all.

Finally, there is the test of school attendance. It is well known how sternly the priests denounce parents who send their children to non-Catholic schools. The practice is very limited indeed. On the other hand non-Catholic children are eagerly welcomed at Catholic schools, and in many places attend them freely. One must take also into account the fact that lapsed parents

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very commonly send their children to the Catholic school; while the number of Catholic children in private schools is relatively small. These circumstances make the problem somewhat complex, but a broad inference from the figures is possible. In the *ideal* parish the priest multiplies his school children by five to form an estimate of his total congregation. Now the number of children attending Catholic elementary schools in England and Wales is considerably less than 300,000.¹ This would give less than 1,500,000 Catholics on the ideal ratio; but I know many Catholic parishes where the school children even outnumber the worshippers over the age of fourteen instead of forming only one-fifth of the whole congregation. For this and the other important reasons I have given we must make very large deductions. If we grant the school children are one-fourth of the whole, we get once more the figure of 1,200,000.

Here, then, we have five completely independent lines of research that bring us to an identical conclusion. In no reasonable sense whatever can more than 1,200,000 of the people of England and Wales be claimed as Roman Catholics. They number less than a twenty-fifth of the population. But there are 3,200,000 baptised Catholics, or children of such, in the country, at the very least, and we have thus to credit the English Roman Church with a loss of 2,000,000 followers. It has gained amongst the wealthy, the titled, and those who needed no moral

¹ I base the figure on the official statement in the Accounts and Papers for 1904 that in that year grants in aid were given to 931 Catholic schools, at which the average attendance was 238,287. The remaining 131 Catholic schools, with no aid, would hardly carry the total beyond 250,000, or not much beyond. Multiplied simply by five, this would mean only 1,250,000 people, without deductions.

regeneration, to a considerable extent. It has lost the very poor, who are absolutely dependent on a priest, to an appalling extent. And to-day the number of deliberate seceders amongst the Catholic middle-class and alert workers increases enormously. They are found in thousands in all parts of the country. Even the clergy, in spite of the great struggle that follows secession, and the almost invariable calumny and bitterness that punish it, abandon the Church in a remarkable proportion. Of the priests of the Franciscan order, to which I once belonged, about 12 per cent. seceded during my acquaintance with them. At one time or other the names of about fifty ex-priests (in England) of recent years have come under my notice,¹ but the ex-priest is quick to disappear in the crowd, and my list is almost a chance collection of names.

The repression of the modernist movement is giving grave anxiety to the educated Catholics of England, as of other lands, and the process of disintegration must go on more rapidly. As I write, an able young priest, professor of philosophy (Mr Cecil Burns), writes me that he has seceded. Catholic scholars find themselves confronted with the drastic enforcement of a scheme of theology that cannot count *one* adherent now amongst the world's leading figures in philosophy, science, history or letters. No one takes the place of the dead Mivarts and Actons and Brunetières, liberal as they were. The *Catholic Encyclopædia* they are issuing betrays, in its international list of contributors, their dire poverty in respect of culture. Where, in the Catholic England of to-day, are the successors of Wiseman, Newman, Pugin, Digby, Ward, Hope-Scott, T. Arnold,

¹ See chapter xi. of "Twelve Years in a Monastery" (2nd ed.) and my article in *The National Review* (April 1902)

Coventry Patmore, Aubrey de Vere, Mivart and Lord Acton? Even such scholars and writers as they claim seem generally to reserve the explicit profession of their faith till, like Mivart and Acton, they are beyond the reach of the hierarchy, and of Pius X.'s modern inquisition. Divided in opinions, oppressed by a papacy they cannot respect, yet must represent as having a vaguely supernatural assistance, cut off from the higher culture of the world by a mountain chain of obsolete traditions, their position cannot be permanent. And behind them is the army of middle-class men and women who are guided by them; while the workers are, as elsewhere, being swept into the rapids of political democracy and social movements.

The situation in Scotland is so similar to that in England, and the total number of Roman Catholics is so small, that it may be dismissed in a few pages. The early story shows the same quickening into fresh life of the lingering Catholic elements by French and Irish refugees. By 1837 there were seventy-four priests and seventy chapels in Scotland, with a population of about 30,000. After 1847, Glasgow became one of the familiar destinations of the boats full of poor emigrants from Belfast and Dublin, and they made their way, south and north, to the mining or manufacturing centres. Conversions have been comparatively few from the Scottish Churches. This immigrant Irish body constitutes the bulk of the small Roman Catholic population of Scotland to-day.

It is usually computed at 400,000. What the real number of Irish immigrants and their descendants is I cannot discover, but the similarity of the conditions to England, and the greater scarcity of priests, incline one to believe that the loss is at least proportionately as great. In one respect, indeed, the situation is

worse. Painful as the fact is to one who sympathises with that afflicted race, it is undeniable that the poor Irish workers abnormally swell the criminal statistics of Scotland.¹ This points undeniably to the state of things amongst them—great drunkenness and indifference to all religious or moral culture—that Father Morris assigns to them in English cities. We shall find it the same in America. Those are they whom, above all, the social student would care to see some Church uplift. It is those above all who have been allowed to lapse from the Catholic Church, while clerical energies were spent in adding a few additional dogmas to the creeds of refined Protestants.

I need only observe that the claim of 400,000 Roman Catholics is excessive. There are 550 priests in the land, many of them shut up in monasteries like Fort Augustus. If we allow the high average of 500 souls to each priest who is fully occupied in parochial work, we get a total of less than 250,000. The number of churches, chapels and stations is 385, and very many of these are tiny structures that admit only a handful of worshippers. If we were to assign them the *London* average of 700 souls each—a much too generous allowance for the whole of Scotland—the total would still be less than 270,000. Finally, there are 68,993 pupils in the Catholic elementary schools of Scotland. If we simply multiply these by five we should get a maximum of 345,000. I have already explained that we must by no means multiply them by five, and with

¹ Another point should be noted. The superiority of Ireland to Scotland in respect of ill-births has often been pointed out. As the superiority here of other Catholic country, it would need careful study. It has to draw attention to the fact, discovered and notified by the ecclesiastical authorities of Glasgow, that there has long been a practice of sending girls from Ireland to Scotland to cover the expected

the deductions I indicated the number fairly agrees with the other conclusions.

There are about 250,000 Roman Catholics in Scotland. That is 150,000 less than the authorities claim, and, on the basis of immigration, it betrays a loss of at least 250,000.

CHAPTER VII

THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING WORLD—THE BRITISH COLONIES

FIFTEEN years ago the *English Catholic Directory* claimed that the Church had 10,500,000 adherents within the frontiers of the British Empire. That is a slender enough proportion of the whole population of the empire, but it frequently impresses the unreflecting as a startling indication of growth in the course of a single century, and gives rise to fantastic speculations in regard to the future. Is the empire being Romanised? Is the power of the papacy destined to spread yet farther over what is bound to be an outstanding domain in the civilisation of the future? Is the loss of so many millions in the Latin World, under the spell of their first admission to the culture of the age, to be compensated by the return of older nations, with a longer and deeper literacy, to the allegiance of the Vatican?

These questions are being asked on every side, and too often the answer has its sole inspiration in the impressive claim of 10,500,000 adherents. It is our task in this chapter to see if the Catholicism of the empire at large be more solid and promising than that we find in the United Kingdom. The 10,500,000 ought to be 12,000,000 to-day. I may say at that we shall find the actual Catholic population of the empire to be considerably less than 10,000,000, that the whole apparent growth is due either to movements of population or to extension of the Imperial frontier. The extension of British rule over existing populations (in Canada, Malta, Mauritius,

Trinidad, etc.) accounts for 2,500,000 out of the 5,000,000 Catholics of the empire outside the United Kingdom. Of the remainder 1,500,000 are claimed as converts in India and Ceylon—a change of little cultural, and no political, importance—and the fifth million is mainly accounted for by the Irish dispersal.

It is thus at once apparent that the cry of a Romanising of the empire is a very hollow one indeed. Proselytic action there has been in abundance, but we shall find that, as in the case of Great Britain, its slight results do not nearly cover the immense losses that the Church of Rome has suffered amongst all the literate populations that enter into the British Empire. Apart from the converts that are claimed in illiterate India—a significant exception—a considerable net loss is discovered at once. We may begin with Canada, where the Catholics are most numerous, and proceed to verify this throughout the empire.

CANADA

When the British flag was first unfurled on the heights of Quebec, almost the entire population of Canada was Roman Catholic. To the 65,000 French Catholics who gazed darkly on that symbol of Protestantism one has to add only a few thousand migrants from below the lakes, scattered, almost churchless, amidst the ardent supporters of Rome. The land was overwhelmingly and fanatically Catholic. To-day it is Protestant to the extent of 54 per cent. and Catholic to the extent of only 41 per cent. The circumstance might be deemed sufficient to warn the Catholic statistician to pay more heed to movements of population, but even in the case of Canada

we find him descanting on the remarkable growth, because the original 60,000 Catholics have now become 2,000,000. Let us glance briefly at the making of Canada. There were two distinct Catholic settlements in Canada at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Lower Canada was the land of the French colonists, who absorbed most of the invaders from the south. But in 1803 an interesting body of immigrants from the Old World planted a fresh Catholic community in Upper Canada. This was a strong contingent of Catholic Highlanders from Scotland, who fled from the persecution and poverty of their native home, and, after a temporary settlement in the North American Colony, formed the nucleus of the later Catholic population of Ontario. When we add to these two elements the immigrant Irish Catholics, who found their way to Canada from the beginning of the century, and came in thousands each year after the famine of 1847—as well as the Irish Catholics who later crossed the United States frontier in great numbers—we have all the constituents of the Catholic population of Canada. Its growth, and the increase of its clergy and missions, present some striking figures, when these are torn from the text of its history, as is usually done. But when one glances at the analysis of nationality, and the records of immigration, the miracle loses its halo, and we find the customary story of loss and failure.

The only element of mystery one can discover in the story of Canada is the multiplication of the original French Catholic inhabitants. At the time of the conquest by General Wolfe (1760) they are said to have numbered 65,000; by the year 1871 they had increased to 1,082,940; yet, according to the census report (1901), the whole immigration from France during the nineteenth century only amounted to

7944 individuals. Probably the figure 65,000 belongs to an earlier census (1703), but even in 1791 the population of Lower Canada was only 130,000, after the migrations of French from the revolted British colony. However that may be accounted for, the figure of the year 1871 is correct, and we may make it the first basis of our study of Canada. Persistently as they have maintained their different nationality, and restless as they have been under the more or less alien rule of the British, the French-Canadians have the respect of their brothers in the Dominion. But their admirers will hardly claim for them an advanced culture, or, until it was officially enforced, a high degree of literacy. As in the case of Ireland, moreover, they have had the political sympathy of their clergy. The result has been a closer aggregation of priests and people, a united aversion to the literature that was weakening the faith in other Catholic lands, and a warm feeling that the priests were with them in what they regarded as a democratic resistance to despotic power. These different cultural and political conditions have given entirely different characters to France and to French Canada, and kept the latter predominantly faithful to the Vatican, while the former has so signally abandoned it. As, therefore, 1,649,371 of the actual inhabitants of Canada are of French nationality (*Census*, p. 284), its large Catholic population is not difficult to understand.

When we add that, according to the same official return, 988,721 of the inhabitants of Canada are of Irish extraction, we not only account at once for the high percentage of Romanists in the Dominion, but we begin to catch a glimpse of leakage. The nominal Roman Catholic population is 2,229,600. This falls short by 400,000 of the combined French and Irish inhabitants, and only a small proportion of it could be

accounted for by admitting a one-fifth percentage of Irish Protestants amongst the immigrants. But we have still other elements of the population to take into account: 2,000,000 of the inhabitants (1901) are of English and Scottish extraction. Here, of course, we have the great strength of the Protestant Churches, which now far outnumber the Roman Catholic in the Dominion, but a fair percentage—at least 100,000—(especially of those from the United States, which is not accounted a separate nationality) must be assigned to Rome. Of the Germans, 310,501 in number, more than a third must be assumed to be Catholic; and of the other nationalities, calculating according to the actual percentage of Catholics in each country, about 50,000 must be Catholic. The total number of inhabitants of Catholic extraction is thus found, on a moderate estimate, to be 2,700,000. This shows at once a clear and unmistakable loss of 470,000. No ingenuity of arithmetic can evade this conclusion. The Canadian Church has lost at least 470,000 in the course of the nineteenth century, and mostly in the second half of the century. If it claims to have made many converts, the loss figure must be proportionately increased. Without counting one convert its due population is 470,000 short.

Further, I have so far assumed the accuracy of the official returns of religious profession, but we have learned in the course of our inquiry to distrust these inflated census statistics. We saw how utterly worthless they were in the case of Spain and Italy.¹ In the

¹ A further illustration may be useful, as I am now dealing with a large French population. As I write, I meet an educated Frenchman who was baptised in his infancy, but has not entered a church for more years than he can remember, and has lost all religious belief. He insists, however, that he is a Catholic (because he was baptised), and would describe himself as such in any formulary.

case of Canada we have further reason for distrusting them. The census takers there are directed, not merely to ascertain what Church a man or woman "belongs to," but what Church "he or she favours." No doubt, that is the common practice, but it is explicitly enjoined in Canada. Further, the *Canadian Catholic Directory* for 1903, commenting on the census returns of 1901, says that "the official diocesan statistics make a somewhat larger total." It would be strange if they did not. Official diocesan statistics are notoriously optimistic. They are not based on any real test of belief, such as attendance at mass or Easter communion, but on the priest's estimate of the number of Catholics (faithful or unfaithful) in his parish. Yet these diocesan statistics only claim 19,200 more than the government return! In other words, the highest figure that the clerical authorities see fit to offer us betrays a loss of nearly 500,000. However the *Canadian Catholic Directory* goes on to make an observation that at once arouses distrust of its statement of strength. "In view of these statistics," it says, "the percentage of Catholics in the legislative bodies of the Dominion is noticeably small." In point of fact, of the eighty-one members of the Senate only twenty-six (or 32 per cent.) are Catholics: of the 213 members of the House of Commons only sixty (or 28 per cent.) are Catholics: while the Church claims to number more than 40 per cent. of the population amongst its followers, and certainly there are distinct and serious Catholic issues to be fought for in Canada. The proportion of Catholic members of the more popular body, with its wide electoral basis, is very instructive.

I have been unable to discover anything like a strict inquiry into the practical tests of Catholic belief (churchgoing, etc.) in Canadian literature, but a

cursory examination of the statistics given at various periods fully confirms the fact of a very considerable leakage. The French district had from the start of British rule a large and organised clergy, which has grown with the population. It has, further, been less disturbed than the others by immigration, and the immigrants have (according to the nationality returns in the census report) been more Catholic in origin than the immigrants to any other province. Of Quebec's 1,648,898 inhabitants no less than 1,322,885 are of French extraction and 114,842 Irish. Yet even here the *nominal* Catholic population does not reach these figures; the real Catholic population is much below them. And there are, in addition, many thousand German, Italian and other Catholics.

Ontario is peculiarly instructive in this regard. Mr T. O'Hagan ("Canadian Essays") exults in the progress of his Church in Ontario, with the usual hint at miracle. He tells us there were 25,000 Catholics in it when it first became a diocese (1826), though they had only seven priests to minister to them. Obviously the leakage set in on a large scale in those distant days, and when the rush of Irish immigrants began in 1848 the leakage would be even greater. It is enough for Mr O'Hagan, however, to consider that those 25,000 have now increased to 400,000. His claim is modest compared with that of the *Catholic Directory*—460,000—but even the census returns only yield the figure of 390,000 who "favour" the Catholic Church. As there seem to be little more than 400 active priests (as distinct from non-parochial monks) in the province, the figure 390,000 is difficult to accept; it would mean the impossible proportion of nearly 1000 souls per priest. But the most extraordinary result is discovered when one glances at the nationality of the inhabitants of Ontario. Of its

2,182,947 inhabitants no less than 783,000 are of French and Irish extraction, and 128,000 more are of other Catholic extraction! Even if we allow its Catholic population to be 390,000, the Church is found to have lost nearly 400,000 in Ontario alone. It is significant enough that this enormous loss occurs in the most forward and cultivated part of the Dominion.

New Brunswick, one of the next strongest Catholic provinces, has a total population of 331,120. Of these 125,698 are described in the census report as Roman Catholics. On turning to the analysis of nationalities I find no less than 163,000 are of French or Irish extraction, and some 10,000 more of Catholic origin. Here again is a very serious leakage.

Manitoba shows a lesser, but still a considerable, lapse. Of its 250,000 inhabitants only 35,000 are returned as Roman Catholic to-day. On the other hand, the census returns show that about 77,000 of them must be of Catholic origin.

No doubt, these leakages were largely occasioned by the dearth of priests and chapels in the early days of immigration, but there is ample evidence that it still goes on to a very great extent, and is now due more considerably to deliberate secessions. The clergy have not only not recovered the hundreds of thousands who fell away in the days of disorganisation, but they have to record heavy losses in some of their modern dioceses. This is curiously seen in a comparison of *La Canada Ecclesiastique* for 1890 and the *Canadian Catholic Directory* for 1903. The Montreal diocese reports 450,000 faithful in 1890 and only 415,000 in 1903. The figures for St Hyacinth sink from 118,000 to 115,000: London (Ontario) from 60,000 to 58,000: St Albert from 20,000 to 18,000: Charlottetown from 55,000 to

53,000. According to the Catholic directories there were about 164 churches and chapels in Canada in 1890, and about 174 in 1900. This is about the same number that we find in England and Wales for a Catholic population of 1,200,000. We found that the proportion of Catholics per church in London (England) is about 700; in the best colonies of Australia it is less than 300; in the United States it is less than 900. The Canadian claim of 2,229,600 Catholics would mean a proportion of 1280 per church, which, I think, few non-Catholics will care to allow. The same point becomes apparent when we regard the number of priests. *The Statesman's Year Book* gives the number as 1500, but I calculate from the *Directory* that it is rather 2500, besides 580 "regulars," a third of whom may be classed with the "seculars" for our purpose. When we add these to the total, and deduct "invalids" and "retired," we have about 2500 active priests. The claim of 2,250,000 Catholics would assign an average of nearly 900 to each priest. As the average is only about 500 souls per active priest in Great Britain, and much less than that in Ireland (a closer parallel to Canada), the reader may judge whether it is possible to allow 900 per priest in Canada. The average for the Protestant minister in Canada is about 600.

But I have already observed that the census returns do not pretend to give 2,250,000 as "belonging" to the Roman Church. The enumerators are expressly told that the qualification covers all who "belong or adhere to, or *favour*," that denomination. The returns are, therefore, no more trustworthy than elsewhere. In view of the proportion of priests and chapels the Catholics must number less than 2,000,000, and that means a loss (on the emigration and other figures I have given) of at least 700,000 souls.

Newfoundland is not included in the preceding estimates. It has a total population of 217,000, of whom 75,989 are described as Roman Catholic. The figure is too small to merit special study, and we may let it stand. Mr Bodley remarks, however, in his "Catholic Democracy of America," p. 4, that "the Roman Catholic Church claims half of the population of Newfoundland, and they are to a man of Irish extraction." The body is, therefore, entirely the outcome of movements of population. It is worth noting, too, that while the Church claimed "half the population" twenty years ago, it is content to claim one-third to-day.

AUSTRALIA

When we follow the stream of emigration across the Pacific to the new continent of the far south-west we discover an even greater loss, and more precise means of determining it. That the Australian Church is only a fragment of the broken population of Ireland is a matter of common knowledge. Its story is the story of waves of emigrants washing over the vast territory and quickening it with civilised life: of a band of devoted priests working for the reincorporation of the scattered workers in the fabric of the Roman Church: of a success that meets the eye in every large Australian town to-day: but also of a failure that is suspected by many, and fully appreciated by very few.

The making of Australia is one of the romances of the nineteenth century that have changed, and will further change, the face of the earth. When the century opened it was known in England as a vast wilderness at the antipodes to which it was convenient to despatch the less desirable elements of the popula-

tion. From 1788 to 1839 it was the great natural jail to which our worst convicts were transported. "Criminal" is a relative term, and it must not be imagined that those early elements of the Australian people were wholly disreputable. They included a large number of rebels from Ireland, and amongst these were two Catholic priests who were implicated in the rebellion of '98. English rule refused Catholic chaplains to the convicts, but these two priests defiantly ministered to their co-religionists, and were in time joined by other furtive ministers of the faith. They were officially recognised in 1819, and the formation of the new Church began.

At that time the white population numbered about 30,000, three-fourths of whom were convicts. By 1830 there were 6000 Catholics at Sydney, and 12,000 in the whole of New South Wales; but as there was only one priest at Sydney the leakage must have already begun on a very large scale.¹ Four years later it was officially reported that there were 20,000 Catholics in the country (or a third of the entire white population), who were mainly emancipated Irish prisoners. Convicts were still arriving at the rate of 5000 or 6000 a year, and Bishop Ullathorne declared that at least 1000 of these were Catholics. But there were still only four priests in the continent, and the losses were very heavy. In Van Diemen's Land there was one priest to 4000 Catholics. An official census of 1836 returns the Catholics as 21,898, with six priests and chapels, and a weekly attendance at these chapels of only 2850—a loss of 17,000 already. From 1836 to 1841 a further 7000 Catholic convicts were landed, and at the latter date about 9000 were attending mass—one-third of them doing so under prison

¹ These and most of my historical details are taken from Cardinal Moran's "History of the Catholic Church in Australia."

discipline. Melbourne had then a population of 10,000. A report sent to Rome claimed that 4000 of these were Catholics; but the resident priest only claimed 1000, and said that about 700 attended church. It was the typical situation. Sydney had a population of 40,000. The report to the Vatican says that 14,000 of these "profess the Catholic faith"; the local clergy report that 2550 attend the Sunday mass. These tens of thousands of seceders, it must be remembered, have multiplied fourfold since those days.

In 1851 the discovery of gold was announced, and the fresh rushes of population completely disorganised the overworked Church. One cannot help reflecting, as one reads of this recurring disorder and leakage throughout the history of the nineteenth century, how the famous polity of the Roman Church utterly failed to meet the emergencies, and lost millions of followers from pure *lack* of organisation. There were tens of thousands of superfluous clergy in Catholic countries, and thousands were being sent on "missions"; yet we shall see at the end of this section that the Vatican has lost about 17,000,000 civilised followers from its failure in international control. By 1860 Tasmania had 30,000 convicts and 30,000 free inhabitants, and only three priests; and this was a fairly general condition. In 1870 Bishop Spalding reports the return to the fold of 250 seceders; but he also reports that there are only 4000 Easter communions at Sydney, where the Catholic population is 10,000. New South Wales had then a nominal Catholic population of 100,000; South Australia about 30,000 (to thirty priests); Queensland about 30,000. Of these known Catholics (or people of Catholic origin) the vast majority never went to church, even where they could.

The organisation of the Church proceeded with the organisation of civil and national life. At the time of

the centenary of 1888 the *Australasian Catholic Directory* reported that they had 544 priests, 862 chapels (including temporary stations) and 594,460 followers. In the meantime, of course (since 1848), the Irish had been pouring into the colony far more abundantly than ever. The population had risen to close on 3,000,000. Cardinal Moran puts the number of Catholics at 700,000: the *Directory* at 600,000. Either figure would be moderate in view of the enormous Irish percentage in the population; but both figures claim an exorbitant proportion of faithful to priests. We may, however, pass at once to the census results of 1891 and 1901, which throw considerable light on the situation.

At the census of 1891 some 712,415 of the population (then 3,013,790) were described as Roman Catholics. Quoting from the *Australasian Handbook* for 1893, from which I take the figures, I find that 286,917 of these belonged to New South Wales. Of these, it goes on to say, 109,374 attended church. I believe this figure does not include children under fourteen, who form about a third of a population, and we must allow for illness and enforced absence. But with the most liberal allowance the real Catholic population of New South Wales is about 100,000 short of the number given in the census returns. Victoria has a census return of 248,590 Catholics, and its 551 churches have an average attendance of 124,699. With less than half the number of churches it has a larger accommodation. Adding the children and enforced absentees we get a Catholic population 40,000 short of the census return. West Australia reports 11,159 Catholics, but only 3025 attend mass in its twenty-five chapels (with sixteen priests). Tasmania has 25,805 Catholics, but only 15,000 attend mass. The figures are not available for the other provinces.

We turn to the census of 1901, and find that the Catholics have nominally increased to 856,052. But a closer analysis shows that the leakage is on the increase. New South Wales has now 347,286 nominal Catholics, but only 100,000 are said (*Australasian Handbook*, 1908) to attend mass on Sundays. Add the children under fourteen (50,000) and the enforced absentees (about 15,000), and we get a real Catholic population of 165,000—or 180,000 less than the census return. As the Catholics of New South Wales form two-fifths of the whole Australian Catholic body this result is not flattering. But Victoria redeems it, to a great extent, with a church attendance of 141,000 to a Catholic population of 263,710.¹

The other figures are not available. If we assume for them a position midway between Victoria (which has exceptional church accommodation) and New South Wales, we find that 250,000 of the nominal Catholics of Australia, who could do so, do not comply with the Church's drastic obligation to attend mass on Sundays. One may allow that a certain number of these are what is called "bad Catholics"—steadfast in belief, but of the peculiar complexion that can incur (and believe it incurs) eternal damnation once a week rather than spend a half hour in church. The reader will probably put the mass down as seceders. And these are seceders of the present generation only.

On these official statistics we may form some estimate of the losses that the Church has suffered in Australia. By 1841 there were about 40,000 Catholics in the country, of whom about 28,000 had drifted. The discovery of gold and the inrush of Irish emigrants overtaxed the resources of the clergy before they could recover any of the lost ground, and the situation

¹ The *Handbook* only says in the case of New South Wales that the church attendance does not include children under fourteen.

in 1870 was as bad as ever. There were then more than 200,000 Catholics in the country, and more than half of these were beyond control. Few of these can have been recovered, as, in spite of the enormous immigration, the nominal Catholic population was only 712,000 in 1891. The *real* Catholic population was, we saw, about 200,000 short of this. A heavy Irish immigration continued, since we find that at the census of 1901 there were 181,000 in the Commonwealth who had been born in Ireland. Yet the nominal Catholic population only increased to 856,000, and the practising Catholics again fell short of this by between 250,000 and 300,000. Between this enormous number of recent seceders and the descendants of the earlier drift the loss must amount to not less than 500,000; and the real Catholic population is not more than 600,000.

A word may be added in confirmation of the latter figure. Victoria, the most faithful colony, claims a Catholic population of 263,710. As its total number of priests, active and inactive, is only 242, this would demand an average of more than 1000 per priest. The school test is, however, the best in the case of Victoria. As the church accommodation is particularly ample I infer that schools have, as is usual, been built in proportion. In Victoria, moreover, the system of purely secular education is adopted in the official elementary schools, and Catholics are bitterly opposed to it. Yet I find, from *The Statesman's Year Book* that there are only about 24,000 pupils in the Catholic elementary schools of Victoria. Even if we multiply this by the full number of five, it only yields a real Catholic population of 120,000, instead of 263,000. New South Wales has 41,286 pupils in its elementary schools, which would yield, at the most, a population of 206,000 instead of the official 340,000. It is clear

that we must take off 250,000 from the nominal Catholic strength in Australia ; and these, with earlier seceders and their descendants, make up my figure of 500,000 lapsed.

New Zealand reported at the census of 1901 some 109,822 Roman Catholics in a total population of 888,000. The colony has been built up more rapidly than Australia, but the Church has grown more slowly, and the leakage throughout has been considerable. There were no Catholics in New Zealand until 1828, when an Irish trader settled there. Eight years later the Australian clergy were induced to work amongst the Maoris (there was already Protestant missionaries amongst them), and they claimed a harvest of 4000 native conversions in five years. By the middle of the fifties they had the allegiance of about 25,000 Maoris, but the troubles of the sixties utterly ruined their work, and the natives fell away. Cardinal Moran says that in 1871 a priest found one Catholic Maori where there had been 5000 in 1846.

In the meantime the European population was slowly increasing. By 1851 it reached 26,707, of whom 3472 were Roman Catholics. In 1883 the total population was 515,000. What proportion of these ought to have been Roman Catholic may be gathered from the fact that, in that year, 10 per cent. of the population were returned as "born in Ireland." Yet by 1891 the nominal Catholic population was only 85,856, and the real number much smaller. The *Australasian Handbook* tells that only 30,500 attended the Catholic churches at that time. Since then there has been a continued immigration from Ireland, and the Catholic body does not seem to have proportionately increased. At the census of 1901 it was found that 42,524 New Zealanders had been

born in Ireland. I have not, however, the figures of church attendance for 1901, or the exact proportion of Irish in the islands. On the basis of the figures of 1891, we may say that 30,000 or 40,000 must be struck off the official total, and the destruction of the Maori missions will at least double the loss.

INDIA, SOUTH AFRICA, ETC.

The remaining Catholic population of the British Empire consists to an overwhelming extent of illiterates. India and Ceylon have the greater part of them, and the cultural value of these compensatory gains to the skrinking Church need not be enlarged upon. When the large number of converts that are claimed in India and Ceylon is examined, it must be borne in mind that Catholic missionaries have been at work there since the beginning of the seventeenth century. The labours of St Francis Xavier and the early Jesuits greatly extended the work of the earlier Portuguese missionaries, and the eighteenth-century Jesuits promoted it in their peculiar way. It may be remembered that their policy of decking Christianity with a liberal ornamentation of native ideas and customs brought a strong condemnation upon them from the Vatican, but they paid little heed to it. Under French influence the work was further advanced, and a very large body of Catholic missionaries have been active in India throughout the nineteenth century.

Large as the number of converts is, we have the usual inflated statements to reject. An article over the signature of Cardinal Vaughan in the last edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* gives the number of Roman Catholics in India and Ceylon as 2,005,925.

The generosity of works of reference in allowing Catholics to write on their own affairs has its disadvantages. According to the census report for 1901 the religious census for India showed that there were 1,202,169 Roman Catholics in the country, and 287,419 in Ceylon.

In her "Things as they are" (1903), Miss Carmichael, a Protestant missionary, makes some very serious statements about the larger communities of converts that are claimed in India. "Spiritual things are not considered anything by most of them," she says; and on the claim that the doors are wide open for conversions in certain districts she observes that "we never find that they are so very wide open when it is known we bring nothing tangible with us" (p. 286). Her statement reminded me of an English Jesuit missionary whom I heard deliver an eloquent appeal for funds from a London pulpit. In the clerical smoke-room afterwards he enforced his point by observing frankly that conversions were largely a matter of material aid. In view of the conflicting statements on these matters I turn to our most recent and authoritative work on India—*The Imperial Gazetteer* (1907). It says of the 105,000 native Catholics of Bombay that they are mostly "descendants of converts made by the Portuguese several centuries ago, who at the present day are ignorant and unprogressive." Of the large advances made in recent decades it says: "The secret of many of the conversions is to be sought more in the relations which the missionary bodies have been able to establish with the famine waifs in their orphanages than in any general movement in the adult members of non-Christian communities towards accepting the revelation of the Gospel." Finally, in regard to adult conversions, it quotes the words of Mr Francis:

"The remarkable growth in the number of native Christians largely proceeds from the natural and laudable discontent with their lot which possesses the lower classes of the Hindus."¹ If we assign 1,500,000 converts to the Church in India and Ceylon, they will weigh rather heavily in the illiterate side of its scale.

Mauritius adds a further 117,102 to the adherents of the Vatican. These are mainly French descendants of a very low degree of culture. At the government examinations of 1901 only 3650 children were presented from the sixty-five Catholic schools. There are something less than double that number on the rolls, and they attend very badly. Malta furnishes 183,115 Italian Catholics of the illiterate character that we have seen in the south of Italy. There are 18,000 children on the rolls. Gibraltar contains nearly 20,000, generally of Italian descent. Grenada, Santa Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago contain 166,642 Roman Catholics. Cyprus, the Falkland Islands and the Bermudas add about 2000 more. It would be useless to enter into a close analysis of these 423,000 descendants of French, Italian and Spanish settlers, half-breeds, etc. They may be added *en bloc* to the Catholic total, and put in the same cultural category with the South Americans.

South Africa brings us back to a more advanced section of the empire, but its Catholic population is so small that we need not stay to examine it closely. Cape Colony has 37,069 Catholics; Natal 10,419; the Orange River Colony 3286 (a decrease since the last census); the Transvaal 16,491; Basutoland 5701; the Gold Coast 4850; and Sierra Leone 794—a total of about 78,000. We may take this slight census result without further inquiry. The article in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* by Cardinal

¹ *The Imperial Gazetteer of India*, vol. i. pp. 444 and 445.

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Vaughan, claims that there are 463,824 Catholics in Africa. The figure seems to be as trustworthy as the figure he gives for India and Ceylon, but we will consider the rest of Africa under the head of foreign missions.

It will be convenient for the reader, no doubt, if I tabulate the results for the British Empire. For the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia I give the reduced figures I have already vindicated. For the other places I give the unaltered census results. The total loss for the former countries I have shown to be about 3,500,000 without claiming any diminution in Ireland.

ROMAN CATHOLICS IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE

PART OF EMPIRE	NUMBER OF CATHOLICS
England and Wales	1,200,000
Scotland	250,000
Ireland	3,308,663
Canada and Newfoundland	2,075,000
Australia and New Zealand	670,000
India and Ceylon	1,489,588
Mauritius and the Seychelles	133,000
Malta and Gibraltar	200,000
West Indies	166,642
South and West Africa	78,000
	9,570,000

The total population of the British Empire is 392,846,835.

CHAPTER VIII

THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING WORLD—THE UNITED STATES

SOME years ago Mr Bodley wrote a charming essay on "The Catholic Democracy of America" that may have given a chill of apprehension to the minds of his Protestant readers. Impressed at once with the rise of the great republic, and the wonderful growth of Catholicism within its frontiers, he passed, naturally enough, into a prophetic mood. From 1800 to 1890 the population of the United States had increased from 4,500,000 to 62,000,000. Mr Gladstone had surmised that by the end of the twentieth century it would reach the imposing figure of 600,000,000. Mr Bodley was content to predict a population of 400,000,000. From 1800 to 1890 the Roman Catholics in the States had grown from a struggling and scattered flock of about 100,000 to an organised nation of (Mr Bodley said) 10,000,000, with a vast army of clergy and the richest ecclesiastical structures in the country. It seemed that by the end of the twentieth century they would number 70,000,000, and, with a corresponding progress in England, Canada and Australia, English-speaking Catholics would predominate over the Latin world, capture the papacy, Anglicise or Americanise the Church. . . .

We need not pursue the fascinating prophecy. I do not think Mr Bodley would repeat it to-day. But it was typical enough of the dreams of twenty years ago, and amongst Roman Catholics (outside the States) it still affords hours of consolation. Calculations of the future population of the States are already

more moderate. Agricultural experts estimate that long before the middle of the century it will take every acre of soil in the States to feed its own population. The tide of emigration has turned, and the native birth-rate diminishes. Only rash prophets to-day would attempt to forecast the future. And the future of American Catholicism is even more precarious. Even Catholic writers now realise that every 1,000,000 added to it beyond its native growth—which is slow—means 1,000,000 transferred from some other branch of the Roman Church. The 10,000,000 or so Catholics of the United States do not represent a miraculous addition to the Vatican's following. They come from Ireland, Austria, Italy, Germany, Poland, France, Canada and Mexico. Indeed, it will be apparent in the course of this chapter that they are but the salvage from one of the most appalling wrecks that Catholicism has suffered during the fatal nineteenth century. They do not represent *one half* of the descendants of Catholic immigrants into the United States. For this I will quote a dozen Catholic authorities; and I will establish it by a more patient examination of statistics than has yet been made.

We have seen so often how little of the temper of the sociologist is admitted in considering indications of Catholic growth that we are quite prepared to miss it in the case of America. At the same time, it is remarkable how serious writers (like Mr Bodley or M. Brunetière) can have forgotten for a moment the real character of the American Catholic Church. Its clergy list to-day is a mass of Irish, German, French, Italian and Polish names. Its story is, on the face of the matter, the story of a colossal and religiously fatal scattering of emigrants over a vast wilderness, and then the slow, laborious, and to a very great extent unsuccessful, reordering of them into a Church.

There were at the Declaration of Independence three patches of Catholicism on the broad territory that now makes up the United States. The French freely overflowed the northern frontier from Canada: the Spaniards peopled the whole of the southern and eastern border as far as California: and there was an English settlement in Maryland on the eastern coast. The English colony was founded by Lord Baltimore, a convert to Catholicism, in 1634. Fleeing from the persecution of the English government, and met by the almost equally harsh rule of the colonists, a group of about 200 families, with one priest, obtained a concession on the coast, and founded the Land of Mary. The actual States of Florida, New Mexico, Arizona, Texas and California, with their large Catholic population, were, of course, not in the Union at that time. The only colony in which Roman Catholics met with any toleration at all was the Quaker colony of Pennsylvania. They were at once dreaded and despised, and were nearly everywhere repressed with a cruelty only less than that of the mother country. A few English, Irish and German Catholics penetrated to the Protestant centres, but not many can have survived the repressive measures. In 1700 there were only seven Catholic families in New York; in 1757 they numbered about 10,000 in Maryland and 3000 in Pennsylvania. A few priests, under the direction of the English Vicar Apostolic, tried to keep their faith alive. The French priests in Louisiana and the Spaniards in the south claim to have converted about 100,000 Indians, but their work fell to pieces, and of the 250,000 Indians of to-day Sadlier's Catholic *Directory* only claims 58,000 (and barely that number are officially described as civilised). The French were driven out by the Indians and the English. It is assuredly im-

pressive to throw on the screen this humble picture of American Catholicism in the eighteenth century, and then replace it at once with the imposing picture of its present power and extent. But the social student prefers to proceed more slowly, and finds more charm in watching the process of its growth.

At the time of the Declaration of Independence (1776) the Catholics numbered about 30,000, and had twenty-six priests. Then the sun broke at last on their fortunes, and the story of advance began. Small as their number was, they were able to count in the struggle, and they sided with Washington. When it was over, most of the states abolished or greatly modified their anti-Catholic measures, and the people laid aside their bitterness. The alliance with France against England gave them further encouragement, and after 1790 numbers of the French fugitives went to the States. By the beginning of the nineteenth century they numbered at least 100,000, and German and Irish Catholics were arriving as fast as England's command of the sea allowed.

I may observe that, not only must there have been a considerable leakage already—there were only fifty priests to the 100,000 known Catholics—but the germs of what is now known as Americanism can be discerned easily enough. Carroll, the Prefect Apostolic (after the secession from England), was made bishop in 1790. Both he and other early bishops (such as Spalding and England) give remarkable pictures of the vitality and independence of their clergy. French, German and Irish priests and flocks anathematised each other freely (as they do to-day), while the Americans looked on with cold disdain, and gave no recruits to the clergy. Carroll's reports to Rome, which are quite as "American" as any sent to-day, paint a dismal picture; and the biographies of England

and Spalding give the same impression. The work of organisation in that vast territory was gigantic; and it was grievously hampered by racial quarrels, financial scandals and constant waves of immigrants. There was heroic stuff in those early American bishops and many of their clergy.

By 1820 the Catholics numbered about 300,000. They had increased tenfold in half-a-century, but the loss must have been considerable. It is calculated (no returns were made until 1821) that 250,000 immigrants, chiefly from Catholic quarters, had arrived between 1790 and 1820. The long war had restricted the stream until 1815, but after that date, and with the invention of the steamship, it ran freely. By 1830 the Catholics had increased to 500,000 in a total population of 13,000,000. But by this date we find means of checking the loose calculations that are offered us, and of estimating the loss. In 1836 Bishop England of Charlestown (a diocese embracing the two Carolinas and Georgia) attended a congress of the Society for the Propagation of the Faith at Lyons, and felt bound to rebuke the inflated statements that were already being made about the American Church. He was asked to draw up an official report, and this interesting document may be read to-day in his collected works.¹

He deprecates the "very delusive fancies" that are already entertained in Europe in regard to the Church in America; and says that instead of gain there has been a very serious loss. "I have no doubt in my mind," he says, "that within 50 years millions have been lost to the Church." Half-a-century ago (1786) the population of the States was less than 4,000,000; now it is 14,000,000. There must have been (count-

¹ Vol. iii. p. 226. The memorandum was written, with great care, at Rome by this most zealous prelate.

ing the inclusion of Louisiana and Florida) an accession from without of 8,000,000, and at least half of these were Catholics. As the Catholic population in 1836 is only 1,200,000, he estimates the loss, up to 1836, at 3,750,000! In his own diocese he had reason to believe there were 50,000 people of Catholic origin. Of these only 10,000 were faithful; and he considers his diocese to be typical. The loss is due, he says, as much to the faults of the clergy and to the energy of the Protestants as to the scarcity of priests and churches.

This very interesting and authoritative document is naturally distasteful to later Catholic writers, and some of them (like Mr T. O'Gorman) hint that Bishop England—one of the greatest prelates in the story of their Church—had no foundation whatever for his statements.¹ One may be quite sure that Bishop England penned those statements, written for the supreme council of the Society of the Propagation of the Faith, with the gravest sense of responsibility, but there were few exact returns in those days, and we must slightly curtail his estimate of the net loss. Dr Carroll Wright ("Outlines of Practical Sociology") gives the population of the States as 3,924,314 in 1790, and 17,000,000 in 1840. From 1820 to 1840 about 742,000 immigrants arrived, and it is calculated that only 250,000 came in the preceding years. But there is clearly something wrong with this calculation. The four million Americans of 1790 cannot have grown to more than *ten* millions, by natural increase, in fifty years. As the population was certainly 17,000,000 in 1840, one must admit an outside accession of 6,000,000 or 7,000,000—or on the most generous possible estimate of natural increase,

¹ The references are to Mr O'Gorman's "History of the Roman Catholic Church in the United States," in Schaff's Church History Series.

5,000,000. It is therefore ridiculous for Mr O'Gorman to reckon the total immigration between 1789 and 1835 as only 514,159; that would involve a fourfold increase of the population, by births, in fifty years! Now, of the 5,000,000 immigrants, two-thirds at least (to judge from the first ten years' returns) were Catholics. Add to these the inhabitants of Louisiana and Florida, and 300,000 native Catholics. There should have been at least 4,000,000 Catholics in the States (probably 5,000,000) in 1840. In point of fact, the Catholic estimate for 1845 is 1,071,800. Mr Bodley says they were "nearly a million" in 1840. But as there were only 707 priests and 675 chapels in the States in 1845 even these estimates must be very optimistic. The loss must have far exceeded 3,000,000 by 1840. When Mr O'Gorman tells us that there were 150,000 Catholics in New York State in 1826, and only *ten* priests, we should not be surprised at this.

But we have reached the period of heavy immigration, and may treat the whole question of leakage on a broader scale. From 1815 onwards the Church expanded incessantly. It had 1,600,000 followers in 1850; 2,789,000 in 1860; 4,600,000 in 1870; 6,300,000 in 1880; 8,000,000 in 1890; and it claims 10,000,000 to-day. On these figures the wildest speculations have been expended, and I may quote a few of these before entering on a sober analysis.

Bishop England has had many supporters amongst American Catholics in his depressing estimate, while others have differed from them to the extent of 10,000,000, or even more. Speaking in Paris in 1892, Archbishop Ireland said that his Church had probably lost 1,000,000 or 1,250,000 followers through insufficiency of priests, but had found compensation in "a stream of conversions."¹ Mr

¹ "La situation du Catholicisme aux États Unies."

O'Gorman will not even admit the 1,000,000. By a curious process of arithmetic that I need not examine he concludes that the Catholics of the States ought to number 12,000,000, and he calmly pushes aside census results and Catholic directories, and says he believes they do. He is, however, generous enough to give us some very different Catholic opinions. In 1852 an Irish priest, Father Mullen, said that there were 2,000,000 Irish apostates in the States in 1850. Mr J. O'Kane Murray, "Popular History of the Catholic Church," said that by 1870 there were 24,000,000 people of Irish extraction in the United States—a preposterous assertion. The "Lucerne Memorial," addressed to the Pope in 1891 by Mr Cahensly and other Catholics, submitted that there were 26,000,000 descendants of Catholic emigrants in the States, and of these 16,000,000 had apostatised.

Canon Delassus, an ardent French priest, gives some further opinions in his "Américanisme." He says that when M. Brunetière returned to tell Paris of the remarkable progress of the American Church (*Revue des Deux Mondes*, November 1898), the *Vérité*, Quebec, retorted that, according to Catholic authorities, there had been a loss of 15,000,000 to 17,000,000. He also quotes a Roman prelate saying to a correspondent of the New York *Freeman's Journal* (3rd December 1898), that if one takes account of the eighty years of emigration one finds that "the number of Catholics in the United States ought to be double what it is to-day." The *Freeman* claimed that there were 40,000,000 people of Catholic extraction in the States, and that 20,000,000 of these had gone over to Protestantism.¹

These unpleasant estimates came to the surface

¹ These quotations will be found in Delassus's book, "L'Américanisme," pp. 354-356.

in the shock of "modernists," or Americanists, as they say in France, and ultramontanes. Others arise out of the German-Irish embroilment amongst the American Catholics. Father Walburg, pastor of St Augustine's Church at Cincinnati, wrote, in 1889, a brochure with the title, *The Question of Nationality in its Relation to the Catholic Church in the United States*. He is not over-indulgent to his own countrymen since he says that of the 5,000,000 German Catholic emigrants and their descendants only 1,500,000 have remained faithful (p. 26). But he finds an even greater apostasy among the Irish. In brief, he calculates—on data supplied by General Von Steinwehr—that there should be 18,000,000 Irish Catholics, 5,000,000 German Catholics, and 2,000,000 French, Italian, Polish, etc., in the States in 1889. As the Catholic *Directory* only claims 8,157,678, he concludes that the loss, without counting native Catholics or converts, is 17,000,000. He claims that the details he gives in regard to his own town, Cincinnati, fully confirms this.

Lastly, I will notice the estimate of an Irish priest who made a missionary tour in 1901. Father Shinnors and some fellow Oblates were borrowed by the American Church for "revival services," and on his return he described his experiences in *The Irish Ecclesiastical Record* (February, May and July 1902). He found that deserters "could be counted by the million." On the basis of emigration from Ireland he calculated that there should now be 10,000,000 Irish Catholics in the States, or—adding Germans, etc.—a total Catholic population of 20,000,000. He found it less than 10,000,000. American prelates begged him to arrest the tide of emigration from Ireland. "For your people," one of them said to him, "America is the road to hell." They were always the first of the

emigrants to be "Americanised"—a strange comment, from an honest Irish priest, on the famed faith of the Irish. He says that at the Catholic Congress at Chicago (in connection with the Parliament of Religions), in 1893, one of the speakers, Miss Elder, put the loss at 20,000,000. This loss, moreover, he says, is not merely a reminiscence of the days when a too slender clergy failed to incorporate the masses of emigrants. He found ample priests in every diocese in 1901, yet an appalling leakage going on everywhere.

Here, then, we have sincere Roman Catholics estimating the loss of their Church in the United States at 10,000,000, 15,000,000, 17,000,000, and even 20,000,000, in the course of the nineteenth century. It is a rare and curious spectacle, especially when our chief difficulty, up to the present, has been to get behind the assurances of integrity, if not progress, that Catholic officials usually urge on us. But the very divergence of the estimates warns us to proceed with caution, and we discover the bases of calculation to be delicate and elusive.

The problem is, in fact, a difficult one: it is the problem of determining the various national elements in the population of the United States, before which many a sociologist has quailed. I have made a patient analysis of the official data, and availed myself of all previous work on the subject, and find it possible to reach a fairly precise solution.

In the first place let us try to determine what the Catholic population *ought* to be, and then what it really is. For the first study we need to consider the native growth of Catholicism and the proportion of Catholics among the emigrants. On the former point there is not room for great divergence. Taking 1820—the date when returns of emigration begin—as our

starting-point, we find that the Catholic population is given by Mr Bodley—and this is the highest estimate—as 300,000. Now, the Americans, especially urban Americans (which includes most of the Catholics) breed slowly. Father Shinnors points out that the census returns for Massachusetts in 1880 showed 71.28 per cent. of the native women to be childless; and that the returns for New York showed that 75 per cent. of the native women had a trifle over one child each. The birth-rate has notoriously diminished of late years. American social writers are inexhaustible on the subject. Let us assume, however, that there is less deliberate restriction among Catholic American mothers, as I should expect. The 300,000 of 1820 cannot have grown to more than 1,000,000 in 1900, or, at the outside, a fraction over.

Now let us turn to the seemingly formidable problem of estimating the descendants of Catholic emigrants since 1820. There is not in the census returns an analysis of "origins," as in the case of Canada, but two or three sets of figures are given that help us to reach a very confident conclusion.

In the first place we may allow for the utmost possible growth of the Americans of 1820. The inhabitants of the States then numbered 9,600,000. I propose to leave the negroes and Indians out of account, and we will make the Church an allowance for them in the end. There were in 1820 some 7,860,797 whites in the States. There are to-day—or were in 1900—67,000,000 whites, excluding the Colonies. By normal growth the 8,000,000 of 1820 cannot to-day, in view of the facts I noticed, number more than 23,000,000. Where the stock has been renewed by mixed marriages the increment must go to the account of emigration. There are, therefore, about 44,000,000 descendants of emigrants, since 1820, in

the population of 1901. What proportion of these emigrants were Roman Catholics?

The total number of emigrants between 1820 and 1900 is stated in the report of the Twelfth Census to be 19,115,221, and the nationalities of them are given. In the following table I give the figures for each nationality, the percentage of Catholics in each national group, and the approximate number of Catholics in each group on the basis of that percentage. In the bulk of cases there can be no dispute about the percentage in the countries the emigrants come from. In other cases I have adopted more moderate figures, and the note will explain my procedure.¹

IMMIGRANTS INTO THE UNITED STATES, 1820-1900

ORIGIN	NUMBER OF IMMIGRANTS	PERCENTAGE OF CATHOLICS	NUMBER OF CATHOLICS
Germany	5,009,280	36	1,800,000
Ireland	3,871,253	80	3,100,000
Great Britain . .	3,024,282	5	150,000
Canada and Newfoundland . . .	1,049,939	40	420,000
Norway, Sweden and Denmark	1,619,000
Austria and Hungary .	1,027,195	71	730,000
Italy	1,040,457	100	1,040,457
Russia-Poland . .	926,902	{ Russia, 4 } { Poland, 75 }	450,000
France	400,000	100	400,000
Switzerland . . .	200,000	41	82,000
Holland	130,000	35	45,000
Other Countries . .	816,913	50	408,000
	19,115,221		8,625,457

¹ NOTE.—The Russians and Poles are, as a later table will show, fairly equal, but the returns do not separate them. The last unclassified group contains 500,000 Chinese, but it is predominantly made up of Mexicans, South Americans, Spaniards, Belgians, etc.

Thus of the actual immigrants into the States about 46 per cent. were Roman Catholics. I must add, however, that since 1885 no register has been kept of emigrants from Canada and Mexico. As there were living in the States in 1900 some 395,000 persons who had been born in French Canada, and 103,000 who had been born in Mexico, this means a considerable accession. However, these are balanced by emigrant Protestant Canadians, and our figure of 46 per cent. holds good. On that basis, of the 44,000,000 descendants of emigrants (and living emigrants) more than 20,000,000 should be Roman Catholics.

But the proportion of emigrants from different nations has varied considerably during the nineteenth century. As those who came first have multiplied most, we must see if our results are altered by taking this into account. The rate of multiplication is not the same for emigrants as for a normal population. The vast majority are near the verge of manhood, or are quite mature. The census returns show this to be the case to-day; and it was more likely to be

Italians and French are practically all of Catholic extraction. For Ireland Mr Bodley claims seven-eighths as Catholic, and Father Walburg nine-tenths. If the reader cares to follow either, it will increase the net Catholic loss. The figure for Germany is from Dr Juraschek's authoritative "Die Staaten Europas." Father Walburg agrees. The Austro-Hungarian, Swiss and Dutch figures are from Juraschek. Scandinavians are practically all Protestants. The only difficulty is in regard to Great Britain. Most of the emigrants left after 1840, when inhabitants of Catholic parentage began to form a good percentage. To avoid controversy I take a low figure. If the reader insists on a higher one, it will only add to the ultimate Catholic loss. But there is no divergence possible that would seriously modify the result. The number of immigrants from France, Switzerland and Holland is, to a small extent, inferential, and is based on the table in Dr Carroll D. Wright's "Sociology" and the following tables.

IMMIGRANTS INTO THE UNITED STATES, 1820-1900, AND RATIO OF MULTIPLICATION

ORIGIN	Arrive in 1820-30, multiply by 5	Arrive in 1830-50, multiply by 4	Arrive in 1850-70, multiply by 3	Arrive in 1870-90, multiply by 2	Arrive in 1890-1900	Total of Immigrants and Descendants in 1900
Germany . . .	6,761	587,080	1,739,135	2,171,152	505,152	12,446,986
Ireland . . .	50,724	988,100	1,349,897	1,092,353	390,179	10,830,596
Great Britain . . .	25,079	342,854	1,030,870	1,355,400	270,019	7,570,840
Canada . . .	2,277	55,347	213,180	776,069	3,064	2,417,615
Norway and Sweden . . .	91	15,104	130,229	779,607	315,512	2,326,314
Austria-Hungary	7,800	426,688	592,707	1,469,483
Italy . . .	408	4,123	20,959	363,068	651,899	1,459,444
Russia-Poland . . .	91	1,302	6,157	317,342	602,010	1,260,928
Netherlands . . .	8,497	122,837	112,342	122,672	about 35,000	1,151,100
Denmark . . .	3,226	9,465	48,297	110,281	about 35,000	454,443
Sweden . . .	1,078	9,663	19,891	70,242	about 32,000	276,500
Finland . . .	169	1,604	20,843	119,903	about 56,000	365,596
Prussia . . .	45,038	174,897	213,438	354,027	199,022	2,472,168
Others . . .	143,439	2,312,376	4913,038	8,058,804	3,687,564	44,502,013

the case in the hard early days of emigration. In fact, in order to convert the 19,000,000 emigrants into the 44,000,000 who undoubtedly represent them to-day, I find that one must multiply those who came between 1820 and 1830 by five; those of 1830-1850 by four; those of 1850-1870 by three: those of 1870-1890 by two: and add the 3,500,000 of 1890 to 1900. The table on page 184 shows the number of emigrants, of each chief nationality, arriving in the States during these five periods. In the last column of the table I give the result of the multiplication for each table.

In this way we account satisfactorily for the actual population of the United States. Its white population in 1820 (7,866,797) may, at the outside, be presumed to have trebled in eighty years, and the rest of the 67,000,000 whites of to-day are emigrants and their descendants since that date. We see that many of the guesses at the Catholic leakage (even on the part of Catholics) start from quite erroneous data. There are not 20,000,000 Irish in the States, as Father Walburg says, or 24,000,000 as Mr O'Kane Murray says, nor are there 15,000,000 Germans. The figures I give are official, and, whatever *ratio* of multiplication one takes, the proportion will remain the same.

The next question is, What proportion of these ought to be included in the American Catholic Church to-day? To estimate this I take the last column of the preceding table, and analyse it on the basis of percentage of Catholics in each nationality that I have previously explained:

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NUMBER OF CATHOLIC IMMIGRANTS AND
DESCENDANTS

NATIONALITY	TOTAL IMMI-GRANTS AND DESCENDANTS	PERCENTAGE OF CATHOLICS	NUMBER OF CATHOLICS
Germany . . .	12,446,986	36	4,481,000
Ireland . . .	10,830,596	80	8,664,477
Great Britain . . .	7,570,840	5	378,542
Canada . . .	2,417,615	40	967,044
Norway and Sweden . . .	2,326,314
Austria-Hungary . . .	1,469,483	71	1,043,330
Italy . . .	1,459,444	100	1,459,444
Russia-Poland ¹ . . .	1,260,928	{ 75 4 }	497,000
France . . .	1,151,100	100	1,151,100
Switzerland . . .	450,443	41	186,000
Holland . . .	276,500	35	94,500
Denmark . . .	365,596
Others . . .	2,472,168	50	1,286,084
	44,502,013		20,158,521

When we thus analyse the nationalities according to the date of emigration, we reach substantially the same conclusion as before. Roman Catholics form more than 45 per cent. of the accessions to the population of the United States since 1820. More than 20,000,000 should have been added to the Roman Church in that country (apart from the Philippines) between 1820 and 1900. Two further tables will show that this conclusion is thoroughly sound. The first table shows the number of foreign-

¹ NOTE.—The Russians and Poles are fairly equal in number, as the next table will show. But, as there are only 13,000 members of the Russian Church in the States, the proportion of Roman Catholics is probably much higher than I claim. The unclassified 2,472,168 is largely made up of Mexicans, Spanish Americans, Belgians, Spaniards and other Catholics.

born whites in the States in 1900, with the percentage of Catholics; the second shows the number of whites with both parents foreign, and the percentage of Catholics. The figures which I analyse are taken from the census report:

NUMBER OF FOREIGN-BORN WHITES IN THE
UNITED STATES IN 1900

NATIONALITY	TOTAL NUMBER	PERCENTAGE OF CATHOLICS	NUMBER OF CATHOLICS
Ireland . . .	1,615,419	80	1,292,334
Germany . . .	2,663,418	36	958,827
Italy . . .	484,027	100	484,027
French Canada . .	395,066	100	395,066
Austria . . .	275,907	86	372,000
Bohemia . . .	156,891
France . . .	104,197	100	104,197
Holland . . .	104,931	35	37,000
Hungary . . .	145,714	56	81,500
Mexico . . .	103,393	100	103,393
Poland . . .	383,407	75	287,556
Switzerland . . .	115,593	41	47,000
English Canada . .	784,741	25	196,185
Denmark . . .	153,805
England . . .	840,513	5	42,000
Scotland . . .	233,524	8.4	20,000
Russia . . .	423,726	4	16,950
Norway . . .	336,388
Sweden . . .	572,014
Wales . . .	93,586
China . . .	81,534
Unclassified . .	273,442	50	140,000
	10,341,276		4,578,035

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NUMBER OF INHABITANTS OF THE UNITED STATES
IN 1900 WITH BOTH PARENTS FOREIGN-BORN

NATIONALITY	TOTAL NUMBER	PERCENTAGE OF CATHOLICS	NUMBER OF CATHOLICS
Germany . . .	6,234,220	36	2,244,318
Ireland . . .	3,991,417	80	3,193,134
French Canada . .	635,510	100	635,510
Italy . . .	705,891	100	705,891
France . . .	170,839	100	170,839
Poland . . .	668,323	75	501,243
Austria and Bohemia .	732,504	86	629,982
England . . .	1,360,345	5	68,000
Scotland . . .	419,397	8.4	34,950
English Canada . .	680,686	25	170,171
Hungary . . .	210,188	56	120,000
Switzerland . . .	187,500	41	76,000
Scandinavia and Wales	1,850,524	0	...
Unclassified (or mixed) parentage . . .	1,335,414	50	667,707
	19,851,880		9,244,509

I need not trouble the reader with any further sums in arithmetic. I will only observe that of those with mixed foreign parentage 200,000 have one Irish parent, and that, of a further 5,000,000 with one foreign and one native born parent, 976,765 are Irish. When we recollect that the Church always claims *all* the children of a mixed marriage we should admit a further large accession from mixed marriages. But I prefer to remain on solid ground, and will offer no estimate. It is clear that something over 20,000,000 Catholics should have been added to the American Church between 1820 and 1900. As the emigrants before that date were very largely Irish, French and French Canadians; as there were some 300,000 Catholics in 1820, and as the incorporation of Louisiana and the southern and

western states brought some 100,000 more, there should be to-day a Catholic population of at least 3,000,000, apart from these 20,000,000 emigrants and their descendants. We saw that Bishop England put the loss at 3,750,000 in 1836, when the Catholic emigrants, since 1820, did not number 500,000. The Roman Catholic Church ought to-day to number at least 23,000,000, without counting a single convert.

The next point is to determine its actual extent. I will not labour the point, since it claims, in round numbers, only 10,000,000 followers, but a few observations are necessary. It must be remembered that, in the case of the United States census, we have only the ecclesiastical returns of the Catholic population. It cannot be pretended for a moment that these have the same value as we should attribute to impartial enumerators. We saw in the last chapter how the ecclesiastical estimate for India exceeded even the census returns by 40 per cent., and some such excess is always found; although the census return itself is rarely acceptable. Whatever conclusion we reach on those figures, therefore, will be optimistic.

For the census of 1890 the information was, the official analyst, Mr Carroll, says (*Report of Statistics of Churches*), supplied by the respective denominations. Up to that year the Catholic authorities had been allowed to send in a bare statement of what they regarded as the number of their followers. Such returns are worthless, as the priest is apt to include in them the most pronounced seceders, merely calling them "bad Catholics." For the census of 1890 the Catholic authorities were "induced," Mr Carroll says, to return rather the number of their communicants. They reported them as 6,231,417. It is very rarely noted that, even if this is the correct number of

Easter *communions* in the United States, as we suppose, it is not the number of individual communicants, but much in excess of this. The period for making the "Easter duty" is extended over several weeks, and large numbers of Catholics communicate several times during the period. We shall be safe in taking the round number, at the most, of 6,000,000. This means the entire faithful population over the age of nine, since no one is excused from this grave duty, the sick communicating in their own homes. The proportion of the American community under the age of ten is about one-fourth. If we add these we have the maximum figure of 8,000,000 Catholics in the United States in 1890. There were then 8777 churches, 9157 priests. Dropping a proportion of monks from the latter figure, we get an average of nearly 1000 Catholics per priest and per church—an abnormal ratio, 50 per cent. higher than that of London. We must regard the figure of 8,000,000 in 1890 as *very* optimistic. The total seating capacity of the churches was only 3,365,754. I may add that Sadlier's Catholic *Directory* put the Catholic population in 1891 at 8,227,039. Hoffman's Catholic *Directory* gave the Catholic population in 1895 as 9,077,865, the number of priests as 10,053, of whom 2507 were monastic, and the number of chapels as 9309, with a few small stations. Here again we have a claim for an average of nearly 1000 souls per active priest and per church, that we must regard with great diffidence.

The analysis of the returns for 1901 are not to hand as I write, but I learn from an American source that the total of Catholic communicants was 8,447,801. This figure includes Greek and other Catholics not owing allegiance to the Vatican, besides a number who have communicated twice, or more frequently,

during the Easter period. It will be quite safe to take the round number of 8,000,000 as the total of individual Roman Catholic communicants. An increase of 2,000,000 in one decade is impressive—until we glance at our emigration table. We then find that 1,958,000 Catholic emigrants entered the United States between 1890 and 1900; and to these we must add a large number of unregistered immigrants across the frontier from Canada and Mexico. Much more than 2,000,000, most probably (if we estimate the Canadian and Spanish Catholics by preceding tables and the analysis of parentage) 2,250,000, Catholics were added to the population by emigration during the last decade of the nineteenth century. As the native Catholic population should have increased by 900,000 from *births* alone during that decade, we get, instead of increase, an actual loss on the decade of considerably more than 1,000,000 souls! Further, 8,000,000 communicants means about 10,000,000 for the entire Catholic body in 1900, as the children under nine are much less than a fourth of the population in the States. Yet even this figure cannot be accepted with confidence. There are not more than 10,000 active priests, and this would mean a ratio of 1000 souls per priest. It is about 500 in England. We cannot very well test the population in America by the number of school children, as, although the American schools, which admit only Bible-reading without comment, and are in many states purely secular, are violently assailed by the Catholics, a number of their children must attend them. Still, in view of the violent hostility to the State schools and the intense desire to build separate ones, the figures are instructive. Father Shinnors says that there are 1,000,000 children in Catholic schools and institutions, of all kinds, in the

States. Hoffman's *Directory* gave the number, on exact returns, in 1895 as 918,207 (in the elementary schools, 775,070). We may accept the round number of 1,000,000 for 1900. Multiplied by five, the very highest possible ratio, it gives a Catholic population of 5,000,000. It is preposterous to ask us to believe that more than *half* the Catholic children of the United States attend the "godless schools" of the secular authorities.

On these figures it is quite clear that the faithful Catholics of the United States do not number more than 9,000,000. They probably come to much less, but we may grant the round number. And we have already seen that the Catholic population ought to be, by natural increase and emigration, at least 23,000,000. If I have erred, I have erred throughout on the side of moderation. We may therefore confidently regard the Roman Church's loss in the United States during the last century as something more than 14,000,000. To speak of a loss of 20,000,000, as some Catholic writers do, is to use uncertain and conjectural data. To speak of a loss of 1,000,000, as Archbishop Ireland does, is simply ludicrous. And, whatever number of converts may be claimed by the American Catholic Church, a corresponding number must be added to the loss. The actual population is 9,000,000: it ought to be 23,000,000, without a single convert.

This figure, the reader must bear in mind, has been reached by the employment of statistics provided by the Federal Government, analysed by the ordinary percentage of denominations in each country. I will be content to suggest a few lines of inquiry by which a careful American student *might* add 2,000,000 or even 3,000,000 to the loss; but I have not the material to pursue the analysis. Of the 7,500,000

immigrants (and their descendants) from Great Britain I have only claimed 5 per cent. as Catholics. It is probable, however, that a large proportion of them were Irish who had settled for a time in England or Scotland. Again, of the 1,250,000 Russians and Poles I have only claimed 39 per cent. But the Russian and Greek Churches are so poorly represented in the States that it is probable a much higher proportion were Catholics. Mixed marriages would yield a still higher figure. There were 5,000,000 with one foreign-born and one native-born parent in 1900, and nearly half the former were Catholics. This should have increased the Catholic body, on the Church's rule that all children must be baptised. Probably if these lines of inquiry could be carried out in America, the 14,000,000 loss would rise to 16,000,000 or 17,000,000. This enormous leakage, we saw, is not a matter of past history, but goes on very heavily still. A million, at least, were lost in the last decade of the nineteenth century. With a church accommodation for less than 4,000,000 people, and school accommodation for less than 1,000,000 children, it is likely to continue. And as long as the papacy maintains its quixotic hostility to modern culture the leakage amongst educated Americans is likely to increase.

Lastly, a word ought to be said on the cultural condition of Catholicism in the United States. It is notorious that they are, as a body, burdened with a very high percentage of poor and illiterate. Mr M. M. McCarthy ("Education in Ireland," p. 21) observes that of 448 universities and colleges in the United States only 61 are Roman Catholic; of 52,794 young men passing through a collegiate course only 5052 are Catholic; and of 3762 graduated students only 166 are Catholic. These things are of deep significance to the social student. The Church is largely

recruited from the illiterate emigrants who flock into the country. Of the 3,250,000 illiterate whites, over the age of ten, at the last census, 1,250,000 were foreign-born. Nor is the moral tone of the Catholic body at all satisfactory. For several decades the proportion of Irish Catholics in the saloon trade in the States has been a grave scandal to the Church, and the percentage of Irish in the jails and work-houses is a very long way out of all proportion to their numbers. Any forecast of the future of the Roman Catholic body in the United States must take these things into account.

SUMMARY FOR THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING WORLD

Contrary to a widespread conviction, there has been no progress made by the Roman Church during the nineteenth century in any normally educated portion of the English-speaking world. In illiterate islands like Mauritius and the West Indies, Catholicism, as is usual in such conditions, has grown in proportion to the population. In India and Ceylon, and parts of the British Empire in Africa, it has made positive advances; but these must be regarded as gains of the foreign-mission order, which must be placed on an entirely different footing from gains in a fully civilised community. In the latter the Church of Rome again shows a large net loss everywhere. The extraordinary dispersal of the Irish people has strangely misled social and religious writers, and the enormous emigrations from Catholic Germany, Austria, Italy and Poland to the New World are rarely appraised. The conversions that have been made in the English-speaking world redeem only a small fraction of the

heavy losses. Those losses are moderately expressed in the following table :—

Great Britain,	.	.	.	2,250,000
Canada,	.	.	.	700,000
Australasia	.	.	.	550,000
The United States	.	.	.	14,000,000
Total				<u>17,500,000</u>

NOTE (*Second Edition*).—Summaries of the religious census for 1906 in the United States have been cabled as this second edition goes to press, and it is claimed that they are not consistent with the author's figures. The briefest analysis, however, suffices to show that they do not affect, but confirm, my conclusions.

The Roman Catholic total is returned as 12,079,142, and, as this is contrasted with a return of 6,241,708 at the last religious census (1890), a claim is made for an increase of nearly 100 per cent. The simple fact seems to be generally overlooked that the figure for 1890 is the total of *communicants* only, while the figure for 1906 includes children down to the age of a few days, or all baptised persons. The number of such baptised members in 1890 was about eight millions, so that the increase (on the figures given in the census) is 50, and not 100, per cent. This is merely the ratio of increase of the population of the United States between 1890 and 1906 (62 millions to about 93 millions), and is less than the increase of the Baptists and Lutherans. As the Catholic birth-rate is far higher than the Protestant (being largely made up of poor Italians, Germans, and Poles), the increase is below what it should be.

But the loss of the American Roman Church becomes still clearer when we reflect that the total of 12 millions actually includes the most flagrant seceders from the body. The figure was furnished by Archbishop Glennon to the civic authorities, and has no official value whatever. It professedly gives the number of those who were once baptised, whether they have since left the Church or no. It does not, therefore, affect my conclusions in the least. In the official directions of the United States Census Bureau "*communicants*" does not mean those who do actually communicate, but all who "*would be permitted to communicate.*" The result is a farcical confusion of actual and seceded members. As the official immigration returns for the last fifteen years show an enormous preponderance of Catholic immigrants, and a great decrease of Protestant immigrants, it is plain that the latest results are in full harmony with my conclusions. Of about 5 million immigrants between 1890 and 1906, at least $3\frac{1}{2}$ millions were Roman Catholics;

CHAPTER IX

THE GERMANIC WORLD—THE GERMAN EMPIRE

IT is one of the most singular paradoxes of modern history that, while the Church of Rome is so visibly failing in the Latin world, it seems to be making progress, or at least holding its ground, among the Germanic peoples. We have heard the cries of distress that are wrung from devoted Catholics in France, Italy and Spain ; and we have seen that the better-informed Catholics speak gravely in regard to their losses in the English-speaking world. This note is rarely heard in Catholic Germany. Since the great consolidation of the Germanic States in 1871 Catholics have found themselves forming more than one-third of one of the most powerful Protestant countries of the world, holding a political position of exceptional influence, and apparently gaining in number upon their opponents. In Austria-Hungary they still command seven-eighths of the population ; in Switzerland they approach one-half ; in Holland they number more than one-third.

Here, at first sight, we have some restoration of the balance in favour of the Vatican. When it speaks of the millions it has won on its foreign missions the social student is little moved. The cultural value of such gains affords little compensation for the terrible losses in France, Italy and the United States. But the Germanic nations are in the first line of culture, and merely to hold its ground amongst them is an important achievement for the Roman Church, and one of great significance in any forecast of its future.

It might plausibly be argued that the Latin peoples are caught in a temporary rebellion under the disturbing influence of their sudden admission to the garish world of modern culture, and that any inference we may draw from their defection must be modified by the discovery of Catholic fidelity in lands where the population has long enjoyed a high degree of literacy.

The problem of the Church of Rome in the Germanic world has, therefore, features of great interest and must be carefully investigated. It may be stated at once that the Church is *not* holding its ground in that part of Europe, though its losses there are lighter than those we have recorded in previous sections. Further, it may be noted at once that the superficial expression of Roman power in the Germanic world will be greatly modified on careful analysis. One-third of the Catholic population of the German Empire is not German at all; and the great majority of its Catholic inhabitants lie below a very modest line of cultivation. Annexation of territory and migration will seriously alter the superficial complexion of the statistics. The varying rate of increase of Catholic and Protestant populations will bring a fresh element of importance into the analysis, and it will have to be considered whether this variation, which at present enormously favours the Catholic, is likely to continue. Finally, we shall have to apply our usual severer tests to the census statistics that are so lightly accepted and that we have found almost everywhere to be utterly unreliable.

When the situation of Catholicism is examined in these lights it will be found to be, even in the German Empire, very different from what it is usually supposed to be. An English priest wrote recently :

“A glance at the various fortunes of Catholics on

the Continent should be enough to dispel any suspicion of exaggeration in the words we have just quoted. French Catholics neglected the Press (?) and French Catholics have been swept off their feet by the rising tide of Secularism. It is absurd to imagine that the present government in France has to deal with a majority or even a well-organised and substantial minority of practical Catholics. The bulk of the people simply do not care about religion. . . . The Catholics of Germany, on the other hand, are a very considerable power in the country. They are thoroughly well organised, they have their religion at heart, and they bring it to bear upon the world about them. In spite of severe persecution and overwhelming difficulties they have drilled themselves into an invincible army."¹

The contrast between the fortunes of the Vatican in France and in Germany is very just, but the writer somewhat exaggerates the power and solidity of German Catholicism. Its numerical strength is easily understood when one glances at the history of the empire, and its remarkable political position is due more to the peculiar political conditions of Germany than to its absolute strength, and is already seriously threatened. In Austria the Catholic position has even less solidity. We shall find, in fact, that the Germanic branches of the Church of Rome are affected, like all the others, by the process of decay.

THE GERMAN EMPIRE

If there be one national group that will dominate, or peculiarly affect, the policy of the Church of Rome in the day of its coming reform, it will assuredly

¹ *Month*, March 1908, p. 230.

be the group of German prelates and their followers. We saw that the Latin countries have forfeited their right to predominance. The Tsung-li-Yamen of Italian cardinals that still surrounds the Pope cannot much longer retain its privileged position, in view of the rapid secession of the educated Italians. Spain and France are themselves too shaken in their loyalty to hope to succeed Italy. The whole English-speaking world contains only about 18,000,000 Roman Catholics, and they are weakened by decay in every branch. But the German Empire reports a Catholic population of 22,000,000, with a fairly steady increase and a powerful organisation. If Austria-Hungary break up in the course of the next decade or two, and some millions of Austrians are added to the German Catholic Church, it will become the moral centre of Roman Catholicism and have a significant influence on its policy.

Before, however, we indulge in forecasts of this nature, it is essential to understand very clearly the position of the Roman Church in the German Empire. There is so little rigour and exactness in the customary discussion of this topic that one is not surprised to find writers claiming that the Teutonic world is well on its way to Canossa, while the Latin world is passing into a tardy attitude of protest. There is as little ground for such a cry as there was for the claim that the Anglo-Saxon world was returning to its old religion. The Catholic population of the English-speaking world does not include 1,000,000 Anglo-Saxons in the whole 18,000,000. They are nearly all of Irish, German or French descent. We shall not indeed find so large an alien element in the Teutonic Church, though the dispersal of the Poles will offer some analogy to the dispersal of the Irish, but in this case we must remember that

numbers of the Germanic states either never accepted the teaching of the Reformers or were at once won back by the Jesuits.

German Catholicism is almost entirely a matter of geography, history and, more recently, economic pressure. Take a series of maps of the part of Europe over which the German Empire now spreads. At the middle of the seventeenth century, when the fierce crusades and fiercer wars initiated by the Reformers and the Jesuits had somewhat relaxed, we find the territory occupied by a motley patchwork of small states, free cities, bishoprics, etc., with the common motto, "*Cujus regio, illius religio*"—"you must think as your rulers think, or the majority think, about religion in each community." Gradually a resolute little state in the north-east blurs the complex frontiers, and Austria, in its alarm, blurs them from the south, and Napoleon contemptuously rubs them out from the west, and the Council of Vienna further alters them. But the blue patches of Catholicism and the pink patches of Protestantism remain, however the political frontiers change. Ambitious Prussia spreads steadily to east and west and south, taking in the blue and the pink impartially; but they remain blue and pink. If you take a map of the German Empire to-day, and colour it according to the religious census, you will almost have a map of the territory as it was divided 300 years ago. The only difference is that the removal of feudal restrictions on the movements of the workers has led to a flow of the industrial population which has altered the shade of many of the districts. Germany is largely Catholic because it has taken in a large slice of Catholic Poland, a large slice of the Holy Roman Empire, a slice of Catholic France and a large number of the ecclesiastical principalities that were secularised

by Napoleon. It is predominantly Protestant because the larger states in it—Brandenburg, Prussia, Saxony, Schleswig, Holstein, Hesse, etc.—were converted by the Reformers, and were strong enough, or sufficiently remote from Vienna and near to Sweden, to retain their faith. And the building of all these elements into the structure of the empire has, incidentally, drawn together their religious forces into a powerful and well-organised Church.

Little more than 600 years ago the Prussians were an obscure and despised tribe of pagans by the shore of the Baltic. They were converted by the swords of the Teutonic knights, and made into a duchy for the Grand Master. In 1525 the Grand Master found it convenient to turn Protestant, and the Prussians had to submit to another change of faith. In 1618 the duchy was added to Brandenburg, which was already Protestant, and the work of expansion began. The Holy Roman Emperor (Leopold) allowed it to set up a kingship in 1701, and Frederick the Great added Polish (or West) Prussia to the kingdom, and thus brought a large Catholic element into it. "Let every man go to heaven his own way," the sceptical ruler decreed, and friction was avoided. How further large slices of Poland were annexed, and Napoleon came at length to tear up the map of Germany, and make a fresh one, does not concern us. It will be enough for us to start with Prussia after the Council of Vienna in 1815, and trace the fortune of the Catholics within its frontiers since that date.

The powers who rearranged the map of Europe after the fall of Napoleon granted the King of Prussia a large share of Eastern Poland (Posen), half of Saxony, Pomerania, Westphalia and a long stretch of territory on the Rhine (the Rhine Province). In almost every case the annexed territory added very

considerably to the Catholic population. The Poles were overwhelmingly Catholic; the Rhinelanders had lived under the shadow of the great archbishop-princes of Mayence, Trèves and Cologne for ages, and their whole district had been known as "the street of priests." In 1740 the Catholic population of Prussia was 166,000: in 1816 it was nearly 4,000,000 (to 6,250,000 million Protestants). At one stroke of the pen, without a single citizen changing his religion, the Catholic population rose to 39 per cent. of the whole. Here we have at once the explanation of the later sectarian percentage and the germ of conflict. We have also an excellent means of testing the question of Catholic growth, and we shall find that there has been a notable decrease of Catholicism in this territory instead of an increase. But I will first conclude this slight sketch of the formation of the German Church.

At first the Prussian government wisely recognised the great change in the religious complexion of the country. The famous historian Niebuhr was appointed ambassador to the Vatican, a concordat was drawn up, and a hierarchy established. The Church made slow progress. The restored monarchs everywhere were eager to foster religion in the mass of the people, as a protection to power and property, and the Romantic period of German literature had sent some notable converts to the Catholic Church—such as Frederick Schlegel, Princess Gallitzin, Count Stolberg, Brentano and others. These and other writers (Döllinger, Goerres, Moehler, etc.) put new life into the small literate proportion of the Catholics, and here and there a fairly wide revival was witnessed. Rome, however, looked with some concern on the growth of the new Church. The Vatican could overlook the apathy, the ignorance, and the looseness of life that remained from the days of sceptical and licentious prelate-

princes. The difficulty was that the new Church was not sufficiently Roman, and admitted too much semi-Rationalism. The spirit of Febronius (a powerful Catholic opponent of Roman claims in the preceding century) was very active still.

This opposition to Ultramontane ideas was very acceptable to the Prussian government, and when the Jesuits and other Ultramontanes began to oppose it with their customary vehemence trouble became inevitable. It was in the early thirties that the long conflict of the Roman Catholics with the Prussian government broke out. Frederick William III. had, with Prussian military instinct, forced the Lutherans and Calvinists to join in a common "Evangelical Church." He seems to have had some notion of inducing the Catholics to join in the course of time. The soldiers in the barracks were ordered to attend a common service periodically, and paternal regulations were imposed as to the religion of the children issuing from mixed marriages. Rome, of course, deeply resented both measures. When, in 1837, an ardent Ultramontane (Droste-Vischering) was somehow promoted to the archbishopric of Cologne, in spite of the vigilance of the bureaucrats, and at once defied the government and flouted its laws, the war began. The archbishop was thrown into prison, and the fiery cross sped throughout Catholic Prussia, from the Rhine to Poland.

The statesmen of Prussia had made a great blunder (from the religious point of view) in annexing or accepting territory without regard to the religion of the inhabitants. They made a still greater blunder in their attempts to interfere with that religion. The first blunder provided the material for the most powerful Catholic Church of modern times. The second blunder infused a spirit into that Church which drove

it closer to Rome, and moved it to create a remarkable organisation and press. Nearly every phase of that prolonged conflict has ended in the retreat of the Protestant rulers and the strengthening of the Catholic minority.

Early in the forties the government gracefully retired from the conflict, and appointed a Catholic section of the ministry of worship. By that time the Catholics of Prussia numbered nearly 5,500,000, to nearly 9,000,000 Protestants. Their percentage had fallen, but the new spirit and organisation largely arrested the leakage. In 1844 a fresh agitation swept through the whole German Catholic world. The "Holy Coat," the "seamless garment of Christ," was being exhibited at Trèves, and vast pilgrimages made their way thither. A Silesian priest, Ronge, and a Polish priest, Czerski, led schismatic protests against the superstition displayed and the Roman encouragement of it, and their "German Catholic Church" soon had 60,000 followers. In spite of official encouragement, however, its growth was arrested, and the Roman Church still advanced. The revolutionary movement of 1848 gave it the first impetus to the extensive social work with which it was to hold its ground against Socialism in later years. At that time, too, orators like Ketteler and Reichensperger began to inflame it, and it began to hold national congresses.

During all this time, in spite of the repeated stirrings of the Catholic body, and in spite of the fact that the Catholics were multiplying more rapidly than the Protestants, the Church was really losing ground in Prussia. Its percentage fell from 39 per cent. in 1816 to 37 per cent. in 1849. Taking the provinces where the multiplication of population was greatest, and the number of Catholics largest, we find this remarkable result: in Posen the Catholic percentage

fell from 65.23 in 1817 to 63.42 in 1843, in Westphalia from 59.43 to 56.09, and in the Rhine Province from 76.35 to 75.22. Yet we shall see that in each of these provinces the percentage of Catholic births was far above the Protestant average.¹

If we take account of the actual fall in percentage, the number of Catholics in each of these provinces, and the ratio of Catholic multiplication, we find that the Church must have lost several hundred thousand followers between 1815 and 1850. I will return to the point presently.

In 1861 William I. became king, and the reign of Bismarck opened. There is no proof whatever that Bismarck had more than a political concern about the growth of Catholicism, or that he meditated any coercive measures at all until the Ultramontanes tried to embroil Germany with Italy over the Pope's temporal power. Catholic rhetoric on the point defeats itself with its reckless allusions to Masonic pressure and other quite superfluous agencies. Indeed, while most Catholic writers attribute the Kulturkampf to the dark machinations of Bismarck, a few have pointed out that it began in Catholic Bavaria, and was initiated by a Catholic minister, with the assent of Catholic colleagues and a Catholic ruler.

Before it broke out, however, the German Empire was formed, and the Church rounded to its present proportions. The annexation of Hohenzollern (94 per cent. Catholic) had slightly raised the Catholic

¹ I take the figures from Father Krose, S.J. (*Konfessionsstatistik Deutschlands*, 1904), from whom most of my earlier figures are taken. I have compared his work throughout with that of the Protestant Pastor Pieper (*Kirchliche Statistik Deutschlands*—a rival production), and in regard to the figures after 1870 I have consulted the official publications. Father Krose freely acknowledges a heavy loss from 1816 to 1870, but claims later moderation of it, which, I fear, we shall not be able to allow.

percentage, but the annexations of 1866 more than restored the balance in favour of the Protestants. The last struggle with Austria for supremacy had ended in the triumph of Prussia; and Schleswig, Holstein, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Nassau and Frankfurt were added to the kingdom. These territories added 3,500,000 members to the Evangelical Church and only 500,000 to the Roman Catholic. The south German states—Bavaria, Baden, Wurtemberg and Saxony—formed an alliance with the northern, and the ground was prepared for the completion of Bismarck's plan. This was done after the Franco-German War, when the southern states, with Alsace-Lorraine, entered the imperial structure.

The territorial changes again made a considerable change in the sectarian balance. In 1867 Prussia contained 14,000,000 Protestants and 7,000,000 Catholics. In 1871 the German Empire included 25,500,000 Protestants and (with Alsace and Lorraine) 15,000,000 Catholics. Had the strongly national spirit of the earlier German Catholics prevailed over the Ultramontanes the readjustment would have been made without disturbance, but two things now occurred that inspired the anti-papals on the one hand and the Ultramontanes on the other with a new and somewhat menacing life. The Vatican Council decreed the infallibility of the Pope, and the Italian army occupied Rome. Bismarck's pleasant dreams on the slopes of Versailles were rudely interrupted by the movements of the Catholics. Not only was the Italian ruler of the Church constituted a perfect autocrat, and relieved of such check on his action as an œcumenical council provided, but German Catholics were clamouring loudly for the restoration of the Pope's temporal power by—in the long run—German troops. Further—and this was probably of greater weight—it was

notorious that Catholics were drawing a parallel between the act of Victor Emmanuel and the act of William I. The "revolution from above," which dragged Poles, Hanoverians and Frenchmen into the German Empire, was not obscurely denounced by the Catholic orators. Discontented Poles and discontented Alsatians formed more than a third of the Catholic body, and they fraternised with the Hanoverian and other bitter malcontents of the empire. When they went on to throw all their energy into political organisation, and every pulpit rang with fiery rhetoric during the first elections to the Reichstag, and they returned a formidable body of sixty members (the Centre party), pressing sectarian and papal interests and caring little about Imperial needs, they were promptly dubbed "reichsfeindlich" (enemies of the empire), and a coercive policy was conceived.

In this way the Catholics drew upon themselves the famous Kulturkampf. Virchow and other progressives had urged it, as a moral campaign against Catholic medievalism, a few years before. It now became a political necessity. The growth of the Poles was a standing problem for German statesmen; and now that this anti-national element was to be linked with the disaffected provinces in the far west, and by a power that had its centre in a foreign land, some degree of alarm was unavoidable. The German leader of the party, moreover, Windthorst, was a Hanoverian, and stood for a third element of discontent.

The desperate struggle that ensued between the German bureaucracy and the Catholic clergy interests me only on the ground that it effectively welded together the very mixed Catholic groups of the empire, and did more than any other cause in creating the German Catholic Church of to-day and attaching it to

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the Vatican. As I said, the Kulturkampf really began in Catholic Bavaria. The Jesuits had fought strenuously and successfully against the Reformers for Bavaria, and it remained the chief centre of Catholicism in the northern part of the German Roman Empire. In the calm that followed the cessation of the religious wars, and under the enervating rule of the pre-Napoleonic Catholic princes and prelates, its religion steadily degenerated, and we shall see that throughout the nineteenth century it has suffered considerable leakage. Its scholars, too, were deeply tinged with the Febronian, anti-papal spirit. When, therefore, the Vatican decree on the infallibility of the Pope was issued, the professors of Munich University protested against it, and the Bavarian minister of worship forbade the clergy to promulgate it (August 1870) without the *placetum regium*, which all knew would not be granted. At once the Ultramontanes were in arms. The bishops published the Vatican decrees and excommunicated all professors who would not submit to them. Lutz, the Catholic minister of worship, then issued a stringent prohibition of pulpit interference in political matters, and the religious war began.

But Bavaria now passed into the unity of the German Empire, and the struggle was carried to a larger stage. The Catholics of Prussia had already decided to revive their political group, which had dwindled away in 1866, and had secured a large body of representatives at the Landtag elections in October (1870). When the first elections for the Reichstag (the Imperial, as distinct from the Prussian, Parliament) came on, early in 1871, the agitation spread over Germany, and the Centre party (sitting, both morally and physically, in the centre of the conflicting parties) made its fateful appearance. Had there been a simple

two-party system in Germany, the Centre could merely have used its weight as the Irish party has done at Westminster. But the multiplicity of German parties gave, and gives, an artificial influence to the representatives of a third of the empire. Indeed, they stood, not merely for a religious issue on which they were united, but for all the anti-Prussian elements in the empire.

In the struggle that followed, Bismarck's "blood and iron" methods proved worse than futile. Whether the blood of martyrs is the seed of converts we need not stop to consider; but any less drastic form of persecution generally fails. The imprisonment of the clergy is an excellent means of inflaming the laity, because they can vent their indignation with safety. At all events the only issue of this inglorious campaign of Bismarck's was to strengthen the Church. His first move was to suppress the Catholic section of the ministry of worship, and to attempt a further control of the schools. In 1872 the Jesuits were expelled. In 1873 the famous May Laws were introduced by Falk. One law appointed penalties for all clerics who should make an improper use of ecclesiastical sentences (excommunication, etc.); another laid down a procedure to be followed when a man wished to change his creed; a third set up a special court for clerical offenders; and a fourth—the worst and most futile of all—enacted that any candidate for clerical office must be a German, educated in a German gymnasium and university, and must pass a government examination. In the following year civil marriage was made obligatory by a large majority of the Reichstag.

It was only a few years since Austrian, Papal and Spanish rulers had treated Liberals with a far more terrible procedure, and indeed a large meeting held at London, with Lord Russell in the chair, sent a

message of support to the German Liberals. But the rhetoric of the Catholic orators may well be imagined when these laws were enforced, their bishops were imprisoned, and hundreds of their chapels were closed. Bismarck may have wrongly counted on the schismatic Old Catholic party, which the protests of Döllinger and other opponents of infallibility had created. But it never became a powerful body, while the orthodox millions were now organised for the most stubborn of conflicts. A hundred Catholic journals appeared where there had been only six a few years before, and every priest was turned into a fierce politician. Numbers of the clergy entered the Reichstag, and social and political unions, philanthropic agencies, congresses and every device of agitation and organisation were employed. The struggle braced and knit the frame of the German Church as none of its own spiritual tonics could have done. Bismarck was beaten, and the Roman Church of Germany became what it is. The elections of 1874 doubled the Catholic vote, and increased the Centre party to ninety-one.

It is essential, for the understanding of the Catholic position to-day to note the real causes of the cessation of hostilities. The combat was bound to end in a Catholic victory, but an entirely new element came into the life of Germany that hastened the end. The teaching of Karl Marx and Lasalle was now spreading rapidly among the workers, and the spectre of Social Democracy was beginning to alarm all parties. In 1878 there were several attempts on the life of the emperor, and they were loosely attributed to the Socialists. The emperor impulsively observed to Falk that "if he would leave the workers their religion these things would not happen." Falk took the hint, and resigned. In the same year Pius IX. made way for Leo XIII., who was known to be anxious for

peace. Bismarck quickly perceived the more serious menace of the new force in the Reichstag. He could not be unaware that the Catholic Church was pledged to an uncompromising war against it, and the situation slowly changed. In 1880 a Bill was introduced giving the crown discretionary power in the application of the laws. The Centre party still further increased in 1881 (to ninety-eight), and a fresh Bill enlarged the measure of relief. An envoy was sent to the Vatican, the bishops returned to their sees, and in 1886 the odious restrictions on the training and activity of the clergy were removed. Its enmity to Social Democracy had turned the *reichsfeindliche* Church into the most powerful ally of the bureaucracy.

This brief sketch of the making of the Roman Church in Germany will enable the reader to understand its present strength and reject the fallacious explanations that are sometimes given. Growth there has been on a scale that no other branch of the Catholic Church has shown—an increase from the 9,091,500 Catholics (in the whole of the actual German territory) of the year 1822 to the 20,000,000 of the year 1900; from the 60 members of the Reichstag in 1871 to the 103 members of to-day (more than the Liberals and Socialists together); from the 6 Catholic journals of the sixties to the 330 of to-day; from the apathy of the early nineteenth century to the vast organisation and intense activity of the twentieth century. In view of such an advance it would seem that here we must refrain from speaking of "decay." There seems, rather, to be sober ground for the expectation of a Catholic recovery.

The second part of our examination will show that the Catholic Church of Germany has really suffered considerable losses. It has made relatively few converts from Protestantism, while very large numbers

of its own followers have abandoned their allegiance. The impolitic action of its opponents has hardened and strengthened it, but it has by no means held its ground, or made new ground, in the course of the past century.

I have already mentioned that the Catholic population tends to multiply more quickly than the non-Catholic. The reasons for this I have earlier indicated, and in the case of Germany we have exact statistics that put it beyond cavil. It will be enough to quote the Jesuit Father Krose (*Konfessions-statistik Deutschlands*), and one or two other statistical writers. Father Krose examines the data and conclusions of the official Prussian statistician Von Fircks, and agrees that, while there are 5047 children to every 1000 Catholic marriages (on data extending from 1876 to 1895), there are only 4147 children to the same number of Protestant marriages, and 3845 Jewish. Taking the number of survivals over deaths, he finds that, for every 1,000,000 people, the Protestants have an annual increase of 11,227 and the Catholics 14,102. This means a Catholic excess of 2875 a year (per 1,000,000 people) on the natural increase.

Pastor Pieper (*Kirchliche Statistik Deutschlands*) agrees as to the Catholic excess of 2875 per year per 1,000,000 people. Juraschek ("Die Staaten Europas") gives concordant figures, and shows that the Protestant birth-rate still diminishes. The official tables in the *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich* (1907) show it at a glance. The average increase of population for the empire between 1895 and 1905 was 13·2 per cent. In Westphalia it was 22·4 per cent.; in the Rhine Province 17·7; in Posen 17·5. These are the great Catholic provinces. In almost every state the percentage differs with the religious percentage. A further table of excess of births over deaths show just the same result. In East Prussia

(13 per cent. Catholic) the excess was only 10·6 per cent.; in West Prussia (51·19 per cent. Catholic) the excess was 15·9. Another table shows the increase of population between 1871 and 1905. For the whole empire it is 47·7; for Westphalia it is 103·8; for the Rhine Province 79·8.

There is, therefore, no doubt that the Catholic increase by births over the Protestant is 2875 a year per 1,000,000 people. Now there were, in the year 1820, 9,000,000 Catholics in the present territory occupied by the German Empire, and there were 22,000,000 in 1905. The reader will see that this means an annual Catholic excess beginning at 26,000 and rising to 63,000, or a total of about 3,000,000. This should be the proportional gain of the Catholics over the Protestants since 1816. In point of fact they show no such gain. Indeed, the following table will show at a glance that they have absolutely *lost* ground, for all the imposing growth of their Church:—¹

	NUMBER IN THE YEAR 1822	PERCENT. OF POPULATION	NUMBER IN 1905	PERCENT. OF POPULATION
Protestants .	16,193,000	63·9	37,255,785	65·0
Catholics .	9,091,500	35·42	20,707,158	35·21

¹ This table does not include Alsace-Lorraine, for which the figures are not available at the earlier date. But the Catholics have notoriously not increased as much as the Protestants in Alsace-Lorraine. The figures and percentages for 1822 are from Father Krose. The total population of German territory was then 25,668,420. The figures for 1905 are from the *Statistisches Jahrbuch*. For the making of a fair comparison I have omitted the population of Alsace-Lorraine. The loss in recent decades may be estimated very confidently by a different procedure. According to the results

Nothing could show more clearly that the Catholic Church of Germany has merely covered very considerable losses by the accession of millions of alien Catholics. Father Krose admits that the greater fertility of the Catholic communities ought to raise the Catholic percentage one unit per decade for the whole empire. It should, therefore, stand at something over forty to-day, even making allowance for a slighter excess in the earlier decades. In point of fact, it is—excluding Alsace-Lorraine—less than it was eighty years ago: even including Alsace-Lorraine it is only 36·1 (*Statistisches Jahrbuch*). When we remember the absolute size of the figures that these percentages represent—a population rising from 25,000,000 to 60,000,000—we see that it means a Catholic loss of several millions in the course of the eighty years.

Father Krose admits a heavy loss, but is consoled to think that it is slighter since 1871 than it was before. I have explained that the Kulturkampf proved a bracing experience for the Church after that date, and gave it a far more effective organisation, but we must examine more closely whether this statement is correct. I will not detain the reader long in examining the figures before 1871. The figures for Prussia at least are trustworthy and abundant, and they show a notable leakage. From 3,945,677 in the year 1816 (Poles included) the Catholics of Prussia slowly increased to 8,268,169 in 1871 (the Protestants increasing from 6,000,000 to 16,000,000. This, of course, does

of Von Fircks, which are accepted by Father Krose, the annual increase of the Prussian Catholics should be 14,102 per 1,000,000 people. In 1871 they numbered 8,268,169. It will be found that on natural increase, they should number more than 12,100,000 in 1900; with the excess of Catholic immigrants over emigrants they should be at least 12,750,000. But the actual number (or sensus number, which we shall greatly reduce) was only 12,500,000, chowing a loss of 500,000 for Prussia alone on the census figures.

not indicate mere natural growth, but takes account of the annexations. Father Krose gives the figure of 5,934,000 as the Catholic population in 1822 of the whole territory which is now Prussia. Their number, therefore, is less than doubled in fifty years, in spite of the high birth-rate of Posen, Westphalia and the Rhine district. Their percentage has been dropping steadily during the whole period. From 1851 to 1857—Pieper shows—the Protestants increased by 72·5 per cent. and the Catholics by only 67·8. And the decrease is most signal in the Catholic provinces. In Posen the percentage fell, between 1817 and 1858 (Krose), from 65·23 to 62·11; in Westphalia from 59·43 to 55·14; in the Rhine Province from 76·35 to 74·72.

Nor must it be imagined that emigration will explain the statistics in favour of the Catholics. I may say, once for all, that the Catholics have profited more than the Protestants by the movement of population. We have no exact figures before 1871, and must assume that the proportion was much the same as after that date. Now, at one point (1883-1887), we get a precise determination of the religion of the emigrants from Prussia, which we owe to the indefatigable labours of Von Fircks. Of the 223,834 emigrants during those five years 155,167 (or 66·46 per cent.) were Protestants, and 68,667 (or 30·39 per cent.) Catholics. The Protestants lost the greater number, in proportion to their greater strength. On the other hand, immigration also has favoured the Catholics. Of non-German immigrants during 1883-1887 no less than 53 per cent. were Catholics. Father Krose rightly observes: "We must conclude that not only emigration, but also immigration, has tended to alter the sectarian percentage in Prussia in favour of the Catholics" (p. 122).

Prussia, therefore, shows a large net loss to Catholic-

ism. We need only glance further at one or two of the larger states before 1871. Bavaria, the next chief centre of Catholicism, had 2,755,000 Catholics and 1,007,000 Protestants in 1822. In 1871 it had 3,464,364 Catholics and 1,342,592 Protestants. The Catholic percentage went down from 73 to 70. Wurtemberg had 452,000 Catholics in 1822 and 519,913 in 1858: the Protestants increased in the same period from 997,000 to 1,158,324. Baden had 730,000 in 1822 and 942,560 in 1871. All these figures tell the same story of leakage in a rapidly increasing population.

After 1871 the Catholic percentage ought to increase more rapidly than ever. The discrepancy in the birth-rate was more pronounced, and migration notably favoured the Catholics—to say nothing of the great social and political organisation to which I have referred. Now, there is no dispute about the fact that the Catholics continued to lose heavily until 1890. Father Krose gives the Catholic percentage for the empire as sinking from 36·21 in 1871 to 35·76 in 1890. In the provinces, where the Catholic birth-rate was highest, the decrease was most pronounced. In the Rhine Province the Catholic percentage fell from 73·43 to 69·02: in Westphalia from 53·47 to 50·71. Yet in these provinces the excess of births over deaths (mainly amongst the Catholics) was double the average. In Posen the gain in percentage was slight—not nearly as great as it ought to have been. In some districts there was a considerable rise in the Catholic percentage, but these are precisely the districts where they are very few in number, and the increase was plainly due to the flocking of Catholic workers to new industrial centres, largely from Bohemia and other Catholic districts.

Indeed, the whole question of leakage up to 1890

may be settled by a few figures from an essay by the famous statistician Von Fircks,¹ for the period from 1871 to 1890. The Catholic percentage for the whole of the empire fell from 36·21 to 35·76. It *ought*, as we saw, to have increased by 2 per cent. In Prussia the percentage rose slightly (33·5 to 34·2) on account of industrial movements; in the great Catholic provinces of Prussia it fell considerably. In Bavaria it fell from 71·2 to 70·8: in Baden from 64·5 to 62·0: in Wurtemberg from 30·4 to 29·9: in Alsace-Lorraine from 79·7 to 76·5. Where there was an increase, it was plainly due to immigration. In Saxony, for instance, which is overwhelmingly Protestant, it was found that 60·75 of the foreigners were Catholics; and there were also 175,000 Catholic workers from other parts of the empire. "We should rather be astonished," says Father Krose, "that the increase was not greater" (p. 123). When we recall that the Catholics should show an annual increase of 2800 per 1,000,000 people *above* the Protestants, and that they numbered from 15,000,000 to 17,000,000 during this period, we see that it means a loss of more than 500,000 for the twenty years.

Finally, I will take the figures for 1905 from the *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, and show that the leakage continues. In 1890 the Catholic percentage was 35·76 for the whole empire; in 1905 it was 36·4. It ought to have risen to about 37·4. In the Rhine Province and Westphalia the Catholic percentage has gone down still lower, and in Posen it is about stationary. The gains for Prussia are in Brandenburg and Silesia, and are due to immigration. In Bavaria it falls to 70·6; in Baden to 60·0; in Wurtemberg it recovers slightly (29·9 to 30·2). In other words, the slight increase is a mere fraction of what it ought to

¹ "Bevölkerungslehre," p. 66.

have been, and is, says Father Krose, "due purely and simply to an increase of Catholic immigrants." The heavy leakage has continued, and the whole Catholic advantage of excessive 'birth-rate' (about 600,000) has been lost. The great increase in Italians, Austrians, Belgians and Catholic Dutch and Russians, is the only increase discoverable, beyond a normal multiplication; while the Catholic multiplication *should* be quite abnormal.

As the chief cause of this relative fall in Catholic percentage—or failure to rise, if one prefers to put it so, but a failure that implies the loss of 3,000,000 followers in the last eighty years—Catholic writers indicate mixed marriages. It would be more accurate, however, to regard these as an effect, rather than a cause, of decay. We have seen that the law of the Church in regard to mixed marriages is absolute. It will not sanction marriage with a Protestant unless a formal promise is made to the priest that all children of the marriage shall be Catholic. In Germany, whatever promise is made, the Catholic Church has, for many decades, not secured even one half of the issue of mixed marriages. This has been officially determined in Prussia time after time. Early statistics of the year 1864 show that 51 per cent. of such children at that time were Protestant; and the percentage has steadily increased. In 1885 it was 54·4; in 1890 it was 55·0; in 1895 it was 55·7; and in 1900 it was 56·5. In other states the loss of such children to the Catholic Church is still greater. In Catholic Bavaria the Protestants claim to baptise 76·99 per cent. of the issue of mixed marriages; in Saxony 91·05 per cent. Only in Alsace-Lorraine do the Catholics secure a half of the children. Moreover, these figures only relate to children under sixteen, who live with their parents. The school

years take off a further proportion of the Catholic children, and others leave later. Pastor Pieper claims that three-fourths of the children of mixed marriages become Protestant: Father Krose says three-fifths. Even if we accept the latter figure—and remember that in any given year there are about 1,000,000 such children (under sixteen) in Germany—we have here an enormous leakage from the Church.

In such circumstances the high and increasing number of mixed marriages betrays a serious failure of Catholic authority. There were in 1905 about 485,000 marriages in the empire, and 42,000 of these were mixed. For many years now about one-eighth of the marrying Catholics have chosen Protestant partners, and more than half their children have become Protestants. Amongst the Poles alone have the clergy any influence in checking this disastrous practice. In Berlin, Brandenburg, Pomerania, Silesia and Saxony Catholics more frequently marry Protestants than Catholics. In Hamburg in 1901 there were 73 Catholic marriages and 480 mixed. In one place Father Krose finds 3 Catholic marriages and 81 mixed; in another 13 mixed marriages and not one purely Catholic. In Catholic Bavaria, between 1835 and 1900, the proportion of mixed marriages has risen from 2·81 to 9·91 per cent. In Baden the number of Catholic marriages *sank* from 7306 to 7023 between 1868 and 1900; while the percentage of mixed marriages rose from 9·1 to 14·5. Father Krose, from whom I take the figures, admits that it means a loss of hundreds of thousands of children. It really means much more. It plainly intimates that the authority of the Church over a large section of the nominal Catholic body is remarkably enfeebled.

And this brings us to the last point of our inquiry

into the condition of Catholicism in Germany. We have seen that, if we take the census figures of the two great denominations to be correct, the Protestant body has gained, and the Catholic body lost, about 3,000,000 members since the year 1821.¹ Our glance at the high proportion of mixed marriages and their outcome strongly confirms this. But we have found the census statistics to be extremely unreliable in every country, and will hardly expect them to be more reliable in the case of Germany, where officials frown on any qualification other than Catholic, Evangelical or Jew.

Unfortunately, the material for applying the most stringent test of real Catholicism—attendance at mass on Sundays—is entirely lacking. German writers have been most industrious in the collecting and analysis of census figures, but the more proper test seems to have been wholly neglected. We shall see when we come to examine Catholicism in entirely similar circumstances—in German Austria—that the application of this test reduces the Catholic total very materially. I find only one indication of this order in Germany, and it shows a remarkable state of things. This is an indirect indication of churchgoing in Berlin. Catholic writers have, since the last two census reports, commented with warmth on the increase of their faith in Prussia generally, and Berlin in particular. We have already seen that the figures for Prussia really reveal a serious loss, and

¹ It is necessary to note that the "Catholic" total in the census report and books of reference includes Old Catholics and Oriental Catholics. These, however, do not number 100,000, and may be neglected. I have also neglected the figures relating to the formal migrations of adults from one religion to the other. Between 1890 and 1900 Protestant pastors reported 46,600 conversions from Catholicism, and 6820 secessions to Catholicism. This expresses only a small fraction of the leakage from Rome.

the situation in Berlin, where we may assume especially energy and resources of the Catholic body, is more lamentable for the Church than in any other great city in the world.

In his "Kettler et l'organisation sociale," the Abbé Kannengieser, an ardent admirer of the German Church, has a few pages on the condition of Catholicism at Berlin in 1894. He says that there were, for the 135,000 Catholics of Berlin, only "two churches and ten small chapels"—one place of worship to 11,000 worshippers! At London there are 165 chapels to an even smaller Catholic population. The result, Kannengieser says (p. 141), is "that Catholicism loses heart at Berlin. Of the 54,000 married Catholics 26,000 are married to Protestants, and 85 per cent. of the children of these marriages pass to Protestantism. In the schools of Berlin there ought to be 65,000 children more than there are." But this is only a half perception of the truth. Even if we allowed a proportion of 3000 Catholics to each chapel—and the proportion is only 700 at London—it would follow that 100,000 of the Berlin Catholics have really fallen away. I turn to a recent and authoritative work on Berlin ("Berlin und die Berliner," 1905), which purports to give a complete guide to the institutions of the city. Its list of Catholic chapels includes only *eight* (and one Greek Catholic), but we may assume that there are four other semi-public chapels, to agree with Kannengieser. Now the census of 1905 returned the number of Catholics at Berlin as 223,948. That is one of the great increases in percentage of which the Catholic writer boasts. But how even twelve chapels can accommodate 200,000 worshippers every Sunday morning I leave to the reader's imagination. Considerably more than 150,000 must be struck off the

Catholic census total for Berlin alone. It is a most illuminating commentary on German census declarations of religious belief.¹

We must not, of course, seek to apply metropolitan conditions to the rest of Germany, but it is clear that in the larger towns of the Protestant provinces the situation of Catholicism is little better. The fact of Hamburg showing 480 mixed marriages to 73 Catholic is instructive enough, and we saw that there are many similar cases. The Catholic total for these provinces must be shorn of an enormous proportion. In the Catholic provinces the clerical organisation has grown with the population, yet even in these the proportion of priests to population is so low that a large part of the latter must be regarded as purely nominal adherents. In 1895 (the last year for which I have complete figures) there was in the German Empire one secular priest to each 1030 Catholic inhabitants. The figures for the various dioceses, in 1898 show the same striking disproportion. In the Breslau diocese, there were 2162 nominal Catholics to one priest: in the Prag diocese, 1883: Posen diocese, 1865: Kulm diocese, 1803: Gnesen diocese, 1781: Olmütz diocese, 1648. It is true that the Catholic clergy are nearly as numerous as the Protestant, though their followers are little more than half as numerous. But churchgoing is very lax among the Protestants, and their situation is fundamentally different on account of the solemn Catholic command to attend mass. Pastor Pieper says that the church attendance at Evangelical places of worship is 13 or 14 per cent. of the population.

However, in the absence of exact figures, I will do

¹ We have already seen the condition of Catholicism at London and Paris. In the three most cultivated cities of Europe, with a total population of 11,000,000 souls, there are not 300,000 Roman Catholics.

no more than suggest that the number of clergy and chapels points to a large proportion of merely nominal Catholicism in the census figures.

A better test of the reliability of the census figures is found in the marriage statistics. I have already pointed out that the percentage of Catholic marriages is one of the safest *maximum* indications of their strength. It is a grave sin for a Catholic to be married by any other than a Catholic priest: in Catholic lands the marriage is invalid. I need not go back into earlier years, but will take the marriages (from the *Statistisches Jahrbuch*) for 1905, which are in no wise exceptional. There were 485,906 marriages throughout the empire. Of these 289,353 were Protestant and 147,674 Catholic. If we divide the 42,000 mixed marriages equally between them, we find that of the total marriages only 34·5 per cent. were Catholic and 64·3 Protestant. As the Catholic percentage of the population is supposed to be 35·21 we have here a clear indication that the census figure is worthless. Nor must we forget that the percentage is only brought up to 34·5 by including 21,000 mixed marriages, which are so disastrous to Catholicism. Deducting these, it sinks to 30·4. I have already pointed out that Catholic marriages in Catholic Baden are now less than they were forty years ago, though the total number of marriages has greatly increased. In Alsace-Lorraine the number has dwindled very appreciably. In Wurtemberg the proportion of Catholic marriages sank from 27·0 per cent. in 1872 to 25·3 in 1896.

Finally, we may apply a test to German Catholicism from the feature which is its most distinctive pride—its political organisation. I have described in what circumstances the Centre party made its appearance in the Reichstag in 1871, and how the multiplicity of

German parties has given it a factitious influence. For our present purpose I have only to consider the increase in the Catholic vote since 1871. In that year—the Catholic organisation being yet immature—the Centre deputies secured 718,248 votes. By 1874 the Kulturkampf was at its height, and the Catholic vote rose to 1,438,792. Its fortune in the six elections between 1874 and 1884 is given succinctly in the *Statistisches Jahrbuch* for 1886: it fell steadily from 27·9 per cent. of the total vote to 22·6. In the towns it fell from 13·7 to 6·6 per cent. I have taken the figures from later *Jahrbücher*, and worked out the percentages for all of the subsequent elections. They are as follows:—

REICHSTAG ELECTION IN YEAR	TOTAL VOTE	CATHOLIC VOTE	CATHOLIC PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTE
1887	7,540,900	1,516,200	20·1
1890	7,228,500	1,342,100	18·5
1893	7,674,000	1,468,500	19·1
1898	7,752,700	1,455,100	18·7
1903	9,495,600	1,875,300	19·7
1907	11,262,800	2,179,800	19·3

It thus turns out that the feature which lends the chief appearance of strength to German Catholicism is really the most remarkable proof of its decay. From the high-water mark of 1874 the Catholic vote has, with slight fluctuations, sunk by 8·6 of its percentage of the whole. While the total vote has more than doubled, the Catholic vote has not increased by 50 per cent. In view of the enormous importance to the Catholic body of maintaining the prestige of the Centre party this result must be regarded as significant in the highest degree. The filling of a vote paper is a very different matter in point of sincerity from filling

a census paper. As in Italy, the Socialist party is detaching enormous numbers of workers from the Church. The social Democratic vote rose from 349,000 to 3,010,800, while the Catholic vote increased by less than 50 per cent.¹

With all its millions of followers, its remarkably ample press, and its fine organisation, German Catholicism has to admit heavy losses, like every other branch of the Roman Church. The extent of its losses can be roughly measured by the conclusions we have reached. In the first place, the census figures themselves reveal a loss of about 3,000,000 followers since 1821.² The enormous Catholic birth-rate should, in the eighty years, have given the Church an advantage of about 3,000,000 over the Protestants. It shows no such advantage, but a general loss; and its recent slight advance in the Protestant province of Prussia is admittedly due to immigration.

In the next place, we have found that the census figures give a greatly exaggerated idea of Catholicism, so that its real loss must be very much larger. At the one point where we could apply a reasonable test to the census figure—Berlin—we found it to be exaggerated to the extent of nearly 200 per cent. The vast bulk

¹ It is most misleading to judge by the number of deputies. A Socialist deputy in the Reichstag to-day represents 70,000 votes: a Catholic deputy only 21,000. The Abbé Kannengieser explains that the German Catholics are divided and violently embroiled on social questions, and the Socialists are pushing their cause with great energy in Catholic provinces ("Ketteler et l'organisation sociale").

² Rudolf Urba, a Catholic Austrian, says (in his "Oesterreich's Bedränger") that Father Krose admits a loss of 2,000,000; and it will hardly be thought that these Catholic writers are unjust to their own Church. I do not remember seeing the statement in Krose, and give it on Urba's authority. My own figure of 3,000,000 is the result of a minute analysis.

of the baptised Catholics of Berlin are absolutely lost. We saw reason for thinking that there is a similar state of things in many of the large Protestant cities ; and indeed the proportion of mixed marriages, in face of their disastrous effect on the Catholic body, shows an almost general failure of Catholic authority.

Finally, the electoral results put this beyond question. The Catholic vote is less than a fifth of the whole (while the Catholic population claims to be more than a third of the whole). On a wide franchise, and in spite of intense political activity, it has fallen from 27 to 19 per cent. in thirty years. Moreover, ministerialists are lately showing a tendency to dispense with the support of the Centre party, the Catholic workers are rent into factions by the social issues of the hour, and the earlier solid opposition to Socialism (and utility to the government) is disappearing. A corresponding split in the Catholic ranks is found on the question of "modernism." The Vatican has lately (1907) been alarmed at the wide support given to theologians whom it condemned. The loss of the German Church must be admitted to be at least 5,000,000, and the causes of the leakage are more active than ever in the first decade of the twentieth century. Mixed marriages grow more numerous, churchgoing decays, political loyalty dwindles, and fresh issues, social and dogmatic, further distract and enfeeble the Catholic body.

CHAPTER X

THE GERMANIC WORLD—THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE

WE turn now to the largest branch of the Roman Church that survives in modern times. According to the official returns the Catholics of the Austro-Hungarian Empire number well over 30,000,000 or nearly one-sixth of the entire following of the Vatican. It may be thought that I have given undue prominence to the German Church in assigning to it the first place in the Germanic world and suggesting that it may assume a commanding position in the history of Catholicism. In Austria alone the Catholics outnumber those of Germany, and, as I am dealing with political unities, I must add to these the millions of Hungary. But the justice of the procedure will become apparent in the course of the present chapter. How long Austria and Hungary may retain the few imperial links that hold them together to-day we do not know, and even in our time the Austro-Hungarian Church is perilously conflicting in its elements. Moreover, we shall discover that decay is proceeding more rapidly in the case of Austrian than in the case of German Catholicism. In cultural conditions and in the probable effect of any interference with them, Austrian Catholicism must rather be associated with the Latin Churches.

It is not unnatural that we should find the largest branch of the Catholic Church in the shrunken territory of the Holy Roman Empire. Into that empire Hungary entered on the eve of the Reforma-

tion, and it was bound to feel very largely the effect of the counter-reformation, and the strong subsequent alliance with the Papacy. But in deference to Hungarian feeling, and because, indeed, the fortunes of the Church have varied materially in the two nations, we will devote a separate consideration to each.

AUSTRIA

A very brief historical statement will suffice to prepare the reader for an examination of the Austrian Catholic Church. The imperial crown that the Papacy bestowed upon the great Germanic ruler of the ninth century created a link that was to prove of material service to the Vatican at the time of the Reformation. It was from Vienna that the Jesuits proceeded in their brilliant, if unscrupulous, campaign for the recovery of the Germanic peoples and their dependencies. Protestantism did indeed make great inroads even into the southern portion of the Holy Roman Empire, especially in Bohemia and Hungary, with their alien national temperaments. But the bayonets of the Austrian troops came to the aid of Jesuit and Dominican eloquence, and they were preserved for the Vatican. As the imperial armies pushed from victory to victory in the early stages of the Thirty Years' War, they were followed by clerical and civic officials who saw to the extirpation of the Lutheran heresy.

Austria was so effectively restored to orthodoxy that, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Protestantism was almost unknown in it. Bohemia made the more stubborn resistance that one would expect from its alien nationality. Enjoying a high culture

—for the age—at the time of the Reformation, it listened intelligently to the new preachers, and joined willingly in the protest against Roman corruption. By what ghastly devices it was induced to return to the fold the reader will easily surmise from our earlier chapters, and from the fact that the population of Bohemia fell from 2,000,000 to 700,000 during the religious wars, and its very promising civilisation was blasted for two centuries. It was not until the end of the nineteenth century, when the emperor passed an Edict of Toleration, that Protestantism raised its head again in Bohemia. In the meantime it had recovered somewhat in Silesia, where the Swedish conqueror, Charles XII., had, in 1707, compelled the Austrians to restore 120 of the 1000 Protestant churches they had seized.

Hence, when Joseph II. passed his Edict of Toleration in 1781, the Church of Rome had little ground for anxiety. Some alarm was, indeed, caused in Bohemia, where 70,000 presumed Catholics threw off the cloak, and declared themselves Protestant, the moment they were free to do so. But the total number of dissidents was small. What concerned Rome more was the emperor's cavalier treatment of the Vatican and resolute interference with ecclesiastical matters. He suppressed 700 monasteries, and reduced the number of monks from 63,000 to 27,000. In his zeal to emulate the comprehensive activity of Frederick the Great—who scornfully referred to him as “the sacristan”—he altered the character of ecclesiastical ceremonies, dictated the quality of their vestments, and, in fine, brought nearly the whole of Church life under imperial control. “Josephism” has passed into the vocabulary of Catholic Austrian writers, and to it they are glad to ascribe their later losses. The truth is that, for all his blunders, the reforms he made

probably eased the pressure of the revolutionary movements on the Church.

The modern phase of the Austrian Church begins when the rulers of Europe sat down to retrace the map after the fall of Napoleon. The Holy Roman Empire had crumbled into hopeless ruin at the touch of Napoleon, and, though Cardinal Consalvi made great efforts to have it restored, the Austrian ruler decided to cling to his new title of "Emperor of Austria." The empire at that time included a large part of northern Italy, the Tirol, Vorarlberg and Salzberg, Dalmatia and Galicia. A large number of Italian and Polish Catholics were thus united with those of Austria, and the Church began to assume very large dimensions. A Polish rising in 1846 gave pretext for the incorporation of the last fragment of the kingdom of Poland. We have already, in the chapter on Italy, seen the character of the Austrian rule after 1815. The Viennese court and its chief statesman, Metternich, were the centre of the whole European reaction. Liberty was entirely stifled, and progress erased from the Austrian dictionary. The press and literature were subject to a drastic censorship, and a special secret police watched for the faintest indication of progressive or heretical temper. Catholicism did indeed deteriorate; for it was orthodoxy rather than piety, submission rather than character, that was sought. But from 1815 to 1848 the clergy had supreme power in the empire.

Then came the great uprising of the Liberals and the democracy. Hardly had the news of the Revolution at Paris reached Vienna when the flames of rebellion roared throughout the whole Austrian dominion. Metternich fled, the emperor capitulated to his people, and a large measure of political and religious freedom was granted. Within another year,

however, the Austrian troops had trampled under foot the new ambitions of Italians, Slavs, Hungarians and Czechs, and Catholicism was more triumphant than ever. The Vatican had hitherto been jealously excluded from interference with Austrian life, but the fresh revolutionary outbreak led the court to enter into alliance with it. The Concordat of 1855 embodied the usual compact between the temporal and spiritual powers. For the influence accorded to it for the first time in the history of Austria, the Vatican was to stifle education and thunder its censures upon every democratic aspiration. The constitution of 1848 was torn up, the Jesuits and monastic bodies were restored to favour, and the clergy were entrusted with the work of "education"; yet from that time we may date the decay of the Austrian Church. The revolutionary movements of 1848 were not blind outbreaks of ignorant workers, but the calculated work of the middle class. Under the terror that succeeded their first failure they gathered secret strength, and awaited the next opportunity for striking. As in all similar circumstances, the clergy abused their restored power, and anticlericalism spread with great rapidity in Austria. I need touch very briefly the steps in the downfall of the hierarchy. In 1859 and 1860 the Austrians were swept out of Italy, and in the hour of defeat Francis Joseph was compelled to concede many of the Liberal demands. Hungary obtained a separate constitution, a Reichsrath was set up, with popular representation, and the clerical control of education was considerably weakened. In a few years Austria received a fresh humiliation from Prussia, and lost all that remained of her influence in Germany. Again the Liberals pressed, and the power of the clergy was further enfeebled. Hungary secured its autonomy, civil marriage was set up, and education

improved. The Liberals came to power, and from that time onward Austria has presented the remarkable spectacle of a country in which the Catholics number 91 per cent. of the population yet the political life is wholly unfavourable to the clergy. "One of the most striking features of modern Austrian political life," the Colquhouns say, in their admirable work, "has been the growing antagonism to the Roman Catholic Church and the clerical party. It is almost impossible to describe the various phases of this revolt and the forms which it is taking in various parts of the monarchy."¹ We shall see that native Catholic writers are not less candid. The Concordat was abrogated in 1875, and a reformed Reichsrath limited the power of the clergy, taxed their funds and controlled the number of convents and monasteries. The Vatican and the clergy protested vehemently, but the law was passed—in a country more than 90 per cent. Catholic, and with a wide franchise—by 224 votes to 71.

But political life in Austria has of late years been increasingly complicated with racial problems, and we will turn to the clearer consideration of census figures and the various ways we have learned of checking the insincerity of census declarations. I may dismiss the political test with the observation that, for the last forty years, the clericals have never obtained power except through splits in the Liberal party (Liberals, Radicals and, lately, Socialists) and on a non-religious issue like Antisemitism or Czechism.

We will take first the census statistics, and glean

¹"The Whirlpool of Europe" (1907), p. 244. Mr and Mrs Colquhoun give this verdict on the present strength of Catholicism in Austria: "The growth of German Liberalism has affected the middle and working classes in the towns, but the aristocracy and the agricultural peasants are under priestly influence to a great extent" (p. 247). It is the familiar story—the same situation as in Italy and Spain.

what information we may from them. At once we find that, as in the case of Germany, they show a very appreciable leakage. In 1857 the Catholics of Austria numbered 16,634,190, or 92·6 of the total population: in 1900 they were returned as 23,796,814, or 90·99 of the population. In every single province but one in which the Catholics number more than 1,000,000 their percentage has fallen—in Lower Austria from 98·5 to 92·49; in Steiermark from 99·5 to 93·74; in Bohemia from 96·3 to 96·2; in Galicia from 89·6 to 88·4. In Moravia alone and Dalmatia (where they are less than 1,000,000) they show a slight increase of percentage. The Protestants have raised their percentage almost in the same proportion, but their total number is not large. On the face of the matter the Catholics have lost 500,000 in the forty years; and we shall presently see that the real loss is far greater.¹

In the face of this result it is hardly needful to dwell on intermediate statistics. Throughout the period we find Catholic writers who are sensitive of their loss of power. In 1880, Dr Jordan observes, in a minute account of Catholicism at that time:

“Pseudo-Liberalism, the enemy of religion and the nation, has during its brief domination brought about so general a moral and material deterioration that a restoration is absolutely necessary. . . . If in spite of this [overwhelming majority of Catholics] even the most just claims of the Church have in recent years been repeatedly rejected, and it has been put, not merely on a level with, but actually lower than, other creeds, it is time that Catholics began to move.”²

¹ I borrow the earlier figures from Dr Rudolf Urba's work, “Oesterreich's Bedränger” (p. 369). Urba is a devoted Catholic, yet he adds: “The results in the year 1910 will be even sadder.”

² “Schematismus der gesammten Katholische Kirche Österreich-Ungarns.”

His coreligionists have endeavoured to move energetically enough since that date, but every decade has revealed their failure. Twenty years later another Catholic champion, Dr Urba, had to write: "According to statistics Austria is Catholic. That does not mean, however, that the Catholic Church has a great influence on public life and the people generally."

The next point is to determine whether the Catholic percentage ought not to have increased, as in Germany, in virtue of a higher birth-rate amongst the Catholics. Here we have not the exact material for determining the matter that we had in the case of Germany, but we have ample indications that the law of greater Catholic increase holds good. From the official *Vorläufige Ergebnisse* of the census for 1900 I take the ratio of increase of the population in the different provinces for the preceding decade. It is 16·0 per cent. in Lower Austria and 3·1 in Upper Austria; yet in the former the Catholics have dropped 6 per cent. in half-a-century, in the latter (where they are less numerous) they have only fallen a fraction per cent. The increase was 11·4 per cent. in Salzberg, where the Catholic percentage has dropped, and the Protestants are a mere handful; 13·5 in the Trieste district—another case of greatly diminished Catholic percentage, and a solidly Catholic district; 12·4 in Silesia; 12·9 in Bukowina; 11·8 in Tirol and Vorarlberg—all cases of lowered Catholic percentage. As the general increase for Austria was only 9 per cent. it is obvious that this abnormal increase in large and solidly Catholic provinces should have raised the Catholic percentage. Instead of rising, it has fallen in them all. On the other hand, the immigration of Protestant Germans has been fairly balanced by the immigration of Catholic Italians; though probably the

heavy emigration from Austria in recent years has, on the whole, told against the Catholics.

We may safely repeat that the census figures show a loss of at least 500,000. But we are quite prepared to look for the real truth behind the census statistics, and we shall find them as fallacious in the case of Austria as in the case of Italy or Spain. The proportion of priests, it is interesting to note, is less than 1 to 1200 Catholics; but we have in the case of Austria one or two surer indications.

In the first place we may glance at the official *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Wien* (1905). There are supposed to be about 1,500,000 Roman Catholics and about 50,000 Protestants at Vienna. The Protestants have fifteen places of worship, a small enough proportion, but, as we saw, Protestant churchgoing is no test of numbers. On the other hand, we find that the Roman Catholics of Vienna have only 116 places of worship, and only 75 of these have a parochial status. There are, in addition, 213 chapels attached to schools, barracks, cemeteries, etc.; but the fact that interests us is that the more than 1,000,000 free Catholic civilians of Vienna have only 116 chapels. This means a proportion of at least 10,000 Catholics to every chapel! I need not insist that this is absolutely impossible. Not 500,000 people (of the free citizens) can possibly attend mass in Vienna every Sunday; and I am informed by Viennese residents that this is an entirely just conclusion. Vienna is fast becoming a second Paris in regard to religious feeling and observance. Only the influence of the court holds it to a superficial profession of Catholicism in its higher circles, and the middle class and the workers are following the *bourgeois* and the *ouvriers* of Paris.

Now let us turn to one of the largest provinces of

Austria, containing more than a fourth of its whole population, Bohemia. The writer whom I have already quoted, Rudolf Urba, is an ardent Bohemian Catholic, and his work, "Oesterreich's Bedränger," has some instructive and weighty pages on Bohemian Catholicism. They number more than 6,000,000 in the census results, and have a much higher degree of literacy than the Catholics of the West. But they are rent in two by the eternal racial quarrel, and Urba's defence of the Czech Catholics against the German Catholics reveals a remarkable state of things, and gives us one more illustration of the worth of census declarations.

"The condition of the Church in Austria," he says (p. 353), "is very distressing. There are, for instance, parts of northern Bohemia where the priest is superfluous. Not a single man goes to church the whole year round, whether the priest be a Czech or a German." And he quotes "Austriacus" writing in the Catholic *Wahrheit*: "The number of parishes has gone down. A bishop who wished to raise a well-provided mission into a parish could not secure a candidate for six years. The number of parishes remains small, and most of the priests have a poor position. In the towns the priests are frequently insulted and reviled, especially by students." The details with which he supports these statements afford one of those rare glimpses that we get into the condition of the Church in "Catholic countries." In the district of Toplitz and Dux there are 32,000 workers, or a Bohemian Catholic population of 120,000 souls. "In consequence of the complete neglect of those colonies in spiritual matters there has been a frightful demoralisation." I gather that these workers have mainly gone over to the Social Democrats. Urba gives a list of scores of places that have minorities of Bohemian Catholics numbering from 1000 to 10,000.

They have no Bohemian priest, and none of them ever go to church. "In all these large communities," he says, "even the children attending the Bohemian schools do not see a priest from one end of the year to the other, and never receive the sacraments" (p. 360). And he assures us that this statement applies to "hundreds of thousands of Bohemian workers." Indeed the specific cases he gives show a loss of more than 500,000.

Once more, therefore, where we can apply a serious test to the census figures of Catholicism we find them to be utterly worthless. In Austria, as in most other countries, a census of churchgoers (the only Catholics worthy of the name, in view of their solemn obligation) would throw a lurid light on the condition of the country. Unfortunately, this is precisely the aspect of Catholicism that is most neglected by its innumerable critics, and I can only ask the reader to apply the condition we find in Vienna and Bohemia, with a fit sense of proportion, to the whole empire. The situation rapidly approaches that we found in Catholic Italy. The anti-papal bias of the dominant Liberal party reflects the temper of the best-educated class: it is mainly anti-Roman. As to the workers, it is enough to point out that the Austrian Socialists have the largest Parliamentary group in the world, and secured nearly 1,000,000 votes at the 1907 election. We may conclude with Mr and Mrs Colquhoun that "the aristocracy and the peasants" are still Catholic; it reminds us strangely of Bolton King and Okey's verdict on Italy about the same period—that "the women and the peasants" are faithful to the Vatican.¹

¹ I need not point out with what reserve we must accept the orthodoxy of the Austrian aristocracy. It is largely dynastic and political. I remember a conversation I had on the matter with a distinguished member of the Viennese aristocracy. Intellectually he was an Agnostic: politically a Catholic.

I cannot conclude without a glance at the nature of the Roman Catholic body in Austria, so that the reader may have some guidance in estimating its coming fortunes. That it is not generally of a high moral and intellectual quality is well known. Meyer gives the percentage of illegitimate births in Austria as 426 per 1000. The *Vienna Year Book* for 1905 gives 16,867 illegitimate to 38,849 legitimate births.¹

As to literacy, we find that much more than a third of the population (in 1907) can neither read nor write: 30 per cent. *over the age of six* are utterly illiterate. But this is not a full expression of the state of things from our present point of view. Millions of the literate Catholics of Austria are as remote from modern thought as if they lived in the centre of Africa. The Poles and Ruthenes of Galicia, the Italians, Friaulians and Ladinians of Tirol and the coast, the Slovenes of Carinthia and Carniola, and the Roumanians and Serbo-Croats of Dalmatia and Bukowina make up 45 per cent. of the Catholicism of Austria, and their cultural condition is well known. If modern education and culture penetrate into the villages of these backward peoples, as they are doing in any other countries, we may reasonably expect the same result—a very large withdrawal of allegiance to the Vatican. Nearly 3,000,000 of them belong to the retrograde Greek Catholic Church, but as these are in union with Rome I have included them in the figures I have given.

The dense ignorance of so many millions of the population is enough to account for the slower decay of these parts of the Austrian Church.

The intense racial and political quarrels that absorb what mental energy they have are another hindrance to progress. Austria is made up of 9,000,000 Germans,

¹ Catholic Austria, Hungary and Portugal are the three worst countries in Europe in this respect.

6,000,000 Czechs, 4,250,000 Poles, 3,000,000 Ruthenes, and 3,000,000 Slovenes, Serbo-Croats, Roumanians and Italians, with 1,250,000 Jews. The Jews are the most cultivated and the most wealthy. In the Austrian universities 16·7 of the students are Jews; though they are only 4·6 per cent. of the population. There are powerful journals on the staff of which hardly a single Christian can be found. The bitter Antisemitic war which the Catholics wage will, in the long run, bring a heavy punishment.

In the German-Slav conflict the attitude of the Church is more complicated. Czech Catholics complain bitterly that their clerical authorities favour the hated process of Germanisation, and Italian Catholics in the south make the same complaint. The lower clergy, however, being of the people, generally side with the local nationality, and add the strength of a political passion to their hold over the people. Some years ago the Slovenes of Carinthia and Carniola secured power, and restored their cumbrous language and retrograde national character. The Catholic clergy supported them, out of protest against the growing Liberalism of the Germans. Generally speaking, the Catholic clergy support the Pan-Slav movement, and oppose the Pan-German, because Germany stands for Protestantism, Liberalism and Socialism. The political future, into which I cannot venture, will determine their gain or loss by this procedure. It is significant enough, however, that, though the last elections were fought on a basis of manhood suffrage, the clericals lost heavily, while the Socialists and Pan-Germans gained. Out of the 423 members of the Reichsrath after the elections of 1901, only twenty belonged to the Catholic Volkspartei and two to the Czech clerical party. Some of the Catholic leaders were badly beaten in what were

regarded as their strongholds—as Baron Dipauli was at Botzen.

The bitterly anti-Catholic German Radicals returned twenty-one deputies, and the Socialists eighty-seven (with a total vote of 936,673, or nearly a fifth of the electorate). It may well be doubted if the Church has not made one more of its fatal blunders in falling back upon the more ignorant elements of the population.

One recent outcome of the struggle—the “*Los von Rom*” movement seems to have attracted an undue amount of interest, and may be dismissed in a few words. The secessions from Rome to Protestantism in the last ten years are only a moderate increase in a process that has been going on, as in Germany, for many years. In 1897 a great gathering of German students at Vienna University made an impassioned protest against the tyranny of Rome, and a heated agitation set in. Politicians of the Pan-German school fell in with it, and it is even asserted that funds and apostles were supplied from Germany. In many districts, no doubt, the movement assumed a purely religious character. Whole villages solemnly abjured Catholicism, and embraced Protestantism. But the magnitude of the movement seems to have been greatly exaggerated. The Evangelical Consistory Council of Austria officially states that its net gain from Catholicism between 1899 and 1904 was 24,238. Since the latter date the movement has hardly maintained its strength, and it has been checked by the authorities for the too openly expressed demand for union with Germany that some of its speakers entertain. On the other hand, it is untrue that the movement has ceased. I find an account of the solemn abjuration of Catholicism by forty-seven university students, in a Lutheran church at Vienna, in 1905;

and the Viennese *Jahrbuch* tells that there were in that city alone 1690 secessions from Catholicism in the same year. The "Old Catholics" (who reject the infallibility of the Pope) received many thousands of seceders in addition to those recorded by the Protestant clergy.

But the whole movement expresses only a small fraction of Rome's real loss in Austria. The serious loss of percentage in the last fifty years, in spite of the slower growth of the Protestant communities and the obvious gains from Greek and Oriental Catholics, shows, even accepting the census figures, a loss that runs to many hundred thousands. But this again is only a fraction of the real loss. We saw that, in the only two instances where more precise tests are available—Vienna and Bohemia—the census figures are seen to be ridiculous. The political situation fully confirms this. Half the electorate return anti-Catholic deputies; the bulk of the remainder are deaf to clerical appeals, and vote only on political issues. Fully 3,000,000 of the literate and adult population have been lost by the Church of Rome in Austria since 1848.

HUNGARY

The situation of the Church in Hungary is in many respects similar to that it holds in Austria. Until 1867 the intolerant laws of Catholic Austria applied equally to Hungary, but there was an even stronger tradition of Liberalism in the Magyar kingdom, and the granting of a separate constitution gave it ample power. There are to-day 11,774,056 Roman and Greek Catholics in Hungarian territory, out of a total population of 19,250,000. The core of the Catholic body consists of some 5,000,000 Magyars, chiefly of

the peasant class, and with them are associated, in a conflicting and heterogeneous mass, 1,750,000 Germans and 5,000,000 Slovaks, Serbo-Croats, Ruthenians, etc., generally of the most ignorant character. And the body is torn by a German-Slav-Magyar conflict that makes it difficult to reach men's real religious convictions.

I have already mentioned that the Magyar nobles offered the crown of Hungary to Austria on the very eve of the Reformation, and, under Austrian influence, the progress of Protestantism was kept within bounds in the country. Its religious history up to 1848 was bound up with that of Austria, and need not detain us. In 1848, however, a successful revolution was effected in Hungary, and from that date Catholicism decayed amongst cultivated Hungarians. Of the great political movement that is associated with the names of Kossuth, Pulzky, Deak and Andrassy it is not necessary to speak here. Their republic, weakened from the first by its conflicting racial elements, was soon shattered by the Austrian troops, and the rule of Vienna was restored. But they left in the country a tradition of anticlerical Liberalism that is shared by most of the Hungarian middle class to-day. Many laws have been passed in defiance of the clergy, making civil marriage obligatory, enacting that in mixed marriages boys shall be baptised in the religion of the father and girls in that of the mother, and removing the registers into the hands of civilians.

Down to our own time the Liberals have more than sustained the conflict with the clericals—as we shall see—but the issue has now been gravely complicated by the Slav-Magyar controversy. The Magyars, as the more civilised body, naturally claim precedence over the less advanced Slavs and Roumanians, and the Slavs fiercely resist what they regard as an

attempt to obliterate their national character. The priests have taken the side of the more backward nationalities, and this has, for the time, tended to preserve the integrity of the Church in Hungary. The prelates have, it is true, sided openly with the dominant class. Urba complains bitterly that Hungarian bishops have encouraged the "Magyarisation" of his fellow-Slavs of Hungary, and Yves Guyot says that at the critical elections of 1899 "the higher clergy voted with the Liberals." But the lower clergy were ranged against their Magyar or German prelates. Even bishops, like Archbishop Stadler of Sarajewo in 1900, have been gravely censured by the political authorities for inflammatory political addresses to the Pan-Slavists.

This chaotic conflict in modern Austria-Hungary has so important an influence on the fortunes of the Church that I cannot ignore it, yet cannot hope, in a small space, to give a clear idea of it.¹ I may say briefly that the clergy at present gain by their participation in the political struggle. The attitude of the Magyar clergy conciliates the Protestants and Liberals of Hungary proper, who would dread a complete alliance of the Catholic clergy with the Pan-Slav movement. But at the same time the patriotism of the Slav priests secures the devotion of the Slovaks and Serbo-Croats and Ruthenians. The familiar situation in Ireland will give the reader some idea of this. A clergy that vies with the popular patriotic orators in denouncing the "tyranny" of a

¹ The interested reader will find an impartial and valuable account in A. R. and E. Colquhoun's "Whirlpool of Europe." I have collated Urba's "Oesterreich's Bedränger" (a Catholic Czech work); Bresnitz von Sydacoff's "Die Wahrheit über Ungarn" (anti-Slav and anticlerical); Felbermann's "Hungary and its People" (of Magyar bias), and Boulier's "Les Tchèques" (of Czech inspiration) and others.

ruling caste, of alien nationality, does more to strengthen its position than a clergy that acts on the principle of its kingdom being not of this world. Even neutral writers like the Colquhouns are sensible of this. They say, for instance, that the Slovaks (a Slav people in Hungary, numbering about 2,000,000), "a simple people, in a primitive state of development," are "chiefly exploited by the clerical party to form a counterpoise to the growing Liberalism of Hungary."¹ The other Hungarian elements in the Pan-Slav movement are not spoken of with any greater respect by those who know them. Felbermann describes the Ruthenians as "but slightly touched by the waves of civilisation" and the Wallachians (a non-Slav people that enter largely into the Catholic total) as "very ignorant, cunning and superstitious." The Serbo-Croats are at the same level of development.

These are the elements that make up more than 40 per cent. out of the Catholic population of Hungary. Nearly 40 per cent. of the remainder are Magyar peasants, whose cultural condition is not very much higher. In a Magyar work of the year 1890, Dr Bela's "Statisztikai Tanulmányók a Magyar Protestantizmusról," I find a close analysis of the religions of Hungary that makes this clear. It shows that the Roman Catholics are 44·29 per cent. Magyar, 15·95 per cent. German, 15·79 per cent. Slovak and 18·44 per cent. Serbo-Croat. The Greek Catholics are mainly Wallachian (or Roumanian) and Ruthene. As the lower races outgrow the Magyars and Germans, the proportion is much worse to-day. On the other hand, the Calvinists (who form two-thirds of the Hungarian Protestants) are Magyar to the

¹ "The Whirlpool of Europe," p. 285. Felbermann speaks of the Slovaks as "stupid and cowardly," and "almost as ignorant as their ancestors were when Arpad conquered Hungary."

extent of 94 per cent. We must not, therefore, look for any great decrease in the number of the Hungarian Catholics. Political prestige they have assuredly lost, but so long as the Church retains its hold on the prolific population of the least educated provinces, and encourages the anti-Magyar sentiment that inflames them, its percentage must remain high. Dr Bartha Bela (in the work I have quoted) and Dr Juraschek ("Die Staaten Europas") give the Roman Catholic percentage as 47·8 in 1857 (a point I have verified) and 50·1 in 1880. The increase is greater than the Catholic birth-rate demands, but it is due entirely to accessions from the retrograde Greek and Oriental Catholic bodies. These prolific communities fell considerably in percentage, while the slower-breeding Protestants and Unitarians maintained their level.

Since 1880 the Roman Catholic percentage has advanced at a very much slower rate. In 1890 it stood at 50·84: in 1900 at 51·5. When we learn that since 1857 the Oriental Catholics have gone down about 5 per cent., we see at once the source of the slight Catholic gain, and we can gather that it hides a very serious loss. The decay of the Greek and Oriental Catholics, who have the highest birth-rate in the kingdom (the Roumanians, Servians, and Ruthenians), means obviously that hundreds of thousands of them have made the easy transition to the Roman Church. People of these races do not emigrate much and never become Protestants or Freethinkers. They have made a considerable addition to the Roman body. Now the Roman birth-rate is quite enough to explain its slight increase in percentage without this addition, and we are forced to conclude that the accession of hundreds of thousands of ignorant Wallachians, Servians and Ruthenians has merely

concealed the loss of hundreds of thousands of Magyar and German Catholics of a higher type.

A glance at the political world entirely confirms this. The Liberals of Hungary observed, in the early nineties, that the Catholic clergy were making strenuous efforts to secure all the children that were born of mixed marriages, as the law of the Church directs. But the Liberals had passed a law twenty years before to the effect that, in such families, the boys must follow the religion of the father and the girls that of the mother. A conflict was soon raging, and the priests appealed forcibly to their followers to oust the Liberals and have the law of the Church respected. The fight was dragged on to our own time, but the only issue of it has been the remarkable success of the most explicitly anticlerical group, the Kossuthists. In the elections of 1899 (after civil marriage had been made obligatory) the Kossuthist deputies rose from 47 to 74. In 1901 a split in the Liberal camp occurred, but the Kossuthists rose still further. In 1905 their group of delegates rose to 163 (and there were other anticlerical groups), while the Catholic people's party could secure only 23 seats! Finally, in 1906, the Liberals and Kossuthists united, and at a fresh election the Kossuthists won 250 seats in 400. The main issue of their party is, of course, separation from Austria; but they are professedly anti-Roman, and their extraordinary success sufficiently reflects the religious temper of the educated Magyars.

The Church has, indeed, only a majority of illiterates who are still nearly 50 per cent. of the population of Hungary. Amongst the Magyars the work of education is proceeding rapidly and effectively, and it has its usual effect upon Catholicism. But the Croats and other Catholic groups are illiterate to the extent

of nearly 70 per cent. In such an environment the encouragement of the Pan-Slav movement by the Catholic priests is enough to maintain the supremacy of Rome. Whether it be true that the Vatican deliberately encourages the movement in the hope that, in the event of a disruption of Austria-Hungary, the Slav peoples will come together in one empire or republic, over which Rome will have a unique influence, one cannot say. Certainly some of its prelates entertain that dream. But even if Austria-Hungary break up, Russia and Germany will never allow the construction of such a kingdom. And when the frenzy of racial passions has subsided, and the light of modern culture breaks upon the calmer mind of the Slavs, we shall see the customary rebellion against Catholicism.

CHAPTER XI

THE GERMANIC WORLD—SWITZERLAND

THE small Catholic population of Switzerland does not of itself require very lengthy consideration, but the singular history and political features of the country invest it with a peculiar interest. It is the only country in Europe where monarchic pressure has not influenced the religious profession of the people from the beginning of the nineteenth century, and to-day it is the theatre of our most advanced democratic experiments. These circumstances will seem to many to give especial value to the fortunes of Roman Catholicism in Switzerland; and when they learn, as they constantly do, that the Church has throughout maintained its ground, and is to-day making considerable progress, amongst the free and sturdy Swiss, they are inclined to see in the fact a peculiar and unsuspected aptitude of Catholicism to thrive in an entirely democratic atmosphere.

I may so far anticipate my conclusion as to say that this estimate of the Swiss Church is wrong in many important respects. In the earlier part of the nineteenth century—and the situation was worse in earlier centuries—the tenor of Swiss life was rather aristocratic than democratic. By the middle of the century the power was diffused among a much larger body of the citizens, and the change was disastrous for Catholicism. In later decades, when even more advanced political forms have been adopted, the Church has suffered more severely than ever, and its

authority is now gradually shrinking to the less educated communities of the Swiss Federation. It has to admit enormous numerical losses and a political defeat that can only bear one construction in so democratic a nation.

The Swiss are predominantly Germanic, but the fact of more than one-third of the population being Roman Catholic does not point to any serious recovery of ground since the Reformation. In that great medieval disruption seven of the cantons remained faithful to the Vatican. It is said ("Historian's History of the World") that "the corruption of the clergy at the beginning of the sixteenth century seems to have been more general and barefaced than in the other countries of Europe." One hesitates to accept this estimate of the Swiss historian, because one finds the historian of nearly every other nation laying claim to the same distinction. However, that may be, Zwingli found an audience no less responsive, when he began to denounce the sale of indulgences in 1518, than Luther did among the northern Germans. The great cantons of Zurich and Berne, and many smaller ones, became wholly Protestant. But the reformers somewhat marred the success of their work by taking pronounced sides on political questions, and seven of the cantons—Schwyz, Uri, Unterwalden, Zug, Lucerne, Friburg and Solothurn—were preserved for Catholicism. The Jesuits were quickly summoned to Lucerne, the centre (then and now) of Catholic influence, and the religious war proceeded briskly. One word will suffice, however, to show how the Catholics have fared since Zwingli's time. Reinforced by half of Appenzell and St Gall, they counted seventeen votes out of twenty-nine in the Swiss Diet, and they practically retained the ascendancy until 1847 (though it was much weakened after

1712). Since 1848 their federal influence has sunk lower and lower, and in the National Rat, elected on a basis of manhood suffrage, they now secure only some 20 representatives out of 160.

Until the end of the eighteenth century the balance of numbers and power was preserved by drastic coercion in both the Catholic and the Protestant cantons. Then the flood of French feeling burst over Switzerland, and the new era of restless change began. I need only note that the Napoleonic treatment of the country vitally enfeebled its Conservative and aristocratic features, and, although the cantons settled down again to a somewhat sluggish life until 1830, the germs of Radicalism were pushing vigorously in its soil. From that date—the second inflow of revolutionary feeling from France—the modern struggle of Roman and anti-Roman began. Each canton took its own measures in regard to religion—of the new cantons for instance, Valais stringently excluded Protestantism, and Vaud as severely repressed Catholicism; but the spread of literature was enfeebling the old barriers, and the new Radicalism was engendering a feeling of great hostility to Rome.

In 1834 seven of the cantons decided to appropriate all conventual premises, and convert them into "useful" institutions. When Aargau gave effect to the resolution in 1841, the Catholics began to arm and organise against the rising menace to their faith. The Jesuits were brought back to Lucerne, Friburg and Valais, and the whole country was soon seething with excitement over the question of their expulsion. Time after time troops of Radical "free lances" made armed descents upon the Ultramontane stronghold, Lucerne, but they were repulsed, and the Catholics drew closer together throughout the Federation. The Radicals now secured a majority in the federal

council, and after stormy discussions decided that the Jesuits must leave the country. Once more in the history of Europe the followers of St Ignatius became the centre of a passionate struggle. Rightly enough—as I think—the Catholics concluded that the new force in the country was fundamentally hostile to their creed and interests, and the sombre preparations for civil war darkened the hills and valleys of Switzerland. The seven Catholic cantons united in a Sonderbund (Special Federation), and defied the federal authority. They had more than the moral support of Austria, as well as a fervent papal benediction, but their brave troops were quickly scattered by the brilliant federal leader, and the Jesuits had to be abandoned.

From that date, 1848, the Radicals—far more anticlerical than the earlier middle-class Liberals—have maintained an overwhelming strength in Switzerland. It has been their constant aim to change the decentralised federalism of the country into a strong centralised government. Knowing that their power was now hopelessly restricted to certain cantons of a more backward character (as I will show), the Catholics stoutly resisted the Radical constitution of 1848. They have had the support of Swiss Conservatives, who resent the centralising tendency, and even of some non-German Radicals, who see in it a process of Germanisation; but the country (while repeatedly rejecting, by its Referendum, political and economic proposals of the Radicals) has maintained the anticlericals in overwhelming strength and contemptuously overridden the Catholics. In the Stände Rat (a federal council to which two deputies are sent from each canton) the Catholics have, of course, been able to keep a powerful minority, though its proportion is less than their supposed percentage in the country.

But in the National Rat, the great popular house to which one deputy is returned, by general election, for every 20,000 citizens, the Radicals have maintained a majority far exceeding the joint bodies of Liberals, Conservatives and Catholics. While in the Bundes Rat, the supreme federal executive, composed of seven members elected by the national assembly, only one Catholic and one Protestant Conservative have found a place since it was set up in 1848!

In face of this political impotence of the Catholics under one of the most democratic constitutions of the world the reader will turn with some interest to the analysis of their census figures. According to the latest enumeration (1900) they number no less than 1,397,664 in a total population of 3,315,443, or 41·6 per cent. of the whole. It seems hardly necessary to prove that here the census figures have no more than their usual worth, but we have to try to ascertain the real situation that lies behind them. It is to be noted, in the first place, that, as in Germany, even the census figures betray a considerable leakage. The exact disproportion of Catholic and non-Catholic birth-rate is not discoverable, and I will only assume that the Catholic peasants of the forest cantons, and of Lucerne, Friburg, Valais and Ticino are obedient to their Church's command to lay no restriction on the birth-rate, while the Radical workers have not the same scruple. Hence, in a country that is more than one-half Protestant we should find much the same rise in the Catholic percentage as we found reason to expect in Germany.

As in the case of Germany, we look in vain for such an increase. Again a fervent Catholic writer comes to my support, and I will take the earlier figures from his pages. In his "Die Katholische Kirche in der Schweiz" (1902), Dr A. Büchi, who has no illusions

in regard to the fortunes of his Church, observes that "from 1850 to 1888 the Catholic percentage remained stationary, but it has increased by 1 per cent. in the last twelve years." In 1850 (the same figures are found in Juraschek) the Catholics formed 40·6 and the Protestants 59·3 per cent. of the whole. I find that in 1870 the Catholics still formed exactly 40·6 per cent. though the Protestants had fallen to 58·2. In 1880 the Catholics were 40·8, and at the census of 1888 were 40·57 per cent. of the whole. In the forty years they had lost the whole advantage of their higher birth-rate, and all the advantage that a large Catholic immigration should have given them. The latter advantage alone was considerable. Of the 230,000 foreigners resident in Switzerland in 1888 some 150,000 were (calculating in the way we did in regard to American immigrants) Roman Catholics.

By the end of the century the number of resident foreigners rose to 392,896—more than a tenth of the population of Switzerland—and here we have the explanation of the small increase of the Catholic percentage. Büchi observes that his coreligionists have grown most in the frontier cantons, and adds: "The reason is obvious enough—because they receive most immigrants from exclusively Catholic lands." Juraschek also assigns the increase to "the extraordinarily large immigration from neighbouring Catholic lands." The problem of the immigrant is a very serious one in Switzerland, and it greatly affects our question, since at least two-thirds of them are Roman Catholic. Instead of being surprised that the Catholic percentage rises 0·9 in half-a-century, we see at once that it betrays a serious loss. The birth-rate alone should have raised it at least 2 per cent. Immigration (bringing at least 280,000 Catholics to 120,000 Protestants) should have raised it a further 5 per cent. There

has evidently been a loss of at least 200,000 on the census figures alone. And as the Old Catholics (now numbering about 40,000) are wrongly included in the Catholic total, they must be transferred to the statement of its loss. Their whole existence is a protest against Vaticanism.

A glance at the summary headings of the census results will make the matter more secure. In the oldest Catholic provinces the percentage has sunk as follows in the last half century :—Lucerne, 98·8 to 91·6, Uri, 99·9 to 96·4, Schwyz, 99·6 to 96·6, Obwalden and Nidwalden, 99·9 to 98·3, Zug, 99·3 to 93·3, Solothurn, 88·4 to 68·8, Friburg, 87·9 to 85·3, Ticino, 100 to 94·7, Valais, 99·4 to 97·8, Inner Appenzell, 99·6 to 93·9. In other words, throughout Catholic Switzerland there has been a continuous and remarkable leakage. This fall is compensated by a rise in percentage in the Protestant and mixed cantons—Glarus, Geneva, Bale, Vaud and Berne. It is only this enormous immigration of French, Austrian and Italian Catholics, across the respective frontiers, that has concealed the great leakage.

So far I have proceeded on the census figures, but the reader will hardly need reminding that they merit little confidence. The political fortunes of Catholicism show this clearly enough. Dr Büchi draws the attention of his coreligionists to their real position, in a brief and painful confession. He reminds them that, while they are supposed to number nearly half the population, they have only 34 representatives in 147 (23 per cent.) in the National Rat, 15 in 44 (34 per cent.) in the Stände Rat, and 1 in 7 in the Bundes Rat. Of 335 Swiss journals the Roman Catholics have only 49 (or 15 per cent.), and of 54 political dailies he complains that they control only 9. "It is clear," he says, "that the Catholics are much be-

hind, and they should endeavour to improve their position in Parliament and Press." He quite admits that a proportion of the nominal Catholics are Liberals, but does not seem to see, or care to confess, that the proportion is *very* large, and fully explains their abnormal situation. I will borrow from his pages one incident that will suffice to show this. Ticino, the Italian canton which was annexed at the beginning of the eighteenth century, is described as almost exclusively Catholic. But throughout the seventies and eighties the Radicals showed great power in the canton, and waged incessant war on the Catholic Conservatives. In 1890 the clericals tampered with the electoral system, in order to retain their waning influence, and there was a sanguinary conflict. Proportional representation was then introduced, and it has had the effect of sending them alternately to power. As the Radicals are pronouncedly anticlerical, and the priests sternly denounce their party, we see what this means as to the religious feelings of the inhabitants of Ticino. Yet in the census of 1900 the Canton was returned as having 135,177 Roman Catholics out of a total population of 138,000!

The reader who has any lingering regard for census declarations will do well to consider this closely. Ticino is, in fact, a bit of Lombardy, and its sturdy workers have all the Radicalism of the Milanese. Its chief town, Lugano, is a notorious centre of Italian Socialism and Freethought. At the disputed local election of 1890, when the Radicals returned 35 deputies to 77 clericals, the total Radical vote was only 600 less than the Catholic (12,166 to 12,783). We must not indeed imagine that the peasantry and the women are divided in anything like the same proportion, but the clean division of the educated adult males is significant.

Nor may we assume that the nominal Catholics are everywhere so really divided into faithful and seceders as they are in Ticino. In the French canton of Valais, no doubt, we find Catholicism of the French type, but in the German cantons there is more fidelity. How far that is due to their greater illiteracy I will forbear to inquire, but it is a fact that the Catholic cantons lag far behind the Protestant in regard to education. Let so neutral an authority as *The Statesman's Year Book*, 1908, attest the fact for us. "In the north-eastern cantons," it says, "where the inhabitants are mostly Protestant, the proportion of the school-attending children to the whole population is 1 to 5; in the half-Protestant and half-Catholic cantons it is 1 to 7; and in the entirely Roman Catholic cantons it is 1 to 9." The law of compulsory education is not enforced where the cantonal authorities are Catholic. Over these large masses of ignorant peasants the clergy retain considerable control.

Yet the slow growth of education is, as everywhere, enfeebling the authority of the clergy. The hierarchy and the Vatican have long imposed on their followers, as a sacred duty, political hostility to Liberals, Radicals and Socialists, but the result of recent elections, in spite of the usual division of the progressive forces, and an alliance of Conservative Protestants with the Catholics, shows a remarkable impotence. At the general election of 1899 the cantons returned to the National Assembly 86 Radicals, 9 Socialists, 19 Liberals (Whigs) and only 33 Catholic and other Conservatives. In 1902 a number of the expelled French monks removed to Switzerland, and were summarily ordered to quit by the National Assembly. In spite of the intense Catholic indignation, the elections of that year returned 97 Radicals, 25 Liberals, 9 Socialists and only 35 Clericals and Conservatives.

A further opportunity was then afforded to the Catholics on account of the increasing split among the progressives. The Radicals and Socialists quarrelled, mainly on the military question. In the elections of 1905 the Socialists lost seven seats (though their two deputies represented 70,000 votes), but the Catholics failed to profit by the quarrel.

The electors to the Swiss National Rat are nearly one-fourth (23·5 per cent.) of the entire population. Setting aside the women, children and foreigners, they represent the substantial body of the nation. It must not therefore be imagined that there are large numbers of unenfranchised Catholic men who would alter the Catholic representation if they had the vote. In no country but France are there so few without a vote. The plain fact is that only a fifth of the men of Switzerland vote Catholic, though the Catholic Church makes pressing appeals for better representation in the Rat. It is surely plain that, as in Ticino—as in Italy and Spain—a very large proportion of the nominal Catholics are really defaulters. The number I cannot pretend to determine, but we may at least double the loss that the census figures themselves betrayed, and put the Church's loss in Switzerland in the last half century at 400,000. If the Church prefers to regard half of these as merely "bad Catholics," the spectacle of her entire political impotence will remain a sufficient indication of profound decay to the social observer.

CHAPTER XII

THE GERMANIC WORLD—BELGIUM

IN the course of this essay the reader will have observed that the fortunes of Catholicism in recent times have been largely determined by a great law of modern political development. The nineteenth century opened with the rise of a political party, the Liberals, that was destined to begin the undoing of Rome. Through its rise the countries that had escaped the Reformation of the sixteenth century were now washed by a fresh wave of humanism, and the protest against Rome that followed was, in the spirit of the time, bound to have a political character. Power passed largely from autocratic princes to parliaments; and the new parliaments represented the educated middle class. In Catholic countries, therefore, the earlier part of the century was conspicuously occupied with a struggle of *bourgeois* and priests. The uneducated workers looked on with little discernment. The Liberal principles of education and enfranchisement at length brought into political existence a fresh body, far larger than the Liberals and, as was quickly discovered, antagonistic to it on economic issues. The century ends, therefore, with a struggle of Radicals or Socialists with the middle-class Liberals. And in the division of their forces clericals and Conservatives here and there steal back to power, or even, at times, secure the support of their old enemies for the purpose of controlling the emancipated Caliban.

In the case of Belgium we have a very clear illus-

tration of the effect of this political evolution upon the fortunes of the Roman Catholic Church. The clerical writer not infrequently adduces Belgium as a country in which the anticlerical forces have been fairly beaten, and the Catholics have again secured an unshakable domination. The facile reader is led to imagine that there Catholicism has recovered the ground it lost in the troubled days of revolution, and now smiles at every effort to dislodge it. Indeed, as I have everywhere insisted on the significance of the political powerlessness of the clergy, I must surely allow that their remarkable power in modern Belgium is a proportionate testimony in their favour. But I am very far from being prepared to make any such admission. The Belgian Church has suffered the most grievous losses, and its decay has proceeded no less rapidly during the last thirty-seven years, in which it has controlled the majority in the Chambre. The fact will be placed beyond dispute by the very positive indications I will give; and the paradox is simply explained.

That Belgium is Catholic at all is a mere matter of political history. At the time of the Reformation the Netherlands were in the hands of Philip of Spain. Belgians and Dutch listened eagerly enough to the appeals of the Reformers, but the merciless procedure of the Spanish Inquisition and the ferocious troops of Alva brought stronger arguments into the theatre. The geographical law of the Reformation held good. The northern provinces successfully rebelled, and Protestant Holland will be dealt with in the next chapter. The southern provinces were retained for Spain, and Protestantism was utterly eradicated. They then reverted to Austria, and, as part of the Holy Roman Empire, were equally guarded from heresy. At the end of the eighteenth century they

were overrun by the French troops, and the germs of Liberalism were, as usual, planted in the educated class. Through the subsequent struggle I need not follow them. At the resettlement of 1815 Holland and Belgium were united again by the Council of Vienna.

From 1815 to 1830 the Church prospered, and suffered little from Liberalism. Catholics and Liberals were associated in a common hatred of the Dutch, and their own struggle was deferred until the Dutch rule should be shaken off. The priests naturally resented Protestant control, though it went little beyond building schools and enacting liberty of religion; and the Catholic body was itself leavened, to some extent, by Liberal Catholic followers of De Lamennais and the French democrats. The Liberals were patriotic enough to chafe under a foreign rule, and there were restrictions on the press and freedom of speech that hindered their advance. In 1830 they joined forces, and drove out the Dutch. The Revolution has been called a "sacristy revolution," and certainly it was in substance a clerical revolt against Dutch efforts to introduce education (both for priests and laity) and to assure liberty of cults. But its leaders were Deistic or Agnostic Liberals, and no sooner was the kingdom of Belgium set up, under Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, and a constitution (on English Whig lines) framed, than the struggle of clerical and anticlerical began.

The ecclesiastical question had been "settled" by releasing the Church from State control, while granting the clergy full State support, the care of the cemeteries, and a number of other privileges. Besides the two State universities, at Ghent and Liège, each party now founded one for itself—the Catholics at Louvain, the Liberals at Brussels. Under the new

parliamentary system, with a moderate middle-class franchise, the Liberals felt their power, and soon began to chafe. For ten years the shrewd king held the parties together, and there was concern enough about their political and financial stability to overrule other matters. Ministries were mixed and impartial. In the early forties, however, the Catholics became anxious about the rapid spread of Liberalism, and attempted to force a law that there should be no elementary education without religious instruction. The two parties now drew up their political forces in open hostility, and the great electoral battle opened. The king disliked the Liberals, as most kings did, and set up a Catholic ministry in 1845. They attempted to meddle now with secondary education, and provoked another fierce Liberal agitation. In 1847 the Liberals came to power, and they held office for twenty-seven out of the succeeding thirty-seven years.

The true religious condition of Belgium is so very clearly revealed by its political life that I must continue to tell the story in greater detail than I have done in the case of other countries. On census returns Belgium is wholly Catholic. There are only some 20,000 Protestants and 4000 Jews within its frontiers. Yves Guyot tells that Protestantism has made remarkable progress of recent years in certain districts. There are now 900 Protestants at Charleroi, where there were formerly not half-a-dozen. There are 500 at Junet, he says, and 8000 in the Borinage. However the best authorities put their number at less than 20,000, and that is a negligible quantity in a population of 7,160,547. Our task is rather to set aside the census declarations and employ more sincere tests of conviction. The reader may remember, from our first chapter, how at the census of 1871 only 85,000 of the inhabitants of France described them-

selves as of no religion; and how five years later the number grew to 7,000,000. There had, of course, been no such extensive change of *conviction* within five years. We shall see that the Belgian census results are on a level with the French results of 1871.

From 1846 to 1878 the Liberals had almost unbroken power. I must warn the reader at once that that does not imply a very large number of seceders, but merely a preponderance of Liberals among the educated minority. Even when the limit of taxation for the right to vote was lowered in 1848, the electors were only 79,000 in 4,000,000. The vast majority of the people were utterly illiterate and densely ignorant. As late as 1866 the people of East and West Flanders, amongst whose sluggish peasantry the clergy still find their chief support, were illiterate (over the age of seven) to the extent of 50 per cent. Until the end of the century, therefore, the electoral struggle represents a contest of less than a hundredth part of the nation, and may be dismissed briefly.¹

In their first term of office, from 1847 to 1855, the Liberals pressed the work of education, thereby incurring not only the bitter hostility of the clergy, but a good deal of unpopularity on account of the increase in taxation. They were beaten in 1855, and the clericals, who had used no gentle means to influence votes, sought their revenge. In particular, they attempted to recover control of the charities that had been secularised in 1830, and, after a fiery conflict, a Bill was passed to that effect. Such an issue as this, and the standing issue of the school, show plainly

¹ The full details may be read conveniently in Seignobos's "Histoire politique de l'Europe contemporaine"; Wilmotte's "La Belgique morale et politique" (1902), and Count Goblet d'Alviella's "La Représentation Proportionnelle" (1900).

enough that it was a battle of Catholics and non-Catholics. In fact a third issue was now raised, of a still more significant character. The religious orders were accumulating enormous wealth, and the clergy wanted to have a law passed to secure it against the obvious designs of the Liberals. But the communal elections now ran so strongly in favour of the Liberals that the king was obliged to recognise the feeling of the nation, and recall them to power in 1857. The general election gave them seventy deputies to the clericals' twenty-five.

The electorate was so entirely with them that they retained office, in defiance of the Church, for thirteen years. But the next phase of the political development now set in. Young Liberals turned into Radicals, and young Radicals began to listen to Karl Marx. The older Liberals refused to extend the suffrage, and the clergy gladly watched the dissensions in the enemy's camp. Seignobos protests, indeed, that the Belgian Liberals were never more than "a coalition of enemies to Catholicism," and were bound to break up when it came to constructive legislation. At all events there was much cross-voting and abstaining at the 1870 election. The Catholics secured seventy-two seats and the Liberals only thirty-five. But the triumph was not great, from our present point of view. The Liberals actually secured 42,058 votes, while 35,501 votes gave a majority to the clericals (D'Alviella); and many of the latter votes were given by Radicals and discontented Flemish Liberals.

The Kulturkampf in Germany and the occupation of Rome put fresh political life into the Catholics, but the educated feeling of the country was against them. Their opponents combined again, and greatly reduced their majority in 1874. Their ministers were Catholics

of a Liberal shade, and were discreet, but the clergy flung themselves into politics with all that disdain of lay scruples that their higher ideals seemed to them to justify. "Corruption and intimidation had reached such a pitch at this time in the electorate," says Wilmotte, "that even the clerical ministry felt the need of a vigorous remedy." He quotes a Catholic Senator, Limpens, saying afterwards :

"Who does not remember the scandalous scenes that were witnessed on election days—voters marched up to the poll in brigades, and compelled to show their votes to a controller before putting them in the urn, and then the revenge taken on those who voted according to their consciences."

The Liberals and Radicals secured a law ensuring the secrecy of the ballot, and in 1878 they won seventy seats, to their opponents' sixty. Their tenure of office—the last they have had—lasted six years, and brought out afresh the growth of anti-Roman feeling. They passed a law of obligatory and secular education. The clergy responded with stern excommunication of any parents whose children attended their schools and teachers who taught in them, and set up sectarian schools in face of them. The issue showed plainly that the anticlericals were not now a mere handful of *bourgeois*, who were wealthy enough to have a vote. After five years' scattering of ecclesiastical lightning and building of schools there were still in (1884) 346,000 children in the national schools and 500,000 in the Catholic schools (chiefly among the Flemish peasants). The government appealed to the Vatican to check the violence of the clergy, and withdrew their representative when the Pope refused to act, and suppressed the salaries of 400 priests. It is quite futile to represent the struggle as any other than one of Catholic and non-Catholic.

But the old division of the progressives on the franchise question returned, the increased taxation was resented, and at the elections of 1884 the Catholics secured sixty-six seats, and the Liberals only three. Did that mean that Belgium was still Catholic at heart, and only needed to be roused? We glance at the votes, and find—so absurd was the Belgian system—that the three Liberal seats were won with 22,117 votes, while the Catholics won sixty-six seats with 27,930 votes.

On that feeble turnover, the Catholics entered upon the period of office that they still maintain. They at once subsidised the sectarian schools, ruined the national schools, and made religious instruction part of the curriculum in all. The clergy turned with zeal to social activity among the workers, and every effort was made to keep the hated Liberals out of power. In spite of all this the Liberals quickly won back fifty seats. In the partial elections that followed in 1886, 1888 and 1890, only a few hundred voters separated the total number of their supporters. In 1892 the Liberals won thirty-four seats with 52,198 votes; the Catholics secured sixty-eight seats with 58,000 votes. The ridiculous and unjust nature of the electoral system was now too patent to be tolerated, and in 1893 the law of manhood suffrage was passed.

The result of this change is of peculiar interest to our inquiry. It raised the number of electors from 130,000 to 1,350,000; and in a country where the political division coincides with that of religion the electoral division should prove informing for our purpose. Hitherto we have seen little more than the division of middle-class opinion. From 1894 onward we get the decision, on issues that are so persistently clerical, of the vast majority of the adult males of Belgium.

Unhappily, any expectation of that kind must be largely disappointed. The second phase of political development had by this time proceeded far, and the lines of cleavage of the contending parties were materially altered. We have seen in so many cases (Spain, etc.) how the rise of a more advanced party has modified the attitude of the Liberals that we are quite prepared to understand it. In Belgium the rapid spread of Socialism has alarmed the middle class to such an extent that they now often vote for the clerical candidate, as the less dangerous of two enemies. M. Wilmotte, a Liberal writer, and a keen opponent of Socialism, insists sadly on this. The Socialists, he declares, now secure one-fifth of the whole of the votes at a general election. If the system of plural voting be abolished, he fears they "may well turn out to the larger half." In the face of this menace to their economic interests the *haute bourgeoisie* has dropped its Liberalism, and now "elle vote pour Dieu." These are, it must be remembered, the words of one of the *haute bourgeoisie*, and they are entirely just. The danger was so clearly perceived when manhood suffrage was granted—granted, obviously, to disarm revolution—that its effect was moderated by a complex system of plural voting. The father of a family, the possessor of a certain amount of wealth, or the man who had had secondary education, was granted an additional vote. The 1,350,000 electors found themselves possessed of 2,066,000 votes. The Conservative vote, in other words, was artificially multiplied; and in view of the fact that the Belgian nobility and landowners are Catholic, and the *haute bourgeoisie* now turning to support the Church, the result has to be examined with great discretion. The Catholic vote no longer stands for so many individual Catholics.

With these reserves in mind we turn with interest to the electoral battles since 1893. In the very next year the Liberals were apparently annihilated. The Catholics secured 104 seats, the Liberals 20 and the Socialists 28. When one regards only the number of deputies—the only figures, unfortunately, that are commonly quoted—it looks as if the broadening of the franchise proved that Belgium was really Catholic. In truth, it showed precisely the reverse. The new electoral system retained all the defects of the old in the distribution of seats, and we must consider only the number of votes. In spite of the plural vote, in spite of the fact that at second ballots the Liberal usually voted for the clerical against the Socialist, the Catholics obtained only 900,000 votes, while the Liberals had 350,000 and the Socialists 450,000. At the partial elections of 1896 and 1898 the Catholics gained further seats, but actually lost votes. They carried the whole of Brussels with 89,000 votes, while 40,000 Liberal and 73,000 Radical-Socialist votes went without a seat. To complete the absurdity, the provincial elections were held just after the general election, and the Liberals carried every seat at Brussels. In 1898 the same farcical results were seen. In Hainault the Socialists won 20 seats with 220,000 votes; the Catholics 4 seats with 124,000 votes; the Liberals 2 seats with 109,000 votes. In a word, a Liberal deputy in Parliament represented 76,000 votes, a Socialist deputy 6,000 and a clerical deputy 11,000.

A fiery agitation still went on over the injustice of this electoral system, and the king intervened once more. In spite of the violent opposition of Catholics (who profited so much by the actual system) and Socialists (who demanded adult suffrage and single vote), a law of proportional representation was passed

in 1899. The Catholic ministry contrived to enfeeble the reform somewhat in their fixing of the *quorum* and grouping of districts, but it did much toward clearing the expression of popular feeling at elections. The plural vote remained—350,000 having two votes and 250,000 having three votes—with many other limitations, but the result was interesting. The Catholic group sank to 86; the Liberals and Radicals secured 33 seats and the Socialists 32.¹ The number of votes that each group of deputies represented was, according to M. Wilmotte: Catholics 995,000, Liberals and Radicals 497,000, and Socialists 467,000—964,000 anticlerical and 995,000 clerical. In other words, the men of Belgium were found to be seceders from Catholicism to the extent of at least one-half. We must remember that the double and triple vote would give only the slightest increase to the Socialist vote, and would greatly swell the Catholic total. It is quite safe to say that half the men of Belgium, at least, are anticlerical.

And this proportion has been more than maintained in subsequent elections. I have worked up the results given in the Belgian journals after the elections of 1902, 1904 and 1906, and find that the Catholics have steadily lost ground. In regard to the number of their deputies they seemed to secure a great triumph in 1902, when they won the bulk of the new-created constituencies, and raised their party in the *Chambre* to ninety-six. But—apart from the fact that the number of deputies still did not tally fairly with the number of voters—the “triumph” was short-lived. The Catholics lost three seats in 1904 (and four in the Senate) and four seats in 1906, so that their majority over the rising opposition has been reduced to twelve. But it is the votes

¹ It need hardly be said that I am speaking throughout of the *Chambre*, not the Senate.

that especially claim our interest. The Belgian elections are partial, half the Chambre retiring every two years. I therefore add together the total figures for 1900 and 1902, and the figures for 1904 and 1906, in order to get the expression of the whole electorate. In the first case the Liberals, Radicals and Socialists secured 974,725 votes, and the Catholics 1,010,034. But the votes cast for the Christian Democrats (followers of the ex-Abbé Daens, bitterly opposed by the Roman Catholics) numbered more than 50,000, so that the clericals had really a minority of the electorate. It was the same in the elections of 1904 and 1906. The Liberals, Radicals and Socialists obtained 1,090,146 votes, the Catholics 1,125,189. But the Daensists and other independent candidates polled 56,000 votes, and again put the Catholic votes in the minority. With all their advantage of birth-rate, triple votes and the support of certain Liberals, the Catholic vote steadily sinks in proportion to the electorate. It is impossible to calculate with any accuracy the incidence of the plural vote, but (the whole aristocracy, for instance, voting Catholic) it would certainly favour the clericals. We may with complete confidence say that more than one-half of the men of Belgium are anticlerical. They vote for the group of parties whose triumph will mean the disestablishment of the Church and the secularisation of national life.

Here we have a check upon the census returns, of which the efficiency can hardly be questioned. No one who has lived amongst the Catholics of Belgium—as I have done for twelve months—can have any illusion as to the religious sentiments of the Liberals and Socialists. A very few of them may return to the Church when death approaches, but the overwhelming majority are irrecoverable seceders from

Catholicism. To support their political authority is regarded as a deadly sin—far more serious than the omission of mass. Yet of the men of the country over the age of twenty-six (only a small minority being unenfranchised, besides the criminal class) more than one-half have passed to these anathematised bodies and quitted the Church. To what extent their families are with them in the rebellion may be gathered from the fact that the organisation of Socialist children in Belgium is twice as large as the same organisation in Socialistic Germany! The Freethinkers of Belgium also carry their wives and children with them to a great extent. The youth of the country (between sixteen and twenty-six) is notoriously anticlerical in its adolescent way, at least in the towns and the Walloon districts. No one will claim that the women and children are divided in anything like the same proportion as the men, but we shall be well within the mark if we say that of the 7,000,000 inhabitants of Belgium to-day some 2,500,000 stand entirely outside the Catholic Church.

Nor must it be supposed that in this I am applying a somewhat stringent test and denying the name of Catholic to any but the really devout. I am counting as seceders only those who flout the most solemn appeals of the Church, and who are unlikely even to die in its communion. In 1893 I was sent by my English ecclesiastical authorities to spend a year in Belgium, chiefly to follow a course of Oriental languages at Louvain University, and I had an exceptionally good opportunity to study its religious life. As far as the better-educated class is concerned, the Catholics were in a hopelessly small minority. There were four universities in the country. Two of them—at Ghent and Liège—are the old State universities for the north and south of the country. As I explained,

the Catholics founded a sectarian university at Louvain (or Leuven) in Catholic Flanders, and the Liberals established a thoroughly "Liberal" university at Brussels. But the universities of Ghent and Liège are hardly less Liberal, and Catholic families in good circumstances are strictly enjoined to send their young men to Louvain. In the year that I spent there some 1500 to 1600 attended its courses. This was a little more than a fourth of all the university students of the country, and the proportion reflects faithfully enough the proportion of normal Catholics in the middle class. But even here it was quite evident that at least one-third were merely nominal Catholics, and the Church had no real authority over them. A Louvain priest, who knew them well, told me that about a third of them did not go to mass on Sundays, and it needed no close observation to discover that the clerical officers of the university had to give them a loose rein in order to retain even this nominal fidelity.¹

Of the peasantry and the working-class I naturally saw little, but the little was astonishing. In the Flemish provinces the overwhelming majority of the peasants—though the minority is larger than it is sometimes represented to be—are still Catholic. The Flemings are of a more bovine character than the French-speaking Walloons. They are still largely illiterate, and, even when literate, read little. The superstitions of six centuries ago linger amongst them to a remarkable extent. In the Flemish towns, however, Liberalism has quite its customary propor-

¹ There were not residential colleges (except for the clergy), as at Oxford or Cambridge. The 1500 lay students (of law, medicine, engineering, brewing, etc.) lodged as they pleased in the town. The reader will, if he cares, find a fuller account of my experiences in Belgium in my "Twelve Years in a Monastery," ch. vii.

tion of the middle class, and Socialism is making great progress among the workers. English tourists often form their estimate of the religious life of Belgian towns on the picturesque demonstrations that are held in the streets at certain festivals, in which the whole town seems to be absorbed. I took part in one at Louvain, on the Fête Dieu, when the whole body of students and professors, civic dignitaries and notables, and troops, formed an imposing procession before the Sacrament. None of my Belgian colleagues would have hesitated to admit that at least one-third of the demonstrators could hardly be credited with a belief in the Sacrament. At Hasselt, where a miraculous statue of the Virgin in the charge of my own colleagues evoked stupendous demonstrations of piety every few years, my colleagues freely told me that Liberal tradesmen and civic officials were amongst the most zealous promoters of the pilgrimages—and the most ample profitters by them.

In the towns we were commonly insulted in terms that, though I knew little Flemish, were expressive enough. Our shaven polls and sandalled feet and quaint brown frocks—I was a monk of the Order of St Francis—rarely failed to provoke ridicule in the towns and an embarrassing adoration in the country; the gibes of the young and the prostrations of the aged. Brussels I was not allowed to visit, on the ground that my costume would provoke too lively a demonstration in that Catholic capital. But I had an insight into the life of the Walloon district that told me much more than statistics could do, and fully accords with the political life.

It is usually said that in Belgium the peasants and the nobles are—as in Austria—Catholics, the professional and tradesmen Liberals, and the artisans Socialists. My acquaintance—an intimate one—was

with the Walloon peasantry (with a fair sprinkling of Flemish), and much moderated my idea of their fidelity. During the Easter vacation in 1894 I spent a few weeks in a monastery near Waterloo, and was persuaded to assist in the sacerdotal work. My constituency included a distinguished noble family, whose orthodoxy I have no reason to suspect, and a very large village, together with a good deal of the "free lance" work in which a monk is indulged. I found that, amongst the peasantry, not only indifference, but hostility, to religion was extremely widespread. Their clergy had the greatest difficulty in keeping them to their religious duties, and several hundred (out of, if I remember rightly, less than 2000) would make no Easter communion at all. I found men—not vicious men at all—on the point of death who violently refused to see their parochial clergy, and who were only induced with great difficulty to receive the last sacraments from me. From my then point of view, and after experience in London, the spectacle was appalling.

There can be no question whatever that at least a third of Belgium is lost to the Church, and a great deal of the remainder is attached by bonds so frail that the future is certain to see a continuance of the loss. The peasantry are awakening; it is the plaint of some Liberals—a strange reversal of history—that the Church itself is awakening them, and that, as they awake, they are caught by the glitter of Socialism. Nominal Catholicism will not stand the strain. Already the Socialist party polls the largest vote it has in any country (after Finland), in proportion to the population, and the Freethinkers, under the eloquent Belgian lawyer, M. Furnemont, have a powerful party. The future is very dark for the Church. It holds its tenure of authority only until a working

agreement is made between the Liberals and the Socialists, or until the latter have maintained their growth for a few more years. Then the Belgian Church will break up, just as the sister Church did in France.

And finally, one of the chief causes of the undoing of the Belgian Church will be precisely the same as one of the main reasons for its downfall in France. I refer to the monastic bodies. For more than half-a-century they have drawn hostile looks from all classes. It is about fifty years since the anticlericals first began to pay alarming attention to their wealth. The difficulty of assigning any owner to their property—a difficulty that inspires whole chapters of entertaining perplexity in their canonists, and has to be left unsolved—seemed to offer an excellent ground for State appropriation without the shadow of injustice. The Pope (whose decrees I have quoted in the chapter on France) at once instructed the monks to swear on oath that “notwithstanding their solemn vow of poverty they intended from the first to acquire the property in the ordinary way of civil ownership.” The audacity baffled their opponents, but the deferring of the account is only adding to its length. Wilmotte observes that the landed property of the monks and nuns of Liège was officially valued at 4,500,000 francs in 1866, and is appraised at 18,044,201 francs to-day. Guyot says that there were 779 convents (with 11,968 inmates) in Belgium in 1846, and 2221 convents (with 37,684 inmates) in 1900. They have 730,000,000 francs’ worth of landed property, and their furniture, etc., is valued at 300,000,000; while they hold 1,030,000,000 francs’ worth of property through *prête-noms*.

Against this monstrous accumulation both workers and capitalists have a rising indignation. They know,

too, that the bulk of the inmates of the monasteries lead idle and useless lives, and the support of most of them is an imposition on the ignorant peasantry or a futile absorption of unwise foundations. I will only say on this point that, if my close acquaintance with one of the chief monastic bodies in Belgium warrants an opinion, the country will be well rid of them. A few lead useful lives, according to their ideals, and a few lead high-ordered lives; the bulk of them are coarse, sensual, lazy and scandalously ignorant.

It cannot be many years before a Combes and a Combist party come to power in Belgium. The country is rapidly ripening for them. It is no longer "a Catholic country" except in the sense that about half its men and the greater part of its women and children are Catholic. But most of them are Catholic only in virtue of the momentum of a long-unquestioned tradition, and the modern challenge of it is ringing through all their towns and echoing in their villages. The movement amongst them sufficiently shows that they will answer as France has answered.

CHAPTER XIII

THE GERMANIC WORLD—HOLLAND

A DISTINGUISHED Dutch journalist with whom I one day discussed the plan of the present work observed: "It may be that you will find a loss in some countries, but I assure you that the Roman Catholics are gaining ground in Holland." My friend was a Liberal, and a whole-hearted opponent of the Roman claims. He did but repeat the statement that probably most Dutch writers who had not made a close inquiry into its accuracy would have repeated. But I had met the illusion too often to be influenced by it. I had heard it made by English writers, American writers, and German writers, about their respective countries; and I remembered listening to the same plaintive story in the heart of Switzerland. Yet we have seen that in all these countries there has been an immense loss, and that the leakage continues more rapidly than ever.

The root of the fallacy is simple. These are all predominantly Protestant lands, and any growth of Catholicism in them at once attracts the attention of their neighbours. They do not reflect that Catholicism *must* grow—or else it is rapidly decaying. It has a birth-rate, usually an exceptionally high birth-rate, that should double its numbers in less than two generations. In Catholic lands the growth does not strike the eye, because there are no non-Catholic areas into which the new Catholic colonies must shoot. In Protestant countries the new chapel, or

the doubled congregation, is at once remarked. The elders tell how there were in their youth only one or two Catholic chapels where there are now four or five; and few seem to reflect that this is a quite natural increase, and implies no proselytism whatever. Moreover, the earlier Catholic chapels were usually built on sparse resources, and accommodated only what they must at the time. So, even when Catholicism is advancing only at half the pace it ought to do—is, in other words, losing heavily—they note only that it advances at all, and are disinclined to hear of leakage.

This fallacy has naturally occurred to the Dutch mind, but we shall see that is as groundless in regard to Holland as we found it in regard to Switzerland. Indeed, as positive figures will show, there is even less ground for it in the case of Holland. But I will first glance very briefly at the causes why there is a Catholic body at all in Protestant Holland.

In the previous chapter I told how the united Netherlands were in the hands of Philip of Spain at the time of the Reformation, and how the northern provinces avidly embraced the new doctrines. All the ferocity of Alva's troops could not stifle the heroic temper of the Dutch, and the struggle ended in their independence. The southern provinces, including some that were later incorporated into Holland, remained under Spanish and Austrian rule, and were guarded by the Inquisition. The story is reflected in the religious statistics to-day. Friesland, Groningen and Drenthe, in the extreme north, are overwhelmingly Protestant. The eastern provinces are one-fourth Catholic; the central provinces one-third; and the two southern provinces, North Brabant and Limburg, which were part of Austrian Belgium, are overwhelmingly Catholic. Dr Kuiper

explains, in his "*Geschiedenis van het Godsdienstig leven van het Nederlandsche Volk*" (1903), that the Catholics made no progress in Holland until the French Revolution. The French, as elsewhere, fastened upon the reluctant people the maxim of liberty and equality, and decreed religious freedom, in 1795. They planted in Holland those germs of Liberalism that were later to grow into a formidable enemy of clericalism, but for the moment they gave a stimulus to Catholic expansion.

We have seen that, on the settling of the Napoleonic chaos, the Protestant rulers returned to Holland, and the Belgian provinces were added to their kingdom. Gallingly as the rule was to the Catholic Flemings, it gave advantages to the Catholic Dutch. From Limburg and Brabant, especially, they penetrated into the central provinces, and helped to form a substantial minority. We may, in fact, usefully start our inquiry into their fortunes during the nineteenth century from the census of 1829, the year before the secession of the Belgians from Orange rule. We have, luckily, ample figures to test the strength of Catholicism in each decade, and, as in the case of other predominantly Protestant countries that have had a fixed Catholic population from the beginning of the nineteenth century, the question of percentage is important. The usual law of increase in such circumstances holds good; the Catholics have, particularly in the last few decades, a higher birth-rate than the Protestants, and should have some slight increase of their percentage from decade to decade.

I may say at once that, instead of increase, we find a notable decrease. In the year 1829 there were in the present Dutch provinces 1,544,887 Protestants and 1,019,109 Roman Catholics; the Protestants formed 59.11 per cent. of the population, and the

Catholics 38·99. During the following two decades the Protestant percentage slightly increased, and the Catholics slightly fell. After that date the school controversy began to animate the political world. The Liberals had forced a revision of the constitution in 1848, and one of the new measures was the enforcement of elementary instruction. Sectarian schools were allowed to be set up side by side with the national schools, and Catholic life was somewhat invigorated by the new interest that was thrust upon it. The Liberals were at this period more occupied in fighting the Conservative Protestants (or Anti-revolutionaries, as they are still called), and indeed to some extent they had the support of the Catholics. They promised the Catholics full liberty to exercise and propagate their religion, while the Orthodox party threatened to curtail this.

Nevertheless, the Catholic percentage fell still more between 1849 and 1869, and the Protestant percentage increased to a corresponding extent. There was obviously a serious leakage from the Catholic to the Protestant Church. The "Old Catholics" had taken some 5000 from them, but these are always (and quite wrongly) counted with the Catholics. They had fallen from 38·99 per cent. of the population in 1829 to 36·68 in 1869. That indicates a loss of about 100,000, or nearly a twelfth of their body, and the seceders must have gone over to Protestantism or Liberalism. From that time onward the Dutch Catholics have had the usual incentives to organise; the fight over the Vatican decrees with the seceding Old Catholics, the destruction of the Pope's temporal power, and the echoes of the German Kulturkampf, became so many inspiring themes in the mouths of their pastors.

The Catholics of Holland had, moreover, an

especial stimulus to organisation and activity. Their amiable co-operation with the Liberals came to an end in 1868. It is said that the consciousness of their increased strength dictated this resolution. They had certainly not duly increased in numbers, but no doubt the political experience they had acquired would support their decision; nor would either they or the Liberals maintain much cordiality after the publication of the Syllabus by Pius IX. Whatever the immediate occasion was, they now sided commonly with the Antirevolutionaries against the Liberals, and began to return their own members (acting in conjunction with the Protestants), and work for the abrogation of the Liberal school law of 1857. In the southern provinces—Brabant was Catholic to the extent of 97 per cent.—they used the local authority virtually to transform the national schools into sectarian.

I need not pursue their figures decade by decade. It is enough to note that, in spite of their political and philanthropic activity, in spite of the fact that the Protestant birth-rate was now appreciably lessening, the Catholic percentage continued to fall steadily. There were at the last census (1899) 1,790,161 Catholics in an entire population of 5,104,137. Their percentage had fallen from nearly 39 in the year 1829 to 36·68 in 1869, and then to 35·0 at the end of the century. In a word, their percentage of the population of Holland has fallen by four units in the course of the last seventy years. It is quite true that there are now 104,000 Jews and 115,000 professed Freethinkers in Holland. These make up 4 per cent. of the total, or 2 per cent. more than they did in 1829. But the important point is that the Protestant percentage, for all their lower birth-rate, is slightly *higher* than it was in 1829.

The loss has been entirely on the Catholic side, and it has been very considerable. To put it more clearly, if the Catholics had maintained their percentage, as the Protestants have done, they should number to-day 1,990,600. As a fact, they fall short of that by more than 200,000. That is the very lowest measure of their loss. In view of their high birth-rate the loss is more probably 300,000.

Beyond any controversy, then, there has been not growth, but considerable loss, on the part of the Dutch Catholics. They have failed to retain several hundred thousands of their born supporters; and the leakage is just as great in the last decade of the century as in the preceding decades. The official census figures show this to any who care to analyse them. It is curious how Dutch writers so often fail to notice this. "Conversions to the Catholic Church," says Dr Kuiper in his "*Geschiedenis van het Godsdienstig leven*" (p. 725), "are rare, and Roman Catholic immigrants from Belgium and the Rhine Provinces of Germany do not greatly increase their number." So Professor De la Saussaye, in that admirable review of Dutch life, "*Eene Halve Eeuw*": "Catholics of late years have become more prominent in social and political life, though they have not increased in numbers." Neither writer observes that they have really lost a sixth of their supporters in the course of sixty or seventy years. Dr Juraschek, in his "*Staaten Europas*," notices this loss.

Thus far the census figures themselves take us, but we have invariably found that the loss revealed by the census percentages is only a fraction of the whole. Probably the best way to check the figures will be, as in the case of Belgium, to examine the results of recent elections. The Catholics have their own

parliamentary candidates, and, where these fail, support the Protestant Antirevolutionaries. For the last forty years, Liberals have been regarded in the light of the Syllabus, and it has been accounted a sin to support them. Yet in the face of this united Protestant-Catholic opposition the Liberals have held power almost continuously since 1848. It must not, of course, be imagined that there is a clear division between the Protestants and the Liberals. Dutch theology has admitted a great deal of advanced thought, and the ranks of the Liberals include large numbers who will certainly maintain the title of Christian and Protestant. The Antirevolutionaries are the more Conservative body of the Reformed Church. But in the case of the Catholics the division into Progressives and Conservatives is violently repudiated. No doubt, many have voted either Liberal or Socialist at recent elections, but they are either nominal Catholics only, or belong to that fringe of the Catholic body where seceders are most numerous. We may, therefore, look to the political situation with confidence for further enlightenment on the strength of the Roman Church.

Until the year 1887 the franchise was very restricted, and the electoral struggles merely reflect the temper of the middle class. In 1886, for instance, the Liberals secured forty-seven seats, and their united opponents thirty-nine (though the latter had 53,826 votes to the former 47,613). In the following year the electorate was nearly trebled, but it was still very narrow, and the Liberals continued to enjoy power. But the inevitable split now took place in the Liberal ranks, and had the familiar consequence. A number of issues, such as the suffrage question and the colonial policy, developed the latent antagonism of Whigs, Liberals and Radicals. Dr Tak, one of the

ablest members of the Liberal cabinet, introduced a very wide enfranchising measure, and the historic party went to pieces, in the storm that ensued. At the election of 1894 the two Liberal factions still overpowered the clericals. The franchise was now extended, and Catholics and Protestants prepared with great confidence for the election of 1897, when they expected to annihilate the *bourgeois* Liberal party with the aid of the enfranchised workers. The issue was nominally Free Trade or Protection; but as the election approached, and the activity and expectations of the clericals attracted attention, it became in the main a struggle of Liberals and clericals. Nearly every literate and self-supporting male now had the vote, and the result was expected with the liveliest interest.

For us the result contains a good deal of instruction in regard to the strength of Catholicism in Holland. Forming, nominally, more than a third of the nation, and having an overwhelming predominance in two large provinces, it should command a good proportion of the electorate; and the clergy were particularly active in preparing for the election of 1897. Yet, on the increased poll, and with the friendly co-operation of the Protestants, the Catholics lost three seats. The divided Liberals lost ten seats, but the spoil fell to the Protestants and Socialists; the Catholic group fell to twenty-two, or little more than one-fifth of the States-General. The number of votes I have not the opportunity of seeing, but I learn from the "Nieuve Tijd" that the Liberals and Socialists polled 170,000 votes, and the combined clericals 190,000. As the Protestant and Catholic deputies were equal in number, we may divide the vote. The Catholics thus turn out only about one-fourth of the electorate, and claim to be 35 per cent. of the nation.

The division of the Liberals became more pronounced than ever. The democrats and the Socialists started separate parties, and the election of 1901 found the united clericals facing three hostile progressive bodies. The result was that the Liberals were defeated, and the leader of the chief Protestant group, Dr Kuiper, formed a ministry, in which he included several Catholics. The Catholics secured twenty-five seats and the Protestants thirty-one, while their opponents only obtained forty-two. However, according to the figures in the "Nieuve Tijd," the clericals had secured less *votes* than ever, and the anticlericals more than ever. The Catholic and Protestant vote was only 180,557. The Liberal and Socialist 180,959. Nor was the fictitious advantage of the clericals maintained at the next (and last) election. They had again attempted to tamper with education, and the Liberal forces partly united, and threw them out of power. I have not the voting strength of the various parties, but the Liberals again secured forty-five seats and the Socialists seven; while the Protestants lost sixteen, and the Catholics remained as they were.

The political test, therefore, shows that the Catholic number about one-fourth of the electorate. It is difficult to imagine that they really number 35 per cent. of the population in such circumstances, but no more precise tests are available. We must be content to grant them 1,790,161 nominal adherents in Holland, and take their serious drop in percentage since 1829 to mean a clear loss of 300,000.

CHAPTER XIV

RUSSIA

IN the course of the last section I had occasion to point out an aspect of the Vatican's losses that is too often overlooked. If Ireland had prospered, the Vatican would have to-day a nation of 18,000,000 followers (besides the Protestants) within its confines, instead of the 3,000,000 distressed and resourceless adherents that it actually has. When we turn to Poland, we find the Ireland of the East. If Poland had prospered—if Poland had but retained the territory it held as late as 1770, and enjoyed a moderate prosperity—it would form to-day a Roman Catholic nation of about 50,000,000 souls, besides heretics and schismatics. By the evil fortune that has fallen on those two passionately Catholic races, the Church of Rome has, in little more than a century, lost fully 40,000,000 devoted followers.

This is not the place to enter into transcendental inquiries into that evil fortune. I will only recall a Catholic apologetic work of the end of the eighteenth century that one reads with something like amusement to-day. A Spanish priest, Father Balmez, wrote a learned and really able work to prove that Catholicism promoted civilisation, while Protestantism retarded and menaced it. He wrote in an hour when the great Catholic nations still held the field—when Spain still seemed to prosper, and France dominated one half of Europe and Austria the other; when England alone of the Protestant peoples offered them serious rivalry. What a change has come over the

fortunes of the race since that time! The Holy Roman Empire is dead, and shrunken Austria is threatened with dissolution. The papal monarchy is dead, and Italy is half lost to the Church. France is no longer a Catholic country. Spain is stripped of the last tatters of her empire, and her whole literature is steeped in melancholy. Portugal is bankrupt. Poland is trodden under the heel of the Muscovite. The Protestant peoples overspread the globe. What an answer to the proud Catholic argument of Balmez, which was once so much treasured! But I must leave this kind of procedure to the Protestant controversialist, and return to sociological considerations.

In order to appreciate the position of the Church of Rome in Russia we must understand well what Poland was in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and what, with good fortune, she might have been to-day. The Reformation had at first made great progress in Poland. The cultural prestige of Bohemia attracted large numbers of Polish youths in the fifteenth century, and Hussite preachers returned with them and worked with great success. The usual theme, of the corruption of the Catholic clergy, did not lack illustration in Poland. Lutherans and Calvinists came in turn. By the middle of the eighteenth century the greater part of the Poles had rejected Catholicism. The nobles especially embraced the new doctrines, with the feeling that the change of faith accentuated their self-assertion in opposition to the monarchy. The feudal system was still in vigour, and the nobles not only jealously preserved their power, but controlled the submissive serfs as they willed. Before long, however, the somnolent clergy awoke, and called in the brilliant agents of the counter-reformation, the Jesuits. It was not difficult for the followers of St Ignatius to convince the nobles

that the doctrines of the Reformers were dangerously democratic, and they brought the serfs back to the Roman obedience.

The pitiful story of that long and effective persecution of heretics and schismatics does not concern us here.¹ It is enough to note that it lasted well into the second half of the eighteenth century. By that time the glory had entirely departed from the land of Sobieski, but it was still a large and overwhelmingly Catholic country. Its chief Catholic historian, Father Theiner (*"Die neuesten Zustände der Katholischen Kirche in Polen und Russland,"* 1841), says that in 1768 "the Poles were a strong and wholly Catholic nation of nearly 21 million souls." I must confess to a serious difficulty in reconciling the confused statements of Father Theiner and his followers. He speaks at one moment of 12,000,000 Greek Uniates, and at another moment of "between 13 and 14 million adherents of the State Church" (Roman Catholic); while his modern successor, Father Lescoeur (*"L'Eglise Catholique et le Gouvernement Russe,"* 1903) says that there were 12,000,000 Latin and Greek Catholics, 4,000,000 Greek Schismatics, and 2,000,000 Jews and Mohammedans. From all the conflicting statements it seems safe to conclude that there were about 14,000,000 Latin and Greek Catholics (all subject to Rome) and about 5,000,000 Greek Orthodox (subject to the Russian Church) and Protestants. If this nation had held together, the Vatican would, as I said, have a powerful body of more than 40,000,000 Slav followers to-day. From the wreck of this promising Church it has not saved 20,000,000.

¹ See, especially, Krause's "Die Reformation und Gegen-Reformation in Poland" (1901), Heard's "Russian Church and Russian Dissent" (1887) and Neale's "History of the Eastern Church."

How the catastrophe came about I have already explained in part, and will now briefly outline the story. Poland had fallen into senile decrepitude under the guidance of the Jesuits (whom it finally expelled), and two powerful and not very scrupulous neighbours held consultations with regard to the "sick man." Frederick of Prussia expressed concern about the harsh treatment of the Protestants in Lithuania, and Catherine II. of Russia intervened on behalf of the Greek schismatics. Nothing would arrest the bigotry and intolerance of the Catholic clergy, whom the government was not strong enough to check, and Poland was coolly dismembered. In three successive partitions Russia, Prussia and Austria took away nearly the whole of its provinces. The Napoleonic interlude altered the map for a time, but the Council of Vienna in 1815 substantially confirmed the partitions. It left standing only a tiny republic at Cracow, that presently fell into the jaws of Austria; and a shrunken kingdom under Russian suzerainty, which was afterwards fully incorporated in the Tsar's dominions. How the Poles fared in Prussia and Austria we have seen. They have lost heavily in Prussia, but add to-day between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 to the Catholic population of the German Empire. In Austria their creed was sheltered, and the Latin and Greek Catholics of earlier Poland now have some 6,000,000 descendants in Galicia. It remains to consider the fate of the remainder under Russian rule.

We may first inquire into the fortunes of the Greek Uniates, who formed a very large part of the Polish population at the time of the first partition. The eastern provinces had been wrested from Russia in the days of Poland's glory, and were mainly peopled with communities that followed the Greek rite. Most of them acknowledged the authority of Rome, and

were known on that account as the Greek (sometimes, Ruthenian) Uniates. They were originally part of the Russian Church, but in 1595 the Jesuits, failing to bring Russia into union with Rome, fell back upon these Polish provinces, and had the satisfaction of securing the "conversion" of the whole hierarchy with 11,000,000 followers. It seems that the Greek prelates had in view certain material and very secular advantages, which were held out to them, and, as the promises were not fulfilled, they and millions of their followers fell back to Greek Orthodoxy as easily as they had left it. When Sobieski was forced to cede the Ukraine to Russia in 1685, and their clergy passed under the obedience of Moscow, this would take place more than ever.

However, Father Theiner claims that there were 12,000,000 Uniates in Poland, Lithuania, White Russia and Galicia in the year 1771, with 17,000 priests and 251 monasteries. For this he quotes the authority of one of their chief prelates, Bishop Wolodkowicz. The fate of these Uniates is one of the most tragic experiences that the Vatican has had since the Reformation. In a word, only about 50,000 of them remain in union with the Church of Rome to-day, apart from those in Galicia. If we are to follow Father Theiner, and regard them as numbering 12,000,000 in 1771, they must number fully 40,000,000 now; and all but an insignificant remnant in Poland, and the Greek Uniates of Galicia, have passed into the Russian Orthodox Church. Father Theiner says that *eight millions* of them were captured by the Russian Church between 1773 and 1796. Certainly the official Catholic reports, which he gives, describe them as numbering only 3,500,000 about the year 1820, and on these he bases his statement of the appalling loss to the Vatican. Nearly 10,000 churches

and 145 monasteries are included in the loss. The details he gives of the tactics pursued by Catherine II. from the moment of the first partition of Poland make this credible enough. In one year (1795) the Catholic Archbishop of Mohilew reported the secession of more than 1,000,000 Ruthenes. Father Theiner is, of course, unwilling to admit that the Russian procedure was merely an imitation of the procedure hitherto employed by the Poles in the interest of Rome; but he is frank enough to admit that the cupidity of the Uniate prelates and monks, and the folly of the Roman authorities in forcing the Latin rite in the churches, greatly aided the Russian efforts.

However, we will not linger over Father Theiner's arithmetical puzzles, as this vast loss to the Vatican does not quite fall within the period of our inquiry. We have to see rather how the remnant of the Uniates and the Roman Catholics fared under Russian rule after the Council of Vienna.

The story of the Uniates is quickly told. Paul I. suspended the policy of Catherine, and gave back to them their hierarchy and large numbers of their churches. Alexander I. retained this kindlier treatment, and they thrived in peace until his death in 1825. At that time they had, according to the diocesan reports, 1985 priests, 666 monks, 1476 churches and 1,427,579 adult parishioners. But with the accession of Nicholas I. the Catherinian policy returned, and the process of complete Russification went on. For all Father Theiner's rhetoric, it seems to have been innocent enough down to 1834, as the diocesan reports in that year give them 2006 priests and 1,505,281 adult parishioners. Five years later the whole of these Uniates in Russia, with their bishops and clergy and monks, solemnly discarded the Roman allegiance and

joined the Russian Church. It was the most formidable corporate lapse from Romanism since the Reformation. As the diocesan figures do not include children under ten, the total number of seceders must have been about 2,000,000, and they must number quite 4,000,000 to-day. There remained still a diocese of 250,000 Uniates in Poland, but the drama was almost completed when 200,000 of these seceded from Rome in 1877 and 1878.

"That is all right, as regards the Uniates; now for the Latins," said Nicholas I. cheerfully to Benkendorf when the transfer was accomplished. We are concerned with the results, not the manner of their procedure. It was humane indeed compared with the devices by which papal authorities were even then attempting to stamp out heresy in Italy and Spain; and it compares favourably enough with the tactics employed by the Poles themselves when they had power.¹ It commonly consisted in transferring churches to the Russian minority on the ground that they were Orthodox in origin, offering indirect bribes to seceders, and exiling troublesome priests to Siberia. Sometimes a group of the dull-witted Catholic peasantry would be gathered together, and asked to pray for the Tsar. As they prayed, lighted candles were put in their hands; and when they had finished they were astonished to find themselves enrolled in the Orthodox Church, on the ground that they had in their prayers used candles that had been blessed by the Orthodox clergy. The Polish insurrections of 1830 and 1860 afforded a pretext for greater severity, and large numbers were transferred from Rome to Moscow. In the Wilna district alone 140 churches were confis-

¹ See A. F. Heard's "Russian Church and Russian Dissent" (1887); A. D. Kyriakos's "Geschichte des Orientalischen Kirchen" (1902), and Boissard's "Église de Russie."

cated in one year, and 4412 Catholics, in a group of parishes containing 18,000, were "converted." During the seventies, after the declaration of papal infallibility, thousands of conversions were reported every year.

What the total loss was amongst the Latin Catholics, in addition to the millions of Greek seceders, it is not easy to determine, on account of the confusion of Latins and Uniates in the earlier statistics. Some idea may be obtained in this way. The official diocesan statistics (in Theiner) give the *adult* Latin Catholics—"capaces sacramentorum"—in Russia in 1804 as 1,635,490. That means a total Catholic population—apart from Poland—of more than 2,000,000. In 1834 the *adult* population was 2,604,047: the total Catholic population would be about 3,250,000. At this rate of increase the total should be at the end of the nineteenth century more than 7,000,000. But the actual number of Roman Catholics in Russia, without Poland, at the last census was only 4,338,777. This shows a clear loss of 3,000,000 Latin Catholics on the census statistics for Russia proper.

The number of Catholics in Poland at the last census was 6,987,467. Unfortunately, I cannot find a figure for the earlier part of the century with which to compare this. The earliest exact enumeration is for the year 1870, when the Roman Catholics formed 76·1 per cent. of the population and the Greek Catholics 3·9. The latter have, as we saw, nearly disappeared and the Latin Catholics have fallen to 74·3 per cent. of the population. As the number of Orthodox Greeks in Poland has, in the same period, risen from 34,000 to 663,000, it is not difficult to infer what has happened. Father Lescœur, indeed, describes the Russians as robbing the Latin churches little less successfully than the Greek, and Neale gives positive figures of thousands of Catholic seces-

sions in single years. But in the absence of exact figures for the early decades we must refrain from claiming more than the few hundred thousand secessions that Theiner and Lescœur and Neale seem to indicate. With the loss of 3,000,000 Uniates and 3,000,000 Latins in Russia proper since 1834, we get a safe total leakage of at least 6,500,000. When one reads of the great Polish Church of 1771, with its 14,000,000 or 15,000,000 followers and more than 20,000 priests, and then reads that the Catholic Church to-day has only 11,000,000 followers in Russia one feels that this is much too modest a statement.¹ European Russia has trebled its population since the year 1800; and whereas the increase of the Russian population has averaged 74 per cent. in the last fifty years, the increase has reached 117 per cent. in Poland. One can infer what the Polish Church of 1771 ought to number to-day. Yet the whole Catholic population, Latin and Greek, of the provinces that then were Poland, does not to-day amount to 20,000,000 (including Posen, Gnesen, and Galicia).

SUMMARY FOR THE GERMANIC AND SLAVONIC WORLD

The third part of our inquiry reveals the operation of the same laws as the two preceding sections. There is no country in Europe in which Roman

¹ The figure for Russia is variously given. The figures I quote for Russia proper and Poland are from Dr Juraschek. Add 560 Roman Catholics for Finland, and the total is found to be 11,326,804. The Armenian schismatics are often wrongly added to the list. Emigration from Poland does not greatly affect the figures, and when they emigrate, the Poles, like the Irish, freely abandon the Church. In the United States there is a Polish Independent Catholic Church (hostile to Rome) with 80,000 members and twenty-four priests.

Catholicism is making progress; in every country it has to admit, by the mouth of its own representatives, very serious losses; and in almost every part of Europe the loss is proportionate to the literacy and mental activity of the population. The Catholic world in the west of Europe is in one important respect analogous to the English-speaking Catholic world. A devotedly Catholic nation has almost disappeared from the map. This catastrophe is very rarely noticed in itself, but the moment the scattered fragments reappear in a different nationality the hollow cry of progress is raised. The impartial sociological inquirer cannot fail to see that the apparent progress really reveals a disaster more serious to the Vatican than the fate of Ireland. Amongst the really Germanic peoples Catholicism has steadily decayed all through the century. Its numerical strength in western Europe is only maintained at a moderate level by the prolific growth of backward and illiterate races, that have been so largely absorbed into the German, Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires.

In tabulating the results I will add the small outstanding Catholic populations that are found in the Balkan and other small principalities, and in other countries where they are too slight in numbers to merit close analysis. For Norway, Sweden and Denmark we may accept the official figures (which I take from Dr Juraschek) without comment. The grand duchy of Luxemburg and Monaco would, no doubt, show a large proportion of merely nominal Catholicism, but the totals are too small to linger over. The Balkan provinces, with Turkey and Greece, add a larger contribution to the strength, but it is utterly unprofitable and unnecessary to inquire closely into the religious beliefs of these

illiterate communities. The Orthodox Greek and Russian Churches have, in these districts, made great inroads on the Roman jurisdiction, and at any time political changes—I need only recall recent proceedings in Bulgaria—may strike hundreds of thousands out of the Catholic total. In any case the character of the people makes an exact inquiry both impossible and superfluous. I assign the whole of the numbers officially claimed to the authority of the Vatican. The position of Rome in the rest of Europe is therefore as follows:—

COUNTRY	CATHOLIC TOTAL	CATHOLIC LOSS
German Empire	20,000,000	5,000,000
Austria-Hungary	29,000,000	4,000,000
Switzerland	1,000,000	500,000
Belgium	4,500,000	2,500,000
Holland	1,700,000	300,000
Norway, Sweden and Denmark	8,732	...
Luxemburg	232,000	...
Balkan States, Turkey and Greece	847,000	...
Russia	11,326,804	6,500,000
	68,614,536	18,800,000

CHAPTER XV

CONCLUSION

MORE than once in the course of this essay I have been led to recall the fortune of that earlier Roman Empire to which the Church of Rome in a great measure succeeded. At the close of our inquiry many a reader will instinctively revert to the parallel. By the end of the fourth century the Western Empire had so far decayed that the first serious assault from the north laid it in ruins. Yet we look in vain, in the letters of Symmachus or the conversations of cultivated patricians that Macrobius records, for a recognition of the decay in the leading Romans of the time. Here and there we get a blunt soldier like Ammianus Marcellinus breathing disgust, as he returns from the menaced frontiers to the enervation of the capital. But through nearly the whole life of the time there is a feeling of security, an opiate acquiescence in the tradition of Rome's immortality, that we can hardly understand. So it is with the life of the Church of Rome. Here and there a blunt soldier, a priest or layman awakened to the danger by his frontier war, raises a cry of alarm, but the great majority of its supporters still idly cherish the inherited belief in immortality, or even cling to the dream of imperial expansion that quickened the Catholic imagination half-a-century ago. Yet we, who stand outside, see a rapid decay eating into the foundations of every part of the Church and already showing its grim triumph over what were once flourishing provinces.

I do not for a moment suggest that the imagination may pursue the analogy further, and that at some near impending date a historian will write the dramatic story of the decline and fall of the Roman Church. It would be invidious to suggest a parallel between the Goths and Vandals and Huns that pressed on the old Roman frontiers and the Protestants, Greeks and Freethinkers that make inroads into Romanism to-day; nor would the possibilities thus suggested be quite justified. There is a far greater power of recuperation in the Church of Rome than there was in the empire of Honorius. There are easily realisable ways in which certain fatal errors may be redeemed and some of the causes of decay arrested. I will return to these possibilities presently, and only wish, for the moment, to guard against the misconstruction that the parallel with the Roman Empire may naturally prompt. In the meantime let us sum up the result of our inquiry and conceive well the actual position of the Church.

The summaries at the close of each of my three sections show a net loss to the Vatican, within the last seventy years or so, of about 80,000,000 followers. I have taken different periods for the commencement of my inquiry in different countries, because the leakage movement has varied with national and cultural circumstances. Broadly speaking, the great leakage begins with the culmination of the middle-class revolt in the revolutionary wave of the early thirties. In most countries the explicit secessions were few up to that period, though it has been necessary to describe the development of the movement. In some countries—France, for instance—there was a signal Catholic recovery, and my statement of loss belongs entirely to the last thirty or forty years. Indeed, it is probable, as the reader will

easily detect, that 50,000,000 of the loss falls within the last quarter of the nineteenth century. On the other hand, if one cares to ask what has been the total loss to the Vatican since the first revolutionary stirrings of a century and a quarter ago, the figure rises enormously. France was then wholly Catholic; Poland upheld the authority of the Vatican over a vast area of Europe where it is now almost powerless; Ireland was pouring thousands of Catholics annually into the wilderness of North America, of whom and their descendants not a tenth have been retained in the Church; and Spain held large numbers of natives in nominal allegiance to Rome, who had already fallen away at the point where I begin to tabulate the secessions.¹ We should have to add at least 20,000,000 to the total if we extended the inquiry back over those years. I have felt it to be better to restrict myself to the modern period, partly because more reliable figures are available, partly because I do not wish to include the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of seceders.

That the total loss of 80,000,000 does not mean that so many individuals have formally abandoned the Church I have made quite clear as I proceeded. Any attempt to tabulate actual secessions, and to find how many of these seceders, or of their children, were recovered, would be quite futile. The only practicable thing to do, and the point, I assume, that

¹ The earlier loss in Poland I have described. The facts as to France and Spain need no further illustration. As to North America, I have before me a letter to *The Sun* (12th February 1707), by M. J. O'Brien, showing from contemporary documents that the Irish were arriving there in thousands every year from 1720 onwards. At specific ports the numbers were given as 5600 in 1727 and 5655 in 1728. The statistics of American Catholicism that I gave show that the vast majority of these and their descendants fell away to Protestantism.

is of broadest social interest, was to discover how far the Catholic population of each country falls short by leakage of what it should be at the close of the nineteenth century. If 30,000,000 of the French were Catholic in 1875, and only 5,500,000 (at the most) are Catholic to-day, it seems plain that, allowing for the slight increase of population in France, the Church has lost 25,000,000 followers. That, at all events, is the meaning of my statement of loss; and I may add that in countries like France most of the living 25,000,000 have actually been baptised Catholic. My statement means, in brief, that, after making full allowance for conversions to Catholicism, immigration and comparative birth-rates (where there is a proved difference between the Catholic and non-Catholic), the Church of Rome was, at the end of the nineteenth century—though I have carried the figures to 1905 where it was possible—80,000,000 short of its due total entirely through secessions from its creed and authority. The actual loss is far greater. This is the *net* loss, after making allowance for all its converts.

In almost every chapter I have been able to rely on Roman Catholic writers of repute for my estimate of the loss in their several countries; though, no doubt, when Catholics find these admissions now gathered together for the first time, they will shrink in concern from the appalling statement of deficit. Anti-Catholic writers, on the other hand, will claim that I have, in view of the evidence I give, understated the Church's losses. I believe I have; but it was my desire to reach a conclusion that bore no trace of strain, and that the average impartial reader can easily gather himself from the statistics and authorities I have quoted. It must be remembered that the *largest* statements of loss in my account are based on the most positive figures, and cannot be questioned. France, Great

Britain, the United States and Russia account for nearly 50,000,000 of the total loss. In each of these cases the result is not a matter of estimate at all, but of exact statistical analysis; and I should have had the support of very high authorities, even Catholic authorities, if I had put the loss for these countries much higher. To France I allow a Catholic population 50 per cent. larger than that claimed by Sabatier; for the United States I assign a loss 50 per cent. lower than several American Catholic writers admit; for Russia I have claimed the minimum that the positive figures yield. In the other chief instances of loss—Italy, Spain, Spanish America, Germany, Austria and Belgium—my conclusion is less rigorous in form. To an extent it is based on dwindling percentages, in conjunction with a high birth-rate, which evince an indisputable loss of millions. To a further extent it is based on political data to which we must assign the grave importance which the Church itself attaches to the political fidelity of its followers in lands where there is a definite Catholic party. Only to a slight extent have I relied on literary and other indications on which judgment may differ. This it is imperative to note. I do not dogmatise in presenting a positive statement of the Church's loss, but merely put together the plain and indisputable indications, and then further suggest the conclusion that seems to be warranted where exact figures fail. No doubt a few neutral students will differ from me to the extent of a few millions, but I feel sure they will differ in the sense of saying that I have submitted too modest an estimate of the Church's loss in Italy, Spain and Spanish America.

Nor must the reader imagine that I have held too rigorous a conception of what is or is not a Roman Catholic. I have not attempted to strike off every

man who does not go to church every Sunday. Where church attendance has been used as a test it has been taken generously, and allowance has been made for casual absentees. But I decline to regard as a Catholic one who never goes to mass or Easter communion, or who habitually supports political parties that are sternly condemned by, and openly hostile to, the Church. Where there is obviously neither belief nor obedience to commands that, on the most familiar Catholic principles, bind under pain of eternal damnation, I do not see how a census declaration that one is a Roman Catholic can be taken seriously. Our experience has been, in so many instances, that such a declaration merely means that one is neither Protestant nor Jew. At the same time, the reader must not imagine that I have struck off all who do thus habitually neglect mass. Only in a few cases have we the exact figures of churchgoers. Wherever we had them, we found that they cut down the nominal Catholic population to an alarming extent. It is probable that if we had an exact return of the average number of churchgoers in Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain and Spanish America, we should have to add many more million seceders to the list.

With this reserve, therefore, I proceed to state the actual number of Roman Catholics in the world. The totals at the conclusion of each section amount, together, to 188,650,230. I do not for a moment suggest that all these are "practising Catholics." If that test of real Catholicism could be applied over Central and Spanish America, for instance, we should see a great shrinkage of the figure. I have merely put down all the Catholics claimed where I had not positive grounds for lowering the figure; and the vastness of my subject entitles me to some leniency. To these, however, we must add the total of Roman

Catholics on the foreign missions. I have already included India and the Philippines and other countries that properly belong to this group, and the inquiry we made into the Indian figures warned us to take such figures with discretion. We saw that even the official census was enormously below the Catholic claim. Farther India claims 948,820 converts; a figure which is, no doubt, similarly inflated, but the whole question of these mission statistics is too elusive to repay strict inquiry.¹

In China proper the Catholics claim to have 720,540 converts. As the Jesuit missionaries there had 300,000 converts in the seventeenth century, we might be prepared to entertain this result of the enormous labours and expenditure of the nineteenth century. But Protestant missionaries, and even such impartial authorities as Sir Robert Hart, would have us hesitate in interpreting these figures. One quotation will suffice to indicate that we must regard them as we did the figures for India. *The Church of England Missionary Society's Report for 1899* says (p. 329): "It is now a very common practice for men whose sole object is to plunder, to avoid paying their debts, and to escape punishment by the authorities, to place their names as Romanists on the register of the Roman Catholic Church. They are then entitled to the protection of the Romish priest and bishop, and of the French Consul; and can, and do, commit acts of violence with impunity." These things have

¹ Besides that very contradictory figures are offered us. Cardinal Vaughan (*Ency. Brit.* supplementary edition) gives 783,237 for Farther India and Indo-China. *The Statesman's Year Book* gives 893,234. The *Encyclopedia of Missions* gives 948,829. The anti-Catholic writer may reasonably complain that I take the most generous figure. In almost all the other cases I pass over Cardinal Vaughan's smaller figures, and admit the larger ones in other writers; though Cardinal Vaughan wrote in the closing years of the nineteenth century.

had much to do with the anti-Christian riots of the Chinese—one of the most tolerant of nations. In Japan, where also material benefit somewhat complicates the spiritual change, and where it is common for a man to have at least two religions (Shinto and Buddhism), the Church will hardly claim great progress. The Jesuits had 600,000 converts there in 1582, and the modern Catholics are chiefly found in the old centres. The *Encyclopedia of Missions* gives them as numbering 53,400, but as one of the most recent missionary writers says ("The Christian Faith in Japan"): "It is difficult to obtain reliable figures, especially in the case of the Roman missions." In Korea they claim 32,200 followers; in Java 49,800; in the Pacific Islands, 109,388; in Africa (besides those we have given) about 200,000.¹ It is useless to discuss these figures. Altogether they yield a total of 2,114,148 for the foreign missions, besides those we have included in previous chapters. Let us add them *en bloc* to the Catholic total, which will then stand at 190,764,378.

But this grand total of membership of the Roman Catholic Church has now to be examined from the point of view of cultural value. The childish practice of "counting heads" no longer finds the favour it did. The serious social student looks to quality rather than quantity, and in the present inquiry this is peculiarly necessary. The immense losses that the Church of Rome has sustained have had many causes, but our inquiry has made it clear that popular education has been one of the most serious of these. Where a large Catholic population, like that of Ireland or Poland, has been taken out of its narrow groove, and has made acquaintance with other religions, the effect

¹ According to the *Encyclopedia of Missions*, from Catholic sources. Secular authorities always give lower numbers.

has been disastrous. Where a nation, like the French, the Italian, the Spanish, or the Spanish-American, has been liberated somewhat from the mist of dense ignorance, there has been the same disastrous result. The new enlightenment and freedom of the mass of the people is the chief cause of the great revolt in Catholic countries. If, therefore, any large proportion of the Vatican's following still awaits the inevitable shock of this first enlightenment the outlook is dark for Roman authority.

On this point I have only to sum up the statements as to cultural condition that I have made as we proceeded. Of the Vatican's 190,000,000 followers more than 120,000,000 are illiterate. That grave statement is fully borne out by the references to cultural condition that I have made throughout the work. The reader may indeed be reconciled to it at once by glancing back at the chapters on the Latin world. There he will find that southern Italy, where the bulk of the Italian Catholics are found, is illiterate to the extent of 70 per cent., Spain to nearly the same extent, and Portugal to the extent of 78 per cent.; and, as the majority of the literates have seceded, the Catholic percentage of illiteracy rises much higher still. This accounts for 35,000,000 illiterate Catholics. Then there are 48,000,000 in Spanish America whom it is more than polite to describe as illiterate. Half of them are only imperfectly civilised. We have next the Catholics of Russia, and the Slavonic communities of Austria-Hungary and the Balkan States—most of them illiterate to an extent varying between 75 and 80 per cent. The Latins and Slavs alone furnish more than 100,000,000 illiterate followers of the Vatican (if we include the Spanish Americans); and with these we must associate most of the Asiatic and African Catholics. For the other countries I allow

the official rates of illiterates; with due regard to such circumstances as the lower literacy of the Catholic than the Protestant cantons of Switzerland, the illiteracy of Catholic immigrants into the United States, and the great preponderance of the peasantry in the Catholic population of Austria, Belgium, Germany and France.

This rapid survey will show the reader at once that the terrible figure of 120,000,000 illiterates in a total of 190,000,000—a figure that, of course, I have obtained by careful analysis—is in reality a very moderate one. It means, in plain English, that the majority of the Roman Catholics of the world to-day consist of American Indians, half-castes, negroes and mulattoes; Italian, Spanish, Russian and Slavonic peasants of the most backward character; and Indian, Indo-Chinese, and African natives. These make up much more than half of the whole. Further, the great bulk of the remainder are the peasants and poor workers of Germany, Austria, France, Belgium and Ireland. The seceders from Rome we found to be literate in such a very high proportion that the contrast between faithful and unfaithful must have a very different complexion for the social observer from that which the Church petulantly seeks to put on it. Indeed, this aspect of Catholicism is perhaps the most important of all. When we note the extraordinary impotence of Catholicism in the great cities of Europe; when we learn, in country after country, that the middle class forsook it a generation ago, and the artisans are abandoning it to-day; when we find its authority rejected almost in proportion as a nation is touched with culture; and when we see that its larger tracts of unchallenged authority so constantly correspond with the darker areas in the cultural map of the world—we see that its power

rests largely on a basis that is directly and triumphantly challenged by the modern spirit—a basis of ignorance.

Thus the decay of the Church of Rome is likely to continue with unabated speed, unless there is some revolution in its policy. The Vatican is confronted with two grave dilemmas to-day, or will be so confronted when the pathetic figure of Pius X. has passed away, and a statesman comes to the throne. The first dilemma is in regard to culture, the second in regard to politics.

Without entering into theological considerations I may submit that for people of any culture the Roman theology, the most ample and conservative epitome of medieval beliefs, is no longer possible except there be granted a broad liberty of interpretation in a symbolic sense. One has only to note the fact that, with more than 100,000,000 followers in the civilised world, the Catholic Church is singularly poor in representatives in the front line of culture; and when its Mivarts and its Actons die we learn on what terms they held the Catholic creed. But I have fully illustrated this in the chapter on English Catholicism. Under Pius X. this liberty will not be granted, and the cultural level will sink lower and lower. The modernists will carry on their spirited fight with the Vatican, but if the present *régime* last long enough they will be driven out, or coerced into silence. They have been betrayed by thousands of priests whom they know, and many of us know, to be in complete sympathy with them. But the next *régime*, especially if it come in time to have Vannutelli as its leader, will undo the mischief, and cultured exiles will return to the Church in hundreds.

But the dilemma arises when one thinks what the effect of the change will be on the less cultivated

followers. They have not the subtlety of culture, and will be apt to see only that dogmas that were supported with the penalty of damnation a few years before may now be cavalierly rejected. They will see that the supreme head, or heads, of the Church made a profound and disastrous blunder. They will realise that the claim of infallibility was an elaborate myth—the papacy a lath painted to look like iron. The grim arsenal of the Vatican will turn out, as did that of China some decades ago, to consist of wooden imitations of guns and painted dragons and innocent crackers. The change will surely come. Either of the Italian candidates will concede it—one openly, the other discreetly—and Germany and America will discover their power. But the change will come too late for Catholics to have an esoteric and an exoteric creed. The cultural line is not now sharp enough the swarm and persistency of journals too great. Hence the dilemma is a really grave one, and even the inevitable and proper decision to grant liberty will reduce the dimensions while it improves the quality of the Church.

The political dilemma is even more serious. We have seen illustrations of it in so many countries that I need only recall it. Without indulging in political speculations, it is enough to note that in Germany, France, Austria, Italy, Spain, Spanish America, Belgium, Holland, and to an extent in other countries, the Catholic body is rent by a political struggle. The rulers, the wealthy and the middle class see a menace to their interests in the emergence of the proletariat in the political world. The Church had had so poor an experience of rulers and middle class that, when the idea at last became current that the proletariat had come to stay, it coquetted with democracy. Then there was hope of regaining the rulers and the

Liberals by taking the other side, and it was taken. The result has been that the Catholic workers have smiled at the Vatican's thunders, and abandoned the Church in millions. What is to be done? I venture to think that a different policy will be followed in different countries, and that the broad attitude will be in the end that the Church must cease to meddle with politics and economics. This will undoubtedly mean an enormous sacrifice of power and prestige, and the cultural opponents of the Church will be freer than ever to detach its followers. The American dream of a democratic Church is useless. The democracy does not ask its aid anywhere; the rulers do. In either event the Church will suffer further losses.

But I shrink from forecasts. It is enough to have thrown some light on the actual position of the Catholic body. If that light is too strong for the nerves of its adherents I can only say that I have not sought to give pain, but have written, without any feeling, on a question of great public interest. A first effort to survey so wide a field, and thread one's way through so many literatures, is bound to be imperfect. It is claimed only that sufficient sound material is gathered here for establishing the conclusion that the Church of Rome has been decaying rapidly throughout the nineteenth century, and the process is not in the least arrested at the beginning of the twentieth century. Such losses as those we saw in connection with Ireland and Poland, and the lapse of millions for sheer lack of priests in the United States, or under political pressure in Russia, will not recur. But new agencies are at work. The agencies that secularised France are following the same paths in Italy and Spain and Spanish America. The fight with modern culture is going unequally in Germany and the United States. Its unity torn into shreds, its clergy

coerced by an ignorant despotism and harassed by the spies of a modern Inquisition, its body so largely composed of ignorant peasants whose faith has no root in measured conviction, the outlook of the Church is as dark as the whole stretch of its history has been for the last century and a quarter.

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
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